
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DEMOCRACY AND EMPIRE

WITH STUDIES OF

THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book is the product of a nearly continuous interest which, for more than ten years, I have felt in the problems of "Democracy" and of "Empire." My studies of theoretical sociology long ago led me to believe that the combination of small states into larger political aggregates must continue until all the semi-civilized, barbarian, and savage communities of the world are brought under the protection of the larger civilized nations. I became convinced also that the future of civilization will depend largely, and perhaps chiefly, upon the predominant influence of either the English-speaking people of the world or of the Russian Empire, according as one or the other of these two gigantic powers wins the advantage in the international struggle for existence. At the same time, I remained convinced that the democratic tendencies of the nineteenth century are not likely to be checked or thwarted in our own or in future generations. Every phase of this democratic movement has strongly interested me; and I have found myself viewing it from the standpoints of industry, of politics, and of education. I could not cease my study of these problems until I had tried to see them in their mutually qualifying relations, to see how the different modes of democracy sometimes limit and sometimes strengthen one another, and to understand how it is that democracy and empire, paradoxical as such a relationship seems, are really only correlative aspects of the evolution of mankind. As a student and teacher of

sociology, I found it necessary to go even one step further, and attempt to discover the relations of these phenomena of democracy and empire to the psychology of society and to the fundamental economic and ethical motives of human effort.

The result of it all is a volume that, whatever its defects, which I know are many, may at least claim the merit of attempting to look at the problems of democracy and empire in a broad way, and with due reference to the interaction of many motives and tendencies that too often are studied by the method of isolation, with consequences of distorted view or of pessimistic feeling, not justified by fact. Inasmuch as some of the papers which follow have appeared from time to time in periodicals, while others were prepared and delivered as lectures or addresses, that have not hitherto been published, I have thought best to retain, as far as possible, their original form. In form, therefore, the volume is a collection of essays and addresses; but, in reality, it is much more. The several papers could as well have been presented as successive chapters, for they are logically related parts of a whole. A definite thesis is stated in the first paper, and a definite conclusion is reached in the last. The intermediate papers are successive steps in a continuous argument.

I wish to express my obligations to editors and publishers who have kindly permitted me to reproduce matter that has appeared in periodicals. For the convenience of students, a record of dates of publication of essays and of delivery of lectures will be found at the end of the volume.

I am under renewed obligations to my colleagues of the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. For many excellent suggestions I owe thanks to Mr. George W. Morgan, who has helped me in the preparation of manuscript, and to Mr. Arthur M. Day, who has kindly read my

proofs, but who must not be held responsible for errors that have escaped detection. My son, who made the full index for my "Principles of Sociology," has prepared for this book the less detailed index that I have deemed sufficient.

Neither this volume, nor any other of my books, could have been written in the brief intermissions of labours as varied as mine have been (both during the ten years that were given to daily newspaper work, and during the subsequent years that have been given to teaching) but for the untiring coöperation of my wife, to whom above all others I am indebted.

New York,
January, 1900.

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I

THE DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE

DEMOCRACY AND EMPIRE

I

THE DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE

The world has been accustomed to think of democracy and empire as antagonistic phenomena. It has assumed that democracy could be established only on the ruins of empire, and that the establishment of empire necessarily meant the overthrow of liberty by a triumphant reign of absolutism. Yet, in our day, we are witnessing the simultaneous development of both democracy and empire. The two most powerful nations of the world are becoming, year by year, more democratic in their local life, in their general legislation, and in their social institutions. Nevertheless, for a generation, both have been continually extending their territorial boundaries, absorbing outlying states or colonial possessions, and developing a complicated system of general or imperial administration. Not only so, but, under that government which has carried this policy to its highest perfection, the coexistence of democracy and empire has become an approximately perfect blending. Imperial Britain is not merely a combination of democracy with empire in a fortuitous association. The union is organic; the whole is a democratic empire. Not only has the home country, England, become in the last twenty-five years a highly democratic community, not only is the same thing true also of Australia and of Canada; but also in ways which, though not quite so obvious, are not less real, it is becoming true of India, of the African colonies, and of the lesser dependencies. Not only to her colonial children of English blood does England say, as Kipling puts

it, "And the Law that ye make shall be law after the rule of your lands," but practically she says the same thing also to dwellers in the Indian village community and in the islands of the sea. As long as they conform to the English sense of the sacredness of life, and to the English requirement of social order, England is willing to respect their local customs and their religious faiths, and to say to all alike, "The Law that ye make shall be law, and I do not press my will." At the same time, the imperial bond grows stronger, with the strengthening of that loyalty to the imperial throne which England requires in exchange for the protection that she extends to her dependencies and for the order that she establishes among once warring factions.

> "So long as The
> Blood endures,
> I shall know that your good is mine: ye shall feel that my
> strength is yours."

What is the explanation of this blending of democracy with empire, a thing to most minds strange and to many incredible? Like many another fact in the moral, as in the material world, it can be accounted for only through a study of its evolution.

Before the dawn of history, mankind had learned one fundamental lesson touching the conditions that render human society possible. Before any state was formed, while still the only known form of social organization was that which made blood kinship the basis of membership in the tribe, men had learned that social cohesion, practical coöperation, and unity of purpose, rest on some kind of similarity among the coöperating individuals. They were intensely alive to the importance of that "homogeneity" which has suddenly become so interesting to our modern anti-expansionists. They realized that human beings too much unlike could no more get on together peaceably than the warring elements of flood and fire could combine in nature. But their experience of homogeneity was of a narrow sort, and their ideas about it were of the most simple description. The only homogeneity of which they could form any definite conception was

that of blood relationship. Men born of the same mother — brethren in the literal sense — could understand one another, could wish the same thing, could work by like methods, and, in fine, could live together as a community. That strangers might come together and organize a stable social group — much more, that men of different tongues and races might live under one government, would have been propositions to their minds inconceivable.

When, however, with the beginnings of commerce and the development of mechanical arts, tribal communities that had grown to the proportions of a town were invaded by adventurers who had broken away from their ancient clan associations, or whose clan organizations had been broken up by war, and when the interlopers began to multiply and to acquire wealth, it became necessary to devise a scheme of government under which they could be included in the body politic. The device that succeeded after many experiments had failed, was that of a legal fiction, whereby all who lived within the territorial boundaries occupied by a localized tribe became nominally — for political, military, and fiscal purposes — members of a purely nominal tribe, irrespective of their blood relationship. It was a scheme of wholesale adoption, or, as we should now say, of naturalization.

Thus it was discovered that men of different origins could live together amicably, and could coöperate in public undertakings; and, for the moment, the radical minds of their generation may have imagined that homogeneity had ceased to be a factor of any consequence in social organization, and that thenceforth communities could develop without attention to such limiting requirements. In this conclusion, however, if such they reached, they were wholly mistaken. The community had not ceased to be made up of resembling individuals. All that had happened had been the substitution of a new and broader kind of resemblance for the old blood kinship, as a basis of public life. The resemblance now essential consisted in mental and moral qualities, in capacities for practical coöperation, in unity of purpose, and in agreement upon methods of common activity. Mental homogeneity,

or like-mindedness, had taken in men's thoughts the important place formerly held by homogeneity in a physical sense.

No sooner was this fact grasped by the leading spirits of the age than they were seized by a passion to perfect this newer type of homogeneity and to make it as complete as had been the old homogeneity of blood. They perceived that, through the contact of commerce and politics, through imitation and comradeship, men originally unlike in many important particulars would undergo assimilation and would approach a common type. That assimilation could be hastened and that social cohesion could be made stronger, generation by generation, through the systematic development of a public policy, was a natural thought. So it came to pass that governments presently adopted certain policies that were characteristic of all early civilizations. The first step was an effort to bring under one central administration all adjoining regions which, together with the dominant city state, formed a natural geographic unity, and those populations which spoke allied languages and could easily be assimilated to the common type. Thus was created the enlarged or national state, in contrast to the small city state which had been its nucleus. Through this policy a strong military power was developed, and minute military regulation was extended throughout society. Mere military government, however, was not enough to establish that perfect homogeneity of mental and moral type which was desired. Religion was still the dominant interest of the majority of men; and so religious unification also was attempted. Family, gentile, and local gods throughout the nation were subordinated to the national god represented by the king and the organized priesthood of the dominant city. The medley of ancient faiths was blended in a national, organic religion, which, by its sanctions, was made to uphold the authority of the central power. Then, finally, manners and customs, forms of dress and ceremonial, even amusements, were in like manner subjected to a minute regulation, all in the interests of that perfect homogeneity of mental and

moral type which now was believed to be the requisite basis of a true and strong national unity.

Such was the first stage of civilization. It was the establishment of political and social homogeneity by coercive methods, supplementing the spontaneous method of assimilation through social and commercial intercourse, by means of communication, imitation, and the interchange of ideas.

Often this policy was developed into a creation of vast military empires. Distant lands and wholly alien peoples were brought by conquest under the rule of a victorious nation, and compelled to accept religion, law, and manners from the conqueror.

This first stage of civilization, rude, tyrannical, often brutal as it was, accomplished one inestimable good: it put an end to intertribal wars and to more serious contests between petty states. Notwithstanding the enormous drain of men and treasure into the imperial armies, it gradually released larger numbers of men and greater stores of capital to engage in the pursuits of peace. The homogeneity of belief and habit which, to a great extent, it succeeded in creating, prepared men to live together amicably with comparatively little governmental restraint; and so the very methods which at first absorbed men in the activities of militarism, presently released vast stores of intellectual and physical energy for other interests.

And so a second stage of civilization was ushered in. Men became critical: they began to demand release from formal bonds which were no longer necessary to their well-being, as they themselves conceived it. The spirit of revolt and of revolution grew and waxed strong. The imperial bond was weakened, and vast territories became an easy prey to invading barbarians. Chaos and anarchy slowly gave way to the formation of a new order; and through successive developments — of feudalism, of the growth of petty principalities, and of new city states — new political forms were slowly evolved. Throughout all these changes, the spirit of liberty, often suppressed, sometimes well-nigh crushed, was, after all, surely growing and coming to its maturity; until

at length it swept all before it in the vast movements of the Renaissance, of the Reformation, and of the revolutionary struggle, out of which emerged the practical principles of personal liberty, freedom of contract, and constitutional law.

Men, however, had not forgotten that homogeneity of some sort is essential to social unity. Over and over again, they had seen its importance in the days of feudalism and of the slow emergence of new national states from the ruins of the Roman dominion ; and over and over they had attempted to reassert the policies of early civilization in measures of religious persecution, in restraints of trade, and in sumptuary legislation. The outcome of these gigantic struggles was a conviction that liberty and social cohesion could coexist only in states of relatively small dimensions, with well-defined natural boundaries, and peopled by men of substantially one blood and type of mind. The doctrines of local self-government and of state rights were the fruits which the second stage of civilization bore in political philosophy.

No sooner, however, had men comfortably settled themselves to the belief that the final and ideal form of social organization had been reached, than another marvellous change began to take place. Under the opportunities secured to them by liberty, men were stimulated to put forth their energies to the utmost. Enterprise was quickened, and innumerable forms of voluntary coöperation sprang into existence. Invention, discovery, and exploration revealed possibilities of material well-being of which the race had never dreamed, and wealth began to increase and population to multiply at a rate never before known. Soon the new enterprise and the growing population began to threaten to overflow the relatively narrow bounds that had been set by the political philosophy of liberalism to the republican state. For a time the need of room in which to expand was perhaps felt rather than seen ; but presently came the clear perception also, that by an almost paradoxical reaction, the industrial and social consequences of liberty would bring about fundamental changes in the organization of states, just as, at an earlier time, the policy of militarism had brought about

the reactions which caused its own overthrow. These conditions manifested themselves chiefly in those countries which had become most free — namely, England and the United States. It was in the latter that expansion began on a large scale and in which its results first became apparent. Moved more perhaps by instinct than by reasoned-out opinions, the American people added to their Northwest Territory the Louisiana and Florida purchases, Oregon, Texas, and California. Almost before the most far-seeing of men realized what was happening, the compact little nation of the thirteen original states had become a continental domain; and the homogeneous population of English blood was becoming the most heterogeneous admixture of nationalities of every speech and faith and political tradition to be found on the face of the earth.

What, then, happened? Did disintegration begin anew? Did the heterogeneous elements so conflict in interest and contend in activity that national unity was destroyed? On the contrary, when the influence of that element of discord which, from the formation of the Union, had existed in the widely unlike economic and social systems of North and South culminated in the Civil War, it was discovered that there had grown up in this vast heterogeneous people a national feeling, a spirit of oneness, the like of which had never before been seen in all human history. It crushed rebellion; it reinstated in the sisterhood of commonwealths the seceding states; it extended amnesty to all; and again it secured to all the blessings of equal protection, equal privilege, and personal freedom. Furthermore, when all this had been accomplished, no tendency was seen to revert to those earlier policies of civilization whereby the homogeneity necessary to social unity was perfected through coercive means. No suggestion was made that, throughout this vast domain, men should be compelled to confess the same faith, to worship in the same way, to dress in prescribed costumes, or to amuse themselves according to forms prescribed by state authority. Without knowing exactly why, the people had discovered that, notwithstanding the apparent and, in many particulars, the

real diversity of interests and ideas — to say nothing of the diversity of nationalities — some mode of unity had been created among them which was quite sufficient to hold them together in political and industrial organization as firmly as any ancient tribe had been held together by its unity of blood, or any ancient nation by its unity of ritual and ceremonial.

What, now, is the explanation of so strange a phenomenon? If homogeneity is essential to social cohesion — if, nevertheless, the ancient unity of blood or the less ancient unity of faith and practice is no longer requisite, what is the homogeneity which has taken their place and has proved to be so all-sufficient that not only may liberty and social unity coexist, but that they may even coexist and become ever more nearly perfect in a nation of vast territorial area to which no ultimate bounds can be predicted in assurance that they are final? Why, in short, is it that to-day a national life is possible, wherein it has become wholly unnecessary to insist upon any of those limitations in the interests of either security or liberty which, in earlier days, were accepted as the very axioms of political philosophy?

The answer is, that the homogeneity which now underlies all successful national life, or the wider life of vast empires like that of Great Britain, is an ethical one. Kinship, faith, and habit — all have served their time as the cohesive bonds of peoples whom, step by step, they have prepared for the larger life of that human community in which agreement upon two or three principles of aspiration and conduct prove now to be a sufficient basis of vast, intricate, and smoothly working organization. An ethical like-mindedness has taken the place of all earlier and simpler modes of resemblance, as the foundation of human society.

In what, then, does this ethical like-mindedness consist? Essentially it consists in a common loyalty to the common judgment and will, in a common willingness to share a common destiny, and in a common conviction of the priceless value of individual, religious, and local liberty. Given mental and moral agreement in these particulars, and a

nation of any territorial extent, of any admixture of blood, of interests, of religions, can wax strong generation by generation, while yet becoming more free and more diversified in its social organization.

We have now the principle by which to explain the wonderful phenomenon of the democratic empire. It is a corollary of this principle that, when a nation makes itself the nucleus of an empire, step by step extending its sway over distant lands and peoples successively annexed, it can continue to be democratic; it can become, decade after decade, more democratic; it can even permit its colonies or dependencies to be democratic, while at the same time maintaining a strong imperial government for purposes of a common defence; all on the one inviolable condition that, *as it lengthens the reach of government, it must curtail the functions of government.* The small local community, homogeneous in nearly every respect — in blood, in traditions, in beliefs, in interests — may successfully conduct a local or municipal government of highly diversified functions. Through that government it may not only protect life and property, but also build roads and bridges, operate street railways, water-works, and lighting appliances, and maintain schools and libraries. But a national government, if it would respect liberty while maintaining political cohesion, must leave most of these functions to local communities or to voluntary enterprise. An imperial government must be yet more general, if it is not to suppress freedom and the democratic spirit. It must confine itself practically to three things, namely: the imperial defence, the suppression of conflict between one part of the empire and another, and insistence that local administration shall come up to a certain standard in its protection of life and property, and in its respect for enlightenment. Doing these things and only these, it can leave each component part of the empire to evolve its own law and its own administration in its own way, — to become, in short, as democratic as the spirit and the experience of the people will permit.

This, then, is the secret of the democratic empire, — of that

empire which England has already brought to a wonderful perfection, of that empire which the United States is destined to create, and which we hope may, in the coming centuries, be as strong, as free, as broad as any that the world has ever seen. The ancient empire, governed in the conviction that identity of belief and similarity of practice were essential to the homogeneity without which no society can long hold together, endeavoured to establish a perfect unity of faith and of daily habit by coercive measures. The modern empire, governed in the belief that a common loyalty to certain common interests and fundamental principles is an all-sufficient mode of homogeneity for the stability of a more complex civilization than any that existed in ancient times, insists only upon such loyalty, and trusts to the spontaneous intercourse of men in the pursuit of their daily vocations to bring about a further assimilation which ultimately will perfect the human race in the spirit of brotherhood, under the single law of liberty.

II

THE ETHICAL MOTIVE

II

THE ETHICAL MOTIVE

Not least among the contributions to ethical science that Mr. Herbert Spencer has made in his "Principles of Ethics" is the clear and comprehensive description of conduct, viewed as a natural phenomenon admitting of scientific observation and analysis, which is presented in the opening chapters. There we are shown that conduct is distinguished from actions in general by the exclusion of acts that are aimless or purposeless. Conduct is the activity of a volitional being who perceives that he has the power to modify his own existence, and who sets before himself an end to be attained. His conduct, then, differs from the merely physiological activity of his body in being made up of a series of acts adjusted to the end which he has in view. Good conduct, in turn, may be described as consisting of acts which, as means and on the whole, are well adapted to the attainment of such ends as the critical judgment pronounces to be in themselves worth while, satisfying to a reason that has examined all of those possible ends or goals of action which have thus far appealed to the mind.

If this description of conduct is accepted as being a fairly accurate one — and doubtless moralists of all schools admit that, as a general account of conduct, Mr. Spencer's chapters are true — a scientific study of morality necessarily includes a critical examination of the ends which purposive activity attempts to realize, and also a critical examination of the motives by which we are impelled toward the attainment of the end in view.

The study of ethical ends, as all students of moral systems are painfully aware, has produced many differing hypothetical goals of action. We have theological ethics, which assume

that the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him forever; we have utilitarian ethics, which assume that the only practical good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and we have idealistic ethics, which assume that the perfection of the rational and spiritual nature of conscious personality itself is the only end that can satisfy the rational mind.

In the study of motives, as it has found objective expression in moral literature, four distinct hypotheses may be discovered. The first of these is, that there is a moral intuition which is at once a revelation of right and an impelling force, driving us onward toward the attainment of our moral goal. The second hypothesis is, that there is a moral instinct, which has either been created in us as a blind but trustworthy guide, or has been developed in us by evolutionary processes through the experiences of countless generations of experimenting creatures who have learned to go right after trying all the possible ways of going wrong. The third hypothesis is, that there are certain classes and groups of feelings more definite than instincts, which move us to moral action; the feelings, namely, which we know as sympathies and affections. The fourth hypothesis is, that our rationally conceived ideas of ethical ends themselves react as motor forces, and draw or impel us to attempt to realize the conceived ends.

These four hypotheses are commonly held to exhaust the possible explanations of ethical motive. Believing that this is an error, and that neither any one of these four assumptions nor any combination of them gives us an adequate account of the psychological process whereby our voluntary acts are organized into that series which we describe as conduct, I shall attempt in this paper to set forth another explanation. There is a phase of the ethical process that appears to me to have a very great importance, and which, I think, has hitherto not received a sufficient attention.

Since moral conduct consists of acts adjusted to ends, it is, of course, impossible to discuss motives without first stating

one's position in regard to ends. For my present purpose, however, it is not necessary to decide between utilitarianism and idealism. It is sufficient to say that both of these schemes of conduct include in their conception of ends the notion of a relatively large and growing mental life, and of a more varied voluntary activity, as distinguished from a diminishing consciousness, and from a reduction of purposive to automatic or mechanical action. The utilitarian does not set before himself a temporary or exhausting pleasure; he pictures rather the happiness which is concomitant of large and varied life. The idealist no less distinctly looks to the enlargement of the rational and spiritual nature as an essential phase of that perfection which he desires. For the purpose of the present argument, then, it is sufficient to say that the moral motive is one that makes for largeness of conscious life.

If so much is granted, the reader is prepared for a suggestion which I have now to make. It is that, as a result of studies which, in recent years, have been made in quite another part of the psychological field, we are now, for the first time, in a position to make discoveries in regard to the origin and the strength of the moral impulses and in regard to the conditions of their growth.

The studies to which I refer are those that have been made in the psychology of economic activity, and which have undertaken to explain the nature and to formulate the laws of economic motive. Most readers, even those who are not particularly interested in economic discussions, have by this time some notion of the modern psychological theories of utility and value. The names of Cournot, Gossen, Walras, Menger, and Jevons have crept into current literature, and nearly everybody knows the essential doctrine for which they stand. We no longer think of utility as a quality inherent in objective things or conditions. Objects of our strongest desire afford us more or less satisfaction according to ever-varying circumstances. Food itself may please or disgust, according as we are still hungry or have overindulged the appetite. Every commodity offered in the

market appeals strongly, or in slight degree, or not at all, to the desires of possible purchasers, according as they have been able already to satisfy those desires in some measure through a preceding supply. Psychologically, then, utility and value are phenomena that diminish as the consumption of the means of satisfying desire increases. Every want admits of satisfaction, and every satisfaction may become satiety.

There are certain implications of this theory that have not yet been duly examined by either economists or psychologists. It is implied that an economic satisfaction is the pleasurable activity of a particular organ or group of organs, at a particular time and in a particular way. For example, to return to the illustration of the consumption of food, it is not maintained — and, of course, no one could maintain — that food has a diminishing subjective utility at all times. Its value to the organism falls as hunger is appeased, but with the return of appetite the subjective value of food again rises. In like manner, it could not be maintained that the subjective value of food must follow a descending curve, if food articles had the power of ministering in equal degree to every organ of the body. If, for example, a single class of material goods afforded us all the pleasures that we craved, so that by means of commodities fit for food we could satisfy the desires for clothing, for shelter, for amusement, and for instruction, the subjective values of these commodities would remain forever at their maximum point. Subjective values, then, rise and fall simply because each commodity has the power of satisfying only the cravings of some particular organ or group of organs, and usually under some particular combination of conditions existing at a given time.

It is unnecessary to prove that within certain limits these particular satisfactions indirectly minister to other organs than those immediately active, and, indeed, to the whole organism. Food not only satisfies the immediate cravings of the stomach, but it affords the pleasures which spring from the organic sensations of vigour. Nevertheless, it is perfectly obvious that there are limits, beyond

which the satisfaction of a particular organ or group of organs may deprive other organs of those means of satisfaction which they crave, inhibit various activities, and deplete the entire organism. The man who should spend all his substance upon his table would, for that reason, be compelled to do without other material gratifications; he undoubtedly would starve his intellectual nature, and, sooner or later, he would reduce a large part of his physical system also to a condition of atrophy.

This implication of the modern theory of subjective utility is so obvious that further insistence upon it would seem to be quite unnecessary. A second implication, if not quite so obvious, is not less certain. If the cravings of a particular organ or group of organs are being liberally met with appropriate satisfactions, while other organs suffer deprivation, the neglected organs set up a protest, which usually is sufficiently importunate to compel us to attempt their appeasing. The hunger of the neglected parts of our nature normally takes possession of consciousness, and diverts our attention and our effort from the organ which is receiving more than its due share of indulgence. Now this hunger of the entire organism for a varied satisfaction, and this protest of the entire organism against the over-indulgence of any one appetite, is obviously a phenomenon quite distinct from those particularistic desires for specific satisfactions which in recent years have been recognized as the specific economic motives.

Thus distinct and general, the craving of the organism for integral satisfaction, and the organic protest against any excess of particularistic indulgence, constitute, I think, the ethical motive in its original, physiological form.

There is, then, a real and fundamental difference between the economic motive and the ethical motive. The economic motive is the desire for a particular satisfaction of a particular organ, in a particular way, at a particular time. The ethical motive is the desire for the varied satisfaction of the entire organism through continuing time.

This account of the subject is, of course, merely physiological; but I suppose that no modern psychologist will

object to discovering that even ethical phenomena have their origin in physiological processes. Let us, however, turn to the psychological aspect. A sharp organic craving for a particular satisfaction always receives preferential attention in consciousness, and preferential attention is likely to be unduly continued, and therefore to cause excessive indulgence. A mere organic craving would diminish as the point of satiety was approached. The least intelligent animals are less likely than man to carry any particular form of consumption or activity to excess. It is, therefore, even more true of man than of the lower animals that the hunger and protest of neglected organs must take possession of consciousness before the course of consumption or of activity can be diverted into new channels. In other words, the ethical motive plays psychologically a larger part in beings having the greater power of attention, and especially of attention coloured by imagination.

In more technical terms, then, the economic motive is the sum of those normal desires to which, at any given moment, we are giving a preferential attention. The ethical motive is the sum of those normal desires which, at the same given moment, we are denying attention or forcing out of consciousness by neglect, but which will presently assert themselves strongly enough to divert attention.

Strong confirmation of the truth of this analysis is afforded by the popular view of that class of economic activities which is most remotely and indirectly related to the immediate satisfaction of particular wants. If the foregoing reasoning is sound, the prudent and enterprising man, in laying by a portion of his income, converting savings into working capital, energetically improving new conditions, and organizing industrial methods, is acting from mixed motives. He is moved partly by economic, but partly, also, by powerful ethical desires. It is therefore interesting to remember that these forms of industrial activity have always been regarded as no less ethical than economic. Saving, frugality, thrift, have, from immemorial time, been inculcated as duties. In other words, when economy broadens out into a provision

for the expansion and the future development of life, economic activity merges into ethical conduct.

In this broad distinction between economic and ethical motives, I think we may discern the ground of a persistent dissatisfaction with utilitarian ethics. The common mind does not to any great extent think of pleasure in general terms. The average man thinks of pleasure concretely and specifically, in terms of particular satisfactions. Duty or right, on the contrary, the average man thinks of vaguely, as something indefinable imposed upon him by a mass of feelings which he cannot analyze and does not understand, but which constrain him to inhibit specific desires and to deny himself particular enjoyments. The common mind, therefore, associates self-denial rather than pleasure with organic well-being and with a continuous development of either the bodily or the mental nature. The end to which the acts of the ordinary individual are adjusted is a vaguely conceived "welfare" or "salvation." It is only the cultivated mind that can distinctly picture to itself a greater pleasure, a deeper happiness, as the concomitant of a larger and sounder life. Consequently, the common mind always shows a strong antipathy to systems of ethics which make pleasure the end of moral action. Yet objectors have seldom been able to meet the utilitarian argument. In other words, it has been felt, rather than clearly seen, that between economics and ethics there is a distinction which should be discovered; and that there must be something wrong about an ethical theory that calls both motives by the same name.

Another and vastly more important phase of popular thinking is similarly explained by the foregoing account of the ethical motive. When we have discovered that the ethical motive arises as a reaction of the organism upon the organ, of vague feelings *en masse* upon specific feeling, we have discerned the real source of moral authority and the origin of that half-superstitious conception of authority which still holds the common mind in dumb distrust of reason. The mass of mankind thinks of authority as something so abso-

lutely different from reason that it may oppose reason. The mass of mankind also thinks of moral conduct as a course of action which is prescribed by authority; while it thinks of economic activity as being indicated and guided by reason. The explanation is not difficult to find, if there is a real and great difference between the economic and the ethical motive. By authority the average man means a power which constrains his will without his knowing or being able to find out why. By reason he means a knowing why. Now it is perfectly clear that, in pursuing economic ends, the average man thinks that he knows why he does this or that. He acts in a particular way because specific, clearly apprehended wants clamour for satisfaction. It is not less clear that, in obeying what he regards as an ethical mandate, the average man acts without knowing why. A mass of vague feelings and ideas arises within his consciousness in protest against certain indulgences, or constraining him to something which he feels to be a duty, although he cannot possibly explain to himself why he feels or calls it duty. That is to say, the average man can clearly apprehend the economic motive; he knows, or thinks he knows, the whys and the wherefores of his economic life; and therefore he thinks that the economic life lies within the domain of reason. The average man cannot clearly apprehend the ethical motive, analyze it into its elements, or discover its origins. He does not know why he is moral; yet he feels himself constrained to try to be moral. Therefore he believes that morality is imposed upon him by authority — in other words, by a power that constrains his will without revealing to him how or why; and he regards with distrust any intrusion of reason into the ethical domain. So conceiving of reason and authority, and having within his own consciousness an experimental acquaintance with authority, the average man easily passes from a deference to the moral authority that is internally known, to a reverence for any external authority that is impressively asserted, and allows himself to regard the external authority as, like the moral authority within himself, superior to reason.

Has this discrimination of the ethical from the economic

motive a practical value, or is it of merely theoretical interest? It has, I think, a twofold practical value.

First, if a truthful account has been given of the relations which the common notion of authority bears to the ethical motive, the importance of cultivating rationalistic habits of thought is strongly emphasized. Moral authority is real; and, in a sense, it is independent of reason. It is deeper, more fundamental, more nearly primitive as a part of human consciousness than reason is; but it is not independent of organic conditions, and therefore is not apart from or in any way independent of the complex processes of natural causation. Reason alone can enable man to perceive the true nature and origin of moral authority, and thereby to avoid the dangers to human well-being that still linger in the popular confusion of moral with external or supposedly supernatural authority. Only through the rationalistic habit of mind can men come to understand how important it is, on the one hand, to assert the rightful supremacy of moral authority, and, on the other hand, to deny the rightfulness of any external authority other than a common or social consciousness of the reality and rightfulness of the moral authority in each individual. It is, therefore, of supreme importance to continue without quarter to fight that obscurantism which is still endeavouring to keep the control of thought and conduct within the hands of those who assume to rule the spiritual domain by right of divine anointment.

The discrimination of the ethical from the economic motive has, I think, secondly, a practical value because it enables us to reaffirm with renewed assurance certain rules for the strengthening of ethical impulses which have long been recognized, but which have never been regarded as authoritative. If they follow legitimately as deductions from the principle which has here been laid down, their authority is clear.

Ethical motives, as all recognize, may be strengthened both by teaching and by activity. If I have rightly described the ethical motive, it is possible to see with much clearness what teaching and what activity are necessary for ethical culture, and to see, also, the order in which principles are to be emphasized and activities are to be encouraged.

Ethical motives, then, are to be strengthened, first, by reaffirming the doctrine, older even than any teaching of the Greeks, that the efficient cause of morality is manly and womanly power, — is that vitality which, by its own insistence, creates a demand for expansion and variation of life. The ethical motive, as we have seen, springs from physiological conditions; and, as power, it is derived from vitality. To neglect bodily development, therefore, is not merely to do wrong in a sense which all intelligent persons now recognize, by impairing the health that is in itself a good, but in the much deeper sense of impairing the very springs of moral conduct.

The ethical motive may be strengthened, secondly, by recognizing and teaching that varied experiences of pleasure, within limits of moderation, are essential to the existence of a consciously moral motive and a moral life. The organism which has had repeated experiences of many different kinds of enjoyment, associated with the normal activity of every organ, is the one that reacts most promptly and vigorously against any sort of excess or any over-indulgence in a particular pleasure. The hedonists are absolutely right in their fundamental contention. Morality without pleasure of some kind or composition is unthinkable. As certainly as specific pleasures are the springs of economic action, so certainly are varied, measured, and combined pleasures the springs of moral action. The task of moral philosophy is not to condemn pleasure; it is rather to show how differently pleasures are combined and presented in consciousness, when they enter into the moral motive, than when they incite economic effort. We must frankly admit the essential goodness of pleasure, and deny that asceticism is in any sense ethical.

The ethical motive may be strengthened, thirdly, by reaffirming that excess is the fundamental wrong. By permitting attention to dwell too long or too exclusively upon any one object of desire, we in some measure destroy the power of other desires, and not only dwarf our lives, but impair the moral motive. And this is just as true when our excesses are on the side of those things that are conventionally called

"virtues," as when they are on the side of pleasures that public opinion condemns. In other words, the over-zealous Puritan, the moral or religious fanatic, the uncompromising political radical, when they refuse to recognize any interest in life other than the ones to which they are devoted, are, in the light of the physiological and psychological analysis which has been presented, as immoral as the drunkard and the libertine. If this analysis is true, the middle way, which Aristotle described as the only true road of virtue, is indeed such; and no one can wander from it to the right hand any more than to the left, without falling into wrong.

The ethical motive is to be strengthened, fourthly, by teaching that next to moderation is the importance of cultivating a varied outlook and sympathy, and of cherishing ideals as an intellectual duty.

This is an age of specialization and of commercial standards. Men judge one another by their business success, and business brings a fearful pressure upon every man to devote his entire energy to some one line of activity in which he can hope to attain preëminence. This is, in itself, a plain violation of moral law; and there is nothing mysterious in the undermining of personal and public integrity through the insidious action of an excessive commercialism. That the business man who devotes his entire energy and thought to business matters should look without horror upon the control of politics and law by an unscrupulous use of money is no occasion for surprise. This is a normal and necessary consequence of the conditions supposed. Unhappily, our educational policy, which should be the great corrective of such tendencies, has been corrupted and made to encourage the very evils that education should prevent. We have encouraged specialization, which is a proper thing to do just to the extent that by specialization we mean thoroughness, minute and exact knowledge within a certain limited field. But specialization in this sense need not be, and should not be, at the expense of a broad outlook upon the world and a correlative strengthening of varied sympathies. Education should make the average man see that business interests are but one small

part of life, and that "citizenship" is a word of larger import than "trade." It should make him feel a strong sympathy with every spontaneous popular movement. He should care about the well-being of other classes than the one to which he belongs. He should be interested in the progressive civilization of other nations than his own. Above all, he should be interested in the history and development of thought, in the broadening of the mental horizon of the race, and in the expression of its struggles and aspirations in the enduring forms of literature and art. If the ethical motive is what I have here described it as being, then it is the duty of all teachers of morality to insist that any man who knowingly neglects to cultivate throughout his business or professional life some interest or interests that have no direct relation to his business or profession, who intentionally or by negligence permits his sympathies with all mankind and with the progress of science and art to die, is an immoral man, as much to be condemned by a sound public opinion as one who transgresses the conventional code of right doing.

Moreover, the expansion of thought and sympathy must ideally extend into future time. The evolution of social relations is not ended, and the development of the human mind is not complete. The ethical motive does not merely constrain us to act with reference to the many-sidedness of life ; it constrains us to act also with reference to the further development of life. It is, therefore, our duty to form and to cherish ideals. We must believe that many things can be made better than they are at present, and that life in many ways can be made more desirable. But these ideals must not be narrow, exclusive, or grotesquely disproportioned to one another, or to the world of fact. They must be brought into harmony, order, and measure. In fine, the ethical motive must be both strengthened and directed by reaffirming the Platonic doctrine of correlation, subordination, and proportion in all that we think and in all that we do.

III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIETY

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The attempt to construct a science of society by means of biological analogies has been abandoned by all serious investigators of social phenomena. It was one of those misdirected efforts that must be looked upon as inevitable in the development of any branch of knowledge. The notion of a universal evolution compelled those who accepted it to try to find some other explanation of our social relations than that dogma of an original covenant which had come down to us from Hobbes and Locke. Biology supplied most of the facts and ideas of which the evolutionary thought was constructed; and naturally, therefore, biological conceptions were first made use of in formal sociology. At present, however, all serious work in sociology starts from psychological data, and proceeds by a combination of psychological with statistical and historical methods.

Psychology has had a development somewhat similar. Beginning with purely metaphysical terms and reasonings, it became a natural science with the advent of evolutionary thought, and for a long time drew its best materials and its most fruitful hypotheses from physiological data. Physiological psychology was then regarded as the only psychology very well worth attention. George Henry Lewes was one of the first writers to argue, as he did with great force and brilliancy in the "Problems of Life and Mind," that the physiological explanations of mind must be supplemented by explanations drawn from the study of society. At the present time, the social interpretation of mental development is an important part of psychological activity.

Psychological and sociological investigations have thus

converged upon certain common problems, namely: The problem of the social nature of the individual mind, and the problem of the psychical nature of social relations. Any new contribution to either psychology or sociology is likely to be found also a contribution to the other, and we may look in the near future for a number of books of which it will be difficult to say whether they are primarily works on psychology or on sociology.

This is eminently true of Professor Mark Baldwin's "Social and Ethical Interpretations," the second volume of his important work on "Mental Development." The first volume, on "Methods and Processes," was definitely a study in psychology. The problem therein dealt with was that of mental development through the interaction of physical and social causes, and the importance of social factors was emphasized throughout. In the volume on "Social and Ethical Interpretations," we again find the same problem: the development of the individual mind through its social relations and activities is further considered. In this volume, however, the opposite problem also is introduced. The development of social relations and activities through the outgoing of the individual is discussed, and the nature of society is subjected to a critical examination. A division of the volume into two books corresponds to the above distinction between the problems dealt with. Book I is a study of the person, public and private; Book II is a study of society. The four formal parts of Book I deal respectively with the imitative person, the inventive person, the person's equipment, and the person's sanctions. The three formal parts of Book II deal respectively with the person in action, social organization, and practical conclusions.

In the present article I shall not attempt to review Professor Baldwin's treatment of all these subjects, or even to summarize his conclusions: I shall examine only the two conceptions that are of chief interest to the sociologist. These, of course, are the conception of the social nature of the self, or individual personality, and the conception of the psychic nature of society.

Psychology, some time ago, got beyond the conundrum —

> "Should I be I, or should I be
> One-tenth another and nine-tenths me,"

if my great-grandmother had married another suitor? It seems to be agreed on all hands that in any case the ego is nine-tenths or more somebody else. That is to say, one's individual personality is for the most part a product of one's intercourse with other personalities. Professor Baldwin, as readers of his earlier works are aware, goes even beyond writers like Ribot and James in his account of the composite origin of the self. He holds that not only does the self incorporate elements from other personalities, so that, at any given time, it includes thoughts and feelings derived from others, and acts in imitation of the conduct of others, but also that its very thought of itself is merely one pole of a consciousness "of a sense of personality generally," the other pole of which is the thought of some other person or *alter*. This comprehensive sense of personality at first is merely projective — to use Professor Baldwin's term: it is a mass of more or less vague impressions received from persons who are encountered and observed. It is secondly subjective: the ego, by its imitations of observed persons, incorporates their peculiarities to some extent in itself. It is thirdly ejective:[1] the self interprets observed persons in terms of its own feelings, thoughts, and habits.

[1] The term "eject" was first used by William Kingdon Clifford in a remarkable article, "On the Nature of Things in Themselves," which appeared in *Mind*, in January, 1878. Clifford's own definition of the word as there given was as follows: "When I come to the conclusion that *you* are conscious, and that there are objects in your consciousness similar to those in mine, I am not inferring any actual or possible feelings of my own, but *your* feelings, which are not, and cannot by any possibility become, objects in my consciousness. . . . But the inferred existence of your feelings, of objective groupings among them similar to those among my feelings, and of a subjective order in many respects analogous to my own, — these inferred existences are in the very act of inference *thrown out* of my consciousness, recognized as outside of it, as *not* being a part of me. I propose, accordingly, to call these inferred existences *ejects*, things thrown out of my consciousness, to distinguish them from *objects*, things presented in my consciousness, phenomena."

This give and take between the individual and his fellows Professor Baldwin calls "the dialectic of personal growth"; and he says it may be read thus: "My thought of self is in the main, as to its character as a personal self, filled up with my thought of others, distributed variously as individuals; and my thought of others, as persons, is mainly filled up with myself. In other words, but for certain minor distinctions in the filling, and for certain compelling distinctions between that which is immediate and that which is objective, the ego and the alter are to our thought one and the same thing." Thus the individual is always a socius, and not merely because, after reaching adult life, the necessity of coöperating with his fellow-men compels him to adapt himself to them and to modify an original egoism by the cultivation of social habits, but because, from his earliest infancy, his own development as a self-conscious person has been incorporating social elements and creating within himself a social, no less than an individual, point of view.

When adult life is reached, however, the process does not cease. The dialectic of personal growth continues to determine all our thinking, our social no less than our individual judgments: that is to say, in arriving at any judgment, we incorporate in our thought the judgments of other men; and we interpret the judgments of other men by our own.

It follows that all of those social relations and policies which are products of reflection, no less than of feeling, are determined by the "dialectic of personal growth," and that, like judgments of things in general, in the thought of individuals, they are highly composite products of subjective and ejective views of the same phenomena.

Approaching the study of society in this way, Professor Baldwin is naturally led to discriminate between the substance, content, stuff, or material of society, and the functional method or process of organization of the social material. He criticises the sociologists for not having definitely enough discriminated these two problems. Consistently with his conception of our social judgments, he thus describes the social substance, or content: "The matter of social or-

ganization consists of thoughts ; by which is meant all sorts of intellectual states, such as imagination, knowledges and informations." This "matter," he thinks, is found only in human groups, which alone, therefore, can be called societies. Animal communities he would call "companies." The functional method or process of organization of the social material he is satisfied to find in the process of imitation which is subjectively contained in the "dialectic of personal growth," and which has been objectively described, in sociological terms, by M. Tarde. Social evolution he derives from the interaction of the individual as a particularizing force and society as a generalizing force. All solidarity and conservation are due to the generalizing force ; all variation to the particularizing force. Progress is a dialectic of give and take between these two elements.

In examining these conceptions, I shall admit their general or substantial truth, and inquire only whether they need modification, limitation, or expansion. Do they sufficiently and precisely express the whole truth, and nothing but the truth ?

Is the thought of self quite so largely a product of the social relation as Professor Baldwin represents ? Is it accurate to say that "my thought of self is, in the main, filled up with my thought of others," even if we admit "minor distinctions in the filling" and "certain compelling distinctions between that which is immediate and that which is objective" ? What are these compelling distinctions of the immediate ? Obviously, they are those presentations in consciousness which arise from organic conditions rather than from social relations. Hunger is a state of consciousness which can subvert the entire product of the "dialectic of personal growth" ; and the sociologist is unable to lose sight of the fact that, when men who have been developed by that dialectic into socii are confronted by starvation, they are liable to have thoughts of self which can hardly be construed as filled up mainly with thoughts of others, unless he is prepared to accept a cannibal's definition of "others." The sociologist, then, must continue to think of the individual as

being both an ego and a socius, and yet as being at all times more ego than socius.

The importance of this modification of Professor Baldwin's formula is chiefly for purposes of economic theory. No economist will be able to accept Professor Baldwin's contention that it is illegitimate to "endeavour to reach a theory of value based on a calculus of the desire of one individual to gratify his individual wants, multiplied into the number of such individuals." The truth is, that, for most purposes of economic theory, this procedure is not only legitimate, but is the only one psychologically possible. The compelling wants that political economy has chiefly to consider are those which arise from the organic nature and which, therefore, magnify the ego at the expense of the socius.

The modification is necessary also for purposes of ethical theory. Professor Baldwin, if I rightly understand him, derives all ethical phenomena from social relations. This I believe to be an error. Economic motives are specific cravings of particular organs or groups of organs. Complete satisfaction of economic wants may deprive other organs of their due satisfaction. The protest of the neglected organs and the hunger of the entire organism for integral satisfaction is, I believe, the original source of all ethical motive, which, therefore, is indefinitely developed by, but not initiated in, the "dialectic of personal growth." [1]

It seems probable, then, that in "the dialectic of personal growth," the original ego with which the dialectic starts, plays throughout a controlling part; and that, after all, the process of developing a socius is one which essentially consists in modifying, by means of social relations and activities, an originally independent self.

This modification, however, is undoubtedly produced by the process of give and take between ego and alter. The question, then, that I wish next to raise is, Is the give and take, in which the ego engages, carried on indiscriminately with any alter, or is there, from the very beginning of con-

[1] This subject has already been considered at greater length, in the preceding article on "The Ethical Motive."

scious life, a tendency to discriminate between one and another alter, and to limit the conditions of personal growth by that state of consciousness which may be described as a consciousness of "similars" or of "kind." Scattered throughout Professor Baldwin's writings are many intimations that he has suspected, or perhaps has even been definitely aware of, such limitations. I do not find, however, that he has anywhere endeavoured to formulate them or to bring them systematically within the propositions of his dialectic.

What, then, are some of the inquiries which should be made in regard to these limitations?

First, I think that we should inquire whether, long before any discriminations of kind have become possible, a preparation for them and a tendency toward them is made in conscious experience. Of the sensations which first arise in consciousness, some are received from the bodily organism which the self inhabits; some are received from similar bodily organisms, and some are received from wholly unlike objects in the external world. Now we know that many sensations received from self are so nearly like sensations received from like selves that, merely as sensations, they can be distinguished only with difficulty. If, for example, I strike with my voice a certain note of the musical scale, and another person a moment after strikes the same note with his voice, my auditory sensations in the two cases will be very nearly alike. If I cry out in pain, and then hear another man like myself cry out in pain, my auditory sensations will be nearly alike; but if I hear a dog bark, the sensation will be different from that which I have received from my own voice. If I walk with my friend down the street, and happen to notice the motion of my feet as I take successive steps, and then to notice the motion of my friend's feet, the visual sensations, in these two cases, will be closely alike; but if I happen to notice the trotting of a horse that is being driven by me, the visual sensation will be different from that which I have received in observing my own steps. If I stroke the back of my hand, and then stroke the back of my friend's hand, I shall

receive tactual sensations that are closely alike; but if I then stroke the fur of a cat or the mane of a horse, or touch the paw of a cat or the hoof of a horse, I shall receive sensations very different from those received from the back of my hand. It therefore appears that before there is any power to make discriminations of any kind, even to think of differences of sensation, sensations themselves fall into different groupings. At the very beginning of conscious life, certain elements which are to enter into a consciousness of kind begin to appear in experience. They consist of like sensations received from self and from others who resemble self.

On the basis of these experiences there are developed others that call for investigation from the same point of view. When suggestion begins to play an important part in mental life, are suggestions from persons very unlike self equally efficacious with suggestions from persons nearly like self? There is here a great field for investigation. A thousand familiar observations strongly indicate the superiority of suggestions that come from those whose neural organization resembles that of the person affected. Why, for example, does Maudsley venture to say, without offering the slightest proof, that, while men are as liable as silly sheep to fall into panic when they see panic among their fellows, they are not similarly liable when they perceive panic among sheep? Obviously, because facts of this general character are so familiar that no one would think of questioning them. In like manner, a child who objects to performing a certain task which his father asks him to do, will do it without hesitation if he sees other boys in the street engaged in the same work. Phenomena like these, of course, have their origin in a like responsiveness of like organisms to the same stimulus.

A third class of experiences and activities, which are ultimately to enter into a consciousness of kind, and are already very probably dominating "the dialectic of personal growth," are imitations. Here, also, there is room for exact investigation; but we may predict at the outset that investigation will verify the common opinion that we chiefly imitate

our similars. The equally familiar fact that we do not always do so is of immense importance for the theory of variation, invention, and originality. And this theory, I believe, is not to be constructed without referring back to the truth mentioned above, that the ego is at all times the original and dominant element in the "dialectic of personal growth." I am not at present prepared to give my reasons, but I expect that it will be shown that in the same reaction of the organism upon the organ which is the source of ethical motive, will be found the source of originality, variation, and the occasional imitation of those who differ from, rather than resemble, ourselves.

The factors thus far considered, — namely, like responsiveness of like organisms to the same stimulus, like sensations received from self and from others who resemble self, a greater responsiveness to suggestions from like selves than from not-like selves, and a greater readiness to imitate like selves than to imitate not-like selves, — together make up the organic sympathy that is a bond of union in those groups of animals that Professor Baldwin calls companies, and the bond of union of men who act together impulsively rather than reflectively — the bond, in short, of the mob. It is certain that organic sympathy depends on organic likeness, and the phenomena that have been named above are the psychological correlatives of organic likeness.

How now is such organic sympathy converted into a higher or reflective sympathy? The true answer, I think, is: Through the mediation of that perception of resemblance which is the initial stage in the conversion of a mere sensational experience of likeness into a reflective consciousness of kind. When the power to perceive relations and to make discriminations arises, the perception of resemblances and of differences among one's fellow-beings becomes an all-important factor in the further development of social relations and in the "dialectic of personal growth." From that moment organic sympathy becomes a function of the perception of resemblance; and sympathy becomes, to a certain extent, reflective. Even in mob action the reaction of the perception

of kind may be seen with the utmost clearness. When, for example, masses of men simultaneously respond to a party cry or symbol, the action for the moment is merely a like responsiveness to the same stimulus. An instant later, when each man perceives that, in this respect, his fellow-beings are resembling himself in feeling and in action, his own emotion is enormously intensified. It is this which gives to all symbols and shibboleths their tremendous social importance. The phenomenon has been very well described in the concluding pages of Dr. Boris Sidis's "Psychology of Suggestion."

Let us pass, now, to the conception of the psychical stuff, or substance, of society.

Professor Baldwin's thesis, as we have seen, is that "the matter of social organization consists of thoughts, all kinds of knowledges and informations." He thus places himself in definite opposition to those writers who have made sympathy, or any kind of emotion, the psychological stuff of society. It is for this reason that he makes a sharp distinction between animal "companies" and human societies. Criticism of this thesis may be made from two points of view: one, the historical, supported by observations from animal communities; the other, the psychological, supported by those analyses of the relations of sympathy and perception which I have sketched above. From the standpoint of the observer of animal and primitive human societies, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a line of demarcation between the more highly organized bands of animals, like troops of monkeys, or herds of elephants, or bands of wild horses, and the simplest hordes of human beings, like Bushmen or Australian Blackfellows. No one can say when, in the development of man from brute, sympathy ceased to be the chief stuff or substance of the social relationship, and thoughts in the form of inventions and knowledges began to assume that important place. In like manner, when modern human society is looked at from the psychological view-point, it is often — indeed, usually — impossible to say whether sympathy or thought predominates in the intercerebral action of the associating individuals. Professor Baldwin's thesis would

compel him to maintain that the same individuals are a "society" one day and merely a "company" another. At one time they are thoughtful and self-controlled; at another time they are an audience swept by emotion, or a mob given over to fury. Shall we, then, say that the stuff of society is thought merely, or feeling merely, or some combination of the two? Surely the last of these possibilities is the one that is most consistent both with evolutionary hypotheses and with psychological conclusions. The substance of society at first is sympathy and instinct mainly. At its best estate, society may rise to a level where thought has for the moment completely subordinated feeling. But usually, and throughout the greater part of its career, society is sympathy and instinct more or less organized, more or less directed, more or less controlled, by thought. When the thought element appears, society has become reflective; and a better way to mark the distinction between the lowest and the highest societies than by restricting the word "society" to the latter and calling the former "companies," is by indicating this element of reflection. Animal and primitive human communities for the most part are sympathetic or non-reflective societies; progressive human communities in general are reflective societies. The reflective stage corresponds to the appearance of the perception of kind and to reflective sympathy.

But even if we were to accept the thesis that the social stuff is exclusively intellectual, we could not possibly admit that it consists of all sorts of thoughts and knowledges indiscriminately. It undoubtedly includes all sorts of thoughts and knowledges, but not all sorts of thoughts and knowledges in and of themselves make society or the social stuff. The social stuff, so far as it is intellectual, is one kind of knowledge in particular, namely, knowledge of resemblances, knowledge of those modes of like-mindedness that make coöperation possible. The same logic that leads Professor Baldwin to try to separate the social stuff from other kinds of stuff should lead him further to distinguish the thought that is essentially social, and capable of organiz-

ing all other thoughts and knowledges into social material, from the thought and knowledge that have no such inherent power.

Perhaps, however, it is in his few remarks about the social process that Professor Baldwin has been most unjust to himself, and has missed an opportunity to make a really important contribution to social science. He is willing to grant that the social process consists in imitation. Yet, if the earlier chapters of "Social and Ethical Interpretations" prove anything at all, they prove that imitations are progressively controlled, as individual development proceeds, by the process of ejective interpretation, — that is to say, by interpretation in terms of those ideas of our fellow-men which we create in the image of ourselves. To carry this thought into sociology, it is necessary to bear in mind the function of resemblance, especially of mental and moral resemblance, in controlling relationships. In the ejective processes of the "dialectic of personal growth," not all of our acquaintances are indiscriminately utilized. We detect the difference between those who, in ways important to ourselves, resemble us and those who, in ways important to ourselves, differ from us. Our ejective interpretations, therefore, are accompanied at every step by a process of ejective selection. Ejective selections, in fact, are the psychological bases of all social groupings, not only those of the more intimate sort, such as personal friendships, but those also of the purely utilitarian sort, like business partnerships. In a word, while imitation is a process that penetrates society through and through, it is not a distinctively social process. It is wider than the social process, just as thought is more comprehensive than the social stuff. The distinctive social process is an ejective interpretation and selection. In its widest form it includes imitation, controlled by or made a function of ejective selection.

I may now very briefly indicate the further criticisms which, in pursuance of this thought, must be made upon Professor Baldwin's views — criticisms, namely, that apply to his treatment of social policy. No exception is to be

taken to the analysis which describes the individual as the particularizing social force, and society in its entirety as the generalizing social force. But I fail to discover in Professor Baldwin's account of the subject any adequate recognition of the social causation of individuality. That causation must be sought in the phenomena of unlikeness in the social population. Throughout human history, individuality and the possibility of social variation have been due to the commingling of ethnic elements, or, within the same nationality, to the commingling of elements long exposed to different local environments. This commingling itself is brought about by emigration and immigration. If the biological phenomenon of panmixia is all that Weismann, Galton, and other investigators have represented it to be, its levelling effects are counteracted, and social progress is made possible, only by continual groupings and regroupings in the population under the influence of ejective selection.

Finally, there is no possible explanation of social policy which leaves out of account the facts of mental and moral resemblance and the consciousness of kind. Without like-mindedness there can be neither spontaneous nor reflective coöperation. Not only must there be an agreement of thought, but for most, if not for all, public coöperation there must be a vast mass of sympathies and agreeing emotions. Men must have like sensations, must be similarly sensitive to suggestion from resembling fellows, and must subtly enter into like judgments, without always being fully conscious of the process by which their conclusions are reached. The greater part of all public action must be described as a consequence of sympathetic and half-reflective agreement in plans and purposes, rather than as a consequence of systematic deliberation. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that all public policy is a means to an end, proximate or ultimate; and that the ultimate end in every case is the maintenance and development of a certain type of man. That type itself is a mode of resemblance; and the recognition of it, which directs and controls all policies, is a mode of the consciousness of kind.

IV

THE MIND OF THE MANY

IV

THE MIND OF THE MANY

At the general session of the German Association of Naturalists and Physicians, held at Vienna in September, 1894, an Austrian physicist, Dr. Ernst Mach, delivered an address which every scientific inquirer should know by heart. It was entitled, "On the Principle of Comparison in Physics"; and in substance it was a lucid analysis of the nature of scientific thought, and incidentally of the true nature of science itself. Professor Mach began by recalling a definition of mechanics which had been given twenty years before by the great Kirchhoff. Mechanics, Kirchhoff had said, is "the description, in complete and very simple terms, of the motions occurring in nature." This definition had created universal astonishment in scientific circles. It contained no mention of explanation or of prediction as functions of science, no allusion to universal or cosmic law, no hint of any search for first principles or causes. Little wonder was it, that the scientific mind was amazed. Was science, the supreme achievement of the nineteenth century, about to abandon all of its chief pretensions? Mechanics is of all sciences the most exact and the most advanced. If, then, mechanics is nothing but description, no other branch of knowledge can claim to be more. To demonstrate with perfect clearness that exactly this is the simple and practically helpful truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, was the task which Dr. Mach essayed.

I shall not attempt here to repeat this demonstration in detail. It consisted in showing that description is a putting together of facts in a coherent system or continuum, which accurately corresponds to the coherent system or continuum

of reality; and that explanation, prediction, the formulation of laws, are nothing more and nothing less. When, for example, the physicist formulates the law of gravitation, as an attraction of bodies for one another which varies directly with their masses, and inversely with the squares of their distances, and predicts that, in accordance with this law, an unsupported body will fall toward or rise away from the surface of the earth according as its specific gravity is greater or less than that of the atmospheric envelope, he merely puts together, in a single condensed expression, a large number of observed coherences of fact. And what are these observed facts? Is the "attraction" which the formula alleges one of them? Yes or no, according to our definition of the word. Shall we say that it is the "pull" of a "force"? Has any human being ever seen, handled, or otherwise perceived a force? Certainly not. And what, moreover, does any human being know of a "pull"? Nothing whatever beyond certain sensations of muscular tension or of political fatigue. All, then, that can actually be observed of attraction is a certain number of changes in the successive positions of material objects, and a certain number of changes in the degrees of rapidity with which the changes of position take place. All that we can really experiment with is a number of volumes, densities, positions, distances, accelerations, and retardations. And our formula or law, therefore, is nothing more than an accurate description of the way in which these observed facts cohere in an objective series or system of reality. The object of science is to extend description, in this sense of the word, until it includes all knowable facts of matter, life, mind, and society, and places each fact in its proper place in the complete system.

This conception of science — the only one which a critical examination of the nature of our knowledge permits us to entertain — clearly reveals the exact practical value of science. As science approaches perfection, the description of the cosmos becomes continuous. We discover that every known fact has, in coexistence and in sequence, points of contact

with other known facts. The lines and colours in our chart of the universe are not drawn or splashed at random; they lie before the mental vision in a marvellous order of gradations, proportions, series, and systems. All the facts in any part of our chart are seen to be related to all facts in every other part. So we arrive at the conception of nature as a system of interdependent facts. This conception once reached, we perceive exactly what we mean when we say that science enables us to predict combinations of facts not hitherto observed. Convinced by what we already know, that our further description of nature will not derange the system already apparent in our chart, we expect that further knowledge will merely continue the curves already partly drawn, without changing their equations, fill in unknown terms of series without changing their formulas, and supply shades of colour that will not disturb the scheme already apparent. Science thus enables us to anticipate facts not yet actually observed. If, then, we admit that science is description, and that description both reveals and presupposes the interdependence of the descriptive elements, we can accept the theoretical and practical conclusion at which Dr. Mach arrives, that science completes in thought facts that are only partly given.

This conclusion, I affirm, is no less practical than theoretical, because if such is the nature and function of science, science enables us to accommodate our conduct or policy to combinations of facts not yet completely made, but which science assures us will, in the course of time, be made — at least approximately — in the world of reality. The more nearly perfect our description of any part of that world becomes, the more closely may we adapt our plans, not only to the things that now are, but to the things that shall be hereafter.

Let us now pass from these general considerations to an examination of the nature and the practical value of that branch of science which attempts to perfect our knowledge of human society. If the word "description" is a broad enough term to characterize a science so advanced in its methods and

its results as mechanical physics, it surely is broad enough to characterize the comparatively new and, as yet, very imperfect science of sociology. To make our description of human society more accurate, more coherent, more complete, is a task grand enough to awaken the enthusiasm and inspire the labour of any man who has enough of the scientific spirit to justify a career of sociological investigation. Often has the sneer been thrown at sociologists that as yet they have been unable to define their science in terms that anybody but the sociologist can understand. To the extent that sociologists have attempted to put into their definition more or less than the scientific truth, they have deserved their punishment. The truth is simply that sociology is a scientific description of society. And this is a definition that even the most non-scientific of those journalistic illuminati who have denied the existence of sociology might, by diligent cogitation, make out to understand.

What, then, are some of the descriptive elements of sociology, and what practical value have they for the determination of private conduct and public policy?

And first, what is society, the combination of facts to be described? From one point of view, this question is Hibernian, since the description itself must be the answer. From another point of view, however, the question is straightforward and intelligible. It means, What does the word "society" stand for in our everyday use of the term? What facts about the reality which this word brings to mind are already known? What, in short, is the starting point of our descriptive enterprise? Actually to discover this starting point is not an easy matter. The undertaking may be compared to that of a mathematician who wishes to resolve a complicated algebraic equation, and must choose from among many possible ways of stating it that one which he can most easily work with in his subsequent operations. To most of us the word "society" ordinarily means the agreeable intercourse, the helpful coöperation, and the historical relations of human beings; it means, in short, a large and complex group of human facts which we ordinarily

picture to ourselves in a rather vague way. Is there among them some one fact that is essential, fundamental, or universal, and which, therefore, may be selected as a common or characteristic term?

Under no other circumstances does the human mind go so swiftly and so surely to the significant or essential fact in a bewildering maze of things as when it is under the compelling pressure of a great practical necessity. Nearly two thousand years ago, one of the most gifted men of any age found himself under the immediate necessity of trying, for a great practical purpose, to single out and force upon the attention of mankind the most essential, persistent, and formative fact of human society. That man was the Apostle Paul. He had been converted to a new religion, and had become its chief interpreter and missionary. Accepting the duties which circumstances and his own nature placed before him, of attempting to spread and organize the new faith throughout the known world, he was compelled to examine, with the utmost care, the question of the social form in which this new interest should be incorporated. All of the older religions against which Christianity was to make headway had grown into elaborate social systems, with their priesthoods, their carefully graded ranks or classes of believers, their rituals and festivals. Against their formalism Christianity protested. Its own social principle, like its individual principle, must be inward and spiritual, rather than external and legal. We may well believe that during those three years which the Apostle spent in retirement in Arabia, working out the detail of his system, he gave most serious thought to this social aspect of his problem. It was necessary for him to find a psychological fact or principle of social organization, which should be also universal,—as true for the Roman as for the Jew, for the Barbarian as for the Greek; so simple that the bondman, no less than the freeman, could grasp it, yet so rich in possibilities that the philosophical disputants of Mars Hill and the practical lawyers on the Capitoline Hill might be expected to accept and to develop it. What, then, was the social fact that this subtle thinker and emi-

nently practical man, under such circumstances, fixed upon as essential and all-comprehensive?

It was the fact of like-mindedness. Over and over in his Epistles he forces this fact upon the attention of his readers, and warns them to give heed to it. "Be of the same mind one toward another," he says to the Romans; and in the same Epistle he prays for them, that they may be of the same mind; that with one accord and with one mouth they may glorify their God. The Corinthians he beseeches to "speak the same thing"; to "have no divisions" among them; that they may be "perfected together in the same mind and in the same judgment." And the Philippians he implores to "stand fast in one spirit, with one soul"; to "be of the same mind, having the same love, being of one accord." That it was in truth Paul who first seized upon this social principle for practical purposes, we have positive proof. Only in two places outside of the writings of Paul, can any allusion to it be found in either the Old or the New Testament. One is in the first epistle of Peter, where the expression "finally, be ye all like-minded" is so exactly the phraseology of Paul that we can hardly doubt that it was borrowed from him. The other is in Revelation, where ten kings are spoken of as having one mind. That Paul himself derived the suggestion from the Greeks is highly probable, since Aristotle, in the "Ethics," quotes the saying that "birds of a feather flock together," and recalls a contention of Empedocles that "like desires like." But, so far as we know, neither Greek nor Jew, before Paul, ever singled out this principle as the all-essential fact to be remembered in the development of any plan of social organization.

Was Paul right in his selection of the essential social fact? Speaking only for myself, and leaving other investigators of society to form their own conclusions from all available evidence, I must say that after many years of persistent thought upon this question, I am fully persuaded that he was absolutely and profoundly right. If this be true, we have at once our provisional definition of society — the conception from which we go forward to a more complete description.

The like-mindedness upon which Paul insists is known and understood to be such by the individuals who share it. Not only do A and B agree in their thoughts, feelings, purposes; but also both A and B are aware of their agreement. Moreover, they perceive that agreement is pleasurable; that the fruits of concord are happiness and peace; that discord is not pleasurable, and is liable to end in disunion. They strive, as Paul enjoins them, to be without divisions, and to be "perfected together in the same mind and in the same judgment." What, then, is a society? Obviously, it is any number of like-minded individuals, who know and enjoy their like-mindedness, and are therefore able to work together for common ends.

Is not this exactly what we mean by a society when we use the word in our modern conversation? A society as thus conceived may exist for any purpose whatsoever. Can we think of any society which may not be thus conceived and defined? Does there exist a society for the carrying on of a commercial enterprise? Who are its members? Business men who think alike in regard to the expediency and the practical possibilities of the undertaking, — men of like habits, of similar interests; men whose intellectual type the most casual observer can distinguish from that of the scholar, the artist, or the priest. Does there exist a society for the reform of the civil service? Who are its members? Again, men of a common mental and moral type; men who are sensitive to public honour and duty; men who are willing to make sacrifices of time and energy for the general good; men who believe that reform of abuses is possible, and should patiently be sought. Does there exist a society for the promotion of any branch of scientific knowledge, for the enjoyment and promotion of any form of art, for the prevention of any form of cruelty, for the kindly help of any class of needy or suffering beings? Those who belong to such organizations are men and women of easily distinguished types, whose common trait, as members of their respective societies, is their like-mindedness with respect to that object or purpose for which the society exists.

But with truth it may be said that there are societies of another kind. Villages, cities, and nations are societies, less artificial in their formation than those just named. They are natural aggregations of people which have developed a social organization. This they have done, however, only because of like-mindedness. On no other basis can a political system rest. There must be unanimity of feeling and opinion upon all fundamental questions of government and policy. All differences and contentions must be subordinate to the essential, fundamental unity of thought. Therefore a natural society, a nation, for example, may be defined as a population composed of like-minded individuals, who sympathetically work together for common ends.

What, now, is the practical value of this first step in the scientific description of society, this study of the mind of the many? The answer will already have been anticipated. It brings us to a vantage point where we can clearly see how sound has been and always will be that instinct of mankind which opposes a rapid influx of alien elements into any existing population which is fairly homogeneous, and which resists all heresy, schism, and dissension when carried beyond a certain point. One who should name the questions of greatest practical importance in the United States to-day, would include among them the question of the restriction of immigration and the question of the wisdom of that policy of our political parties which reads out of the organization all "mugwumps" and "kickers." Sociology can render no greater practical service than to show that like-mindedness is, in fact, the absolutely essential condition of social cohesion, and of the efficiency of any social organization. There is a limit beyond which we cannot admit alien elements and preserve our identity as a nation; a limit beyond which no party, church, or sect can tolerate the mugwump and dissenter, without incurring the penalty of its own disintegration.

What, then, becomes of progress? Is that a scientific description of society which fails to give any account of variation? Absolute like-mindedness would be the social

Nirvana. To exclude all alien elements from the nation, to drive all heretics from the Church, to expel all independents from the party — this would be a policy that would presently bring our fifty years of Europe to a cycle of Cathay. Sociology can predict for us no such uninteresting future. The scientific description of society is not yet complete.

As certainly as like-mindedness is the cause of social stability, so is unlike-mindedness the cause of social variation. Only as new types of character, new ways of thinking, new habits, new ambitions are brought into the population, can the community undergo any essential change for better or for worse. Only as men differ and dare to differ from their fellows, can the church or the party adapt itself to new conditions. Mere variation, however, is not necessarily progress: there is no progress to be discovered in disunion or in disorganization. We here begin to perceive the next step in the scientific description of society. A progressive society must change, without losing its cohesion or identity. Reducing this statement to terms of our fundamental concept, we find it to mean that, in a progressive society, a certain degree of unlike-mindedness coexists with a large balance of like-mindedness. Looking a little further, we discover also that the unlike-mindedness must be of that kind or quality which can be reconciled with the like-mindedness. Progress, in short, is the continuous harmonizing of a continually appearing unlikeness of feeling, thought, and purpose in the community with a vast central mass of already established agreements.

Thus we arrive at the second practical value of sociology. It enables us to see that, while a fundamental harmony of beliefs and interests must, if possible, be maintained in any social population or artificial social organization; and while, at times, it may be necessary to check a too rapid inflow of alien elements, or a too radical development of dissenting opinions, still, in themselves immigration and dissent are necessary and good, and are to be welcomed just to the extent that they can be assimilated. Their function is to leaven the lump, not to explode it.

From these conditions of social stability and social change, let us now pass to a consideration of the manner or method of change. A great deal of social progress is accomplished as quietly and unconsciously as the growth of a forest. Slight differences of nationality are assimilated; minor peculiarities of manner are imitated; modifications of opinion are effected; until, in the course of time, a really important metamorphosis of society has taken place, and no one can tell exactly how.

Not all social change, however, is of this description. Every now and then, great masses of men become dissatisfied with existing conditions, and, as a result of their voluntary and combined action, bring about momentous changes in a comparatively short interval of time. Such are revolutions and the social transformations inaugurated by some far-reaching governmental policy. Such, for example, were the Puritan rebellion in England, the American Revolution of 1776, the ratification of the Federal Constitution of the United States, the abolition of negro slavery, and the establishment of the French Republic.

These comparatively rapid transformations of the social system are brought about in two ways: an impulsive, unreasoning social action, like that of the mob, is one; deliberation and discussion are the other. Of impulsive social action, sane men in their sane moments have a well-grounded dread. Not all the cruelties that have been deliberately inflicted by political tyrants and ecclesiastical councils can for a moment be compared with the horrors that have been perpetrated by irresponsible masses of men who have ceased to reason about their social situation, and have surrendered themselves to the frenzy of emotion.

Sociology, by its more accurate description of the conditions and processes of mob action, can add nothing to the repugnance which all calm-minded men feel toward such outbreaks of the brute nature that still survives in man. Nevertheless, the sociological description of the mob contributes two elements of great practical value to our knowledge of this subject. The first is a demonstration that in all

cases of impulsive outbreak, the transition from violent talk to violent action is first made by the irresponsible, quasi-criminal elements of the population. Riots, insurrections, revolutions, rarely begin with the striking of a well-directed blow by a disciplined force, under the command of a far-seeing and cool-headed leader. They begin with assaults, thefts, and homicides, with volleys of stones, with random shootings and stabbings, with the looting of shops, and the lynching of opponents. History teems with examples. To mention a single one: the Crusades — perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon of epidemic craze that has ever been witnessed — did not begin, as thousands of careless readers of history suppose, as an organized and disciplined march of military forces towards the Holy Land, under the leadership of Godfrey of Bouillon, Hugh the Great, Robert Curthose, Count Robert of Flanders, Prince Boehmond of Tarentum, and Count Raymond of Toulouse, in the year 1097. They began with the three unorganized crusades of the preceding year, under Walter the Penniless, whose twenty thousand followers, described by historians as the dregs of Christendom, filled Bulgaria with robbery and murder, until they were themselves slaughtered in the storming of Belgrade; under Peter the Hermit, whose rabble of forty thousand men, women, and children was hardly better in character; and under the German priest, Gottschalk, whose fifteen thousand followers from Strasburg, Worms, and Mayence, began their pilgrimage by massacring Jews in the valley of the Rhine. Facts of this kind, I think, are not generally known; and I am sure that their full significance is rarely perceived. They mean that, at the very outset, impulsive social action is quasi-criminal, if not, indeed, altogether criminal; and this for the reason that it begins with the violent acts of those men who are themselves least subject to self-control. It means, therefore, that the unchaining of the wild beast in man, which is so often spoken of as a result of mob action, is really not its result at all, but its very beginning; and that a terrible responsibility rests upon those men and women who, while believing in rational deliberation, and justly dreading epi-

demic emotion, look tolerantly upon the initial stages of social excitement, or carelessly permit themselves to contribute to it, in the unwarranted belief that they can turn to and check it when it begins to go too far.

The impossibility of checking, until it has run its course, any mob action that has once fairly begun, has now been fairly established as a demonstrated sociological principle; and this is the second element which an accurate scientific description of society adds to our knowledge of the non-reasoning or impulsive modes of social transformation. From the moment that reason finally loses its control over masses of communicating men, they fall under the power of imitation and hypnotic suggestion; and emotional fury sweeps through them with increasing volume and accelerating velocity, as a conflagration sweeps through accumulations of combustible material. Impulsive social action, in short, proceeds not slowly through the mass, as water filters through sand, but with the frightful acceleration of a geometrical progression. This law has been fully established by psychological and sociological research; and it is no more open to doubt than is the law of gravitation. Moreover, no fact of social knowledge is of greater practical importance. The only way to prevent the devastating consequences of epidemic madness is to multiply in the community the number of those men who habitually subordinate feeling to reason, and who, therefore, cannot become a part of the combustible material of the mob spirit.

If these things are true, it is obvious that so far as progress depends upon human intention and the putting forth of human will to supplement the slow accumulation of those minute changes that are imperceptibly effected by unconscious evolution, we must look chiefly to the agency of reason and deliberation. What, then, are the conditions under which reason maintains its supremacy in social affairs? What are the conditions under which the number of cool-headed, deliberating men, is multiplied, and the proportion of emotional, fanatical, hypnotizable, impulsive beings is diminished? In answer to these questions, sociology adds

to its scientific description of society a well-demonstrated fact, the practical value of which is certainly not inferior to anything that has yet been mentioned.

I fear that the propositions which I am about to offer will be unwelcome to many excellent men and women. Yet I believe them to be so absolutely true and of such vital importance to the welfare of mankind, that I should think myself dishonest and cowardly if I failed to put them before you. I believe that the further development of scientific thought will fully substantiate them, and that they will presently be accepted by all clear-thinking and far-seeing men.

The questions that I have just raised may best be answered by converting them into a negative form. Under what conditions are irrationality, hypnotic susceptibility, willingness to follow without question or resistance any suggested course of action, most likely to prevail in the community? Are we maintaining educational influences or agencies, whose certain tendency is to multiply the number of unreasoning, impulsive members of society? When our question is put in this way, I cannot doubt that you will immediately foresee the answer that must be made. In the name of religion, society for generations has cherished a dangerous influence and has encouraged the practice of arts that menace the happiness and the further progress of mankind. Of all dangerous teachers in the community, a certain type of the professional revivalist is most to be feared. A certain type of the revival meeting is, and always has been, the chief school of impulsive action. Throughout human history that kind of revival in which reason is denounced, anathematized, and submerged under billows of crazing emotion, has been the foster-mother of the mob.

To my mind it is little short of amazing that any sane person can witness the occurrences of a negro revival in the South, or read of the similar occurrences that took place during the great revival epidemics that swept westward from the Atlantic seaboard in 1837 and in 1857, or listen to the preaching of some of the more popular of modern revivalists, without being overwhelmingly convinced

of the truth of these propositions. Too often the methods of the professional revivalist are those of the professional hypnotizer, even when they are more refined, and keep their machinery out of sight. Too often the revivalist tells his hearers that their reason is the most deadly enemy of their souls; that the deliberating, critical habit of mind endangers their eternal salvation; that their only safety lies in immediately acting upon the impulse which he is striving to awaken in their bosoms. Not long ago, such a teacher, addressing an audience of thousands in New York City, repeated as a model for universal imitation the prayer of a man who besought God to crush his individual will, and make him a helpless drift-log on the current of divine purpose. Now, ladies and gentlemen, look at this thing seriously and reasonably. Do you expect that men and women who surrender themselves to the influence of such teaching in the revival meeting will act coolly, reasonably, and courageously in the affairs of secular life? Do you suppose that those who yield unresistingly to the impassioned appeal of the exhorter, will be unmoved by the harangue of the partisan orator, or resist the impulse to follow blindly the lead of the "boss" who, like his religious preceptor, exacts unquestioning obedience, and visits condign punishment upon the sceptic? Certainly you do not; and the longer you think this matter over, the more fully satisfied will you become of the truth of this conclusion which, I venture to assert, is one of the fundamental truths of a scientific description of society: So long as the grosser, irrational forms of revivalism are possible, the perfect protection of society against epidemic madness, and the overthrow of any bossism of the brutal sort will be impossible. Let us not deceive ourselves with the belief that we can make men irrational, impulsive, hypnotic creatures for the purposes of religion, and then find them cool-headed, critical, rational men for the purposes of politics.

When reason is in control of the social situation, and proceeds through calm deliberation to formulate an account of social evils, and to frame a policy of reform, what is that essential peculiarity of the process which a scientific description

of society brings to attention? The answer is: The rational improvement of society proceeds through a criticism of social values; and one of the objects of sociology should be to lay a sound basis of descriptive knowledge for this, the highest kind of criticism in which the rational intelligence can engage.

By the term "social value" is meant that regard or esteem for any social habit, relation, or institution which makes men cherish and defend it. In the long run, social values are measured, as economic values are, by the sacrifices that men will make for them. The measure of the value that we attach to civil liberty is to be found in the sacrifices that we are prepared to make to maintain it. The measure of the value that we attach to any ancient usage or institution which, in some degree, obstructs the later developments of our social system — as the Established Church and the House of Lords are thought by English Radicals to obstruct progress in England — is the sacrifice of new possibilities that we submit to, rather than witness the destruction of things which we have long admired or revered.

Thus it is obvious that our social values, like our economic values, are determined by a process of comparison extended throughout the entire range of possible utilities and costs. It is important to the individual, in constructing his subjective scale of economic values, to estimate accurately every utility and every cost which enters into his calculations. In like manner, it is of the utmost importance to the general welfare that society should accurately estimate the utility of every social institution, of every cherished usage or custom, and, with equal accuracy, the sacrifices, not only of the time and money of individuals, but also of possible developments along new lines of progress, which must be made in order to maintain the old; or, taking the other point of view, that it should estimate accurately how much of the old must be sacrificed to secure the new. Accordingly, the rational process in social development consists chiefly in that criticism of all our social values which enables us wisely to choose among them.

What practical help can sociology, from its study of the

mind of the many, bring to us for the purposes of this criticism?

It reveals to us, first, the fact that our social values are of two great orders. All objects of social esteem are ends to be attained or they are simply means to the attainment of such ends. Here, again, we have a perfect analogy with economic categories. All economic goods are either goods for final consumption, or those means of production which we describe as capital. Now the ends that we strive to attain in society are not essentially different from those which we strive to attain as individuals. The objects of all endeavour, whether of individuals or of communities, are life, happiness, and the development of our rational personality. Society itself is simply a means to these ends. Philosophy cannot set aside or improve upon Aristotle's dictum that the state exists for the good life. Yet no truth is more frequently lost sight of in personal conduct or in public policy. Nothing is so hard for the partisan as to see and admit that his party is only a means to an end, and that it becomes worse than a cumberer of the ground when it no longer promotes the end for which it was instituted. It should be one of the chief functions of the teacher of sociology to repeat — and to insist until mankind does see and admit — that customs, usages, institutions, parties, churches, creeds, have no sacredness in themselves, and that there is no other warrant for their existence than may be found in their power to contribute, either to the safe and comfortable maintenance of human life, or to the further progress of the human mind in knowledge, power, reasonableness, and moral perfection.

The scientific description of society, however, not only reveals the relativity of all our social arrangements — and thereby enables us roughly to estimate the comparative importance of means and ends — but also reveals to us the conditions under which the different means in use are effectively combined for the promotion of the ends in view. In saying this, I mean to affirm more than is ordinarily implied in the remark that human institutions have become what they now are through a process of historical evolution, and there-

fore cannot be instantly made over or recombined. I mean to affirm that all social institutions are related in a definite way to the fundamental social fact of like-mindedness, and that all criticism of social values must proceed with due reference to this condition.

To make this point clear, I will attempt to indicate to you how three social values that greatly occupy the modern mind are related to the phenomenon of like-mindedness. The watchwords of democracy are, "liberty," "equality," and "fraternity." It was the assumption of the revolutionists of France that the ideals for which these three words stand could all be simultaneously realized, and the same assumption is made by social democrats to-day. But critical thinkers, like Sir James Fitzjames Stephen have attempted to prove that these ideals are fundamentally irreconcilable. If liberty exists, they say, men will develop unequally, and will overthrow any artificial equality of social conditions. If equality is maintained, liberty must be sacrificed. What, now, are the observed facts? Do we actually sometimes see the coexistence of liberty, equality, and fraternity? Do we actually sometimes see the sacrifice of one of these conditions, in the attempt to maintain another? And if sometimes the three conditions do coexist, while at other times they do not, what are the circumstances that may be observed in each case? Actually, there have been innumerable small democracies here and there, and innumerable religious societies and fraternal organizations, in which all three of these democratic ideals have, at the same time, been fairly well realized. We are speaking now, of course, of relative, and not absolute, conditions; for no sane man has ever dreamed of absolute equality or of absolute liberty. He has dreamed only of a social state in which the approximation to equality and to liberty should be sufficiently great to outweigh the inequalities and restraints. That this condition was actually realized in most of the towns and villages of our American commonwealths, from the adoption of the Federal Constitution down to the beginning of the Civil War, I suppose no well-informed American will deny. That it is on the whole true of Republican France to-day, is

the judgment of the most careful observers. That it has always been true of certain ecclesiastical organizations, — for example, the Congregationalists, the Unitarians, the Universalists, and the Society of Friends, — is equally beyond dispute. On the other hand, it is obviously not true at the present time of our larger American cities; and it has never been true of such ecclesiastical organizations as the Roman Catholic, the Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches.

Wherein lies the difference? If we look carefully, we shall discover that those communities or other social organizations which have fairly well maintained both equality and liberty, and have reconciled them with a good degree of fraternity, have been, on the whole, noteworthy for their homogeneity. For the most part, their members have been men and women of the same race and nationality, often of the same family stocks, often of the same pursuits and circumstances in life. The communities and social organizations which, on the other hand, have been obliged to sacrifice either equality or liberty, have been heterogeneous in a high degree. The Roman Catholic organization, for example, has undertaken to include within its membership men of every race and tongue, in every clime, and in every state of life, and to insist upon their absolute spiritual equality and upon an almost unconditional fraternity in their relations to one another. This it has accomplished only by the unconditional sacrifice of intellectual and moral liberty. Its government is an unqualified absolutism. In like manner, our modern cities, like New York and Philadelphia, as they have become heterogeneous in population, have completely lost that approximate balance of liberty and equality which they originally maintained, and present to our view an astonishing medley of specific liberties and specific equalities, offset by inequalities and restrictions that our forefathers would have deemed inconceivable. Equality in the political suffrage is offset by the widest inequality of economic condition. The theoretical liberty of self-government has been lost in the practical surrender of municipal affairs to the state legislature and the party boss.

The conclusion of the whole matter, therefore, seems to be

that the words "liberty, equality, and fraternity" express a perfectly possible order of coexistence, but an impossible sequence. That is to say, we cannot begin with liberty, irrespective of fraternity and equality, and expect that liberty will then develop into fraternity and equality. It is more likely to develop into the widest inequality and burning hatreds. If, however, we first have fraternity, we can also have liberty. Men who are alike, — who have common interests, who are like-minded, — can live together on a basis of mutual agreements, without any coercive power above them to keep them in order. Men of differing nationalities and faiths, if also of discordant minds, can live and work together for a common purpose only when a coercive power maintains order among them. Fraternity, then, must be antecedent to liberty, and not liberty to fraternity, if liberty and fraternity are to coexist. And in order that there may be fraternity, there must first be homogeneity or like-mindedness. Necessary to continuing fraternity also is equality; for only as a certain degree of equality is maintained can like-mindedness prevail. Nothing will so surely bring about an irreconcilable conflict of feeling and opinion as a great inequality of economic condition, of political status, or of educational opportunity. All of the great social conflicts of history have sprung from inequality.

Sociology, then, has a clear and definite word to say on the great practical modern question of the relation of equality to republican self-government. Further progress in true republicanism will be possible just to the extent, and only to the extent, that we can gradually achieve a greater equality, without resorting to methods that destroy liberty or fraternity. Just to the extent that there develops in the community an ethical spirit which leads us to resist the monopolization by the few of resources and opportunities that should be the common heritage of all mankind, to demand that our public school system of education shall be perfected, and that our laws shall be equally enforced, our nation may become republican in fact as in name and in tradition. It was not a socialist, but that calmest of critics, Matthew Arnold, who, many years

ago, endeavoured to convince the English people that the remedy for their social evils was not to be sought in disestablishment or any other constitutional change, but rather in social equality. The more you think of it, he assured them, "the more you will be persuaded that Menander showed his wisdom quite as much when he said choose equality, as when he assured us that evil communications corrupt good manners."

This conclusion is, I think, an excellent example of the help that sociology can render us in the rational and constructive criticism of social values. It tells us that all our social values must be referred for final correction to the fundamental facts that society and social institutions are but means to an ethical end, and that society itself is grounded in like-mindedness. The Anglo-Saxon tendency is to value liberty supremely. This is a disproportionate estimation of a condition which is not, in itself, sufficient for the attainment of "the good life." The social function of liberty is to insure variation and progress, to permit the new to modify and improve the old. But liberty without fraternity and equality would disintegrate society. If, on the other hand, we supremely value equality and fraternity, to the neglect of liberty, we may easily make the mistake of trying to level conditions by radical methods, and thus put an end to progressive change. Whatever other men may think, the sociologist is unable to doubt that only the community which chiefly values equality, homogeneity, and fraternity, can permanently maintain its cohesion and stability; and that only the community which, valuing equality chiefly, values liberty in only a slightly less degree, can be both stable and progressive.

I have now indicated many of the practical values of sociology, regarded as a descriptive study of the mind of the many. The list is by no means complete. I have selected only those chiefly important ones which are more immediately connected with the most important propositions of sociological theory. Sociology enables us, in a measure, to govern the conditions on which social stability and social progress depend. It enables us to appreciate the profound

distinction between impulsive and rational social change, and to discover the dangers that lurk in the practice of attaching the sanctions of religion to irrationality. In addition to all these services, sociology enables us to attempt a rational and constructive criticism of our social values, and to combine them in a realizable social ideal. It extends its scientific description of society into the past, and projects it into the future. Its forecast is no impossible Utopia. It assumes that if the work of description is accurately done in the present, the sociologist of the future will have no occasion to substitute for it a wholly new system of facts; but will merely complete the system already begun. In a word, the supreme practical value of sociology is that, like every other science, it completes in thought, for the daily guidance of mankind, a system of facts which, as yet, are only partly given.

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THE COSTS OF PROGRESS

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He teaches "a blinding superstition," said Theophrastus Such, who teaches "that a theory of human well-being can be constructed in disregard of the influences that have made us human." If modern thought has any new truth to contribute to the inherited stock of ethical wisdom, it is because we are in a position to study more minutely than was possible in earlier days, and to interpret more exactly, the forces and conditions by which our human nature has been wrought. We shall find them to be not altogether different in kind from those that were recognized by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. Indeed, the Greek conceptions were truer than some later ones. Most of the ethical systems that have been constructed since the Protestant Reformation have dealt directly with the individual, and have attempted to work from the individual to society. In this they have been not wholly wrong. Centuries of suppression of individuality by Church and State had obscured one-half of moral truth. Men needed to be reminded that the individual, once he comes into existence, has a value in and for himself, and must be counted as a force reacting on society. But so far as ethical systems have assumed the individual as an independent starting-point of social and moral phenomena, they have been radically untrue.

The Greeks never failed to see that all rational life is a product of social conditions. To the Greek, says Butcher, "'The man *versus* the state' was a phrase unknown; the man was complete in the state; apart from it he was not only incomplete, he had no rational existence. Only through the social organism could each part, by adaptation to the others, develop its inherent powers." Nevertheless, this

doctrine of the creation of man by society was by no means completely thought out in the minds of those writers who first formulated it, and those who last concerned themselves about it left much to be added by the students of a later time. Aristotle's comparative study of one hundred and fifty-eight different communities, which enabled him first among scientific investigators to show in detail how and why the good life can have existence only in the organized state, was a theoretical no less than a practical advance beyond the speculative insight of Plato. In like manner, our modern study of social progress is an advance, both theoretical and practical, beyond the work of Plato and Aristotle, and beyond the philosophy of man as it stood when post-Kantian idealism had achieved in Germany its task of reviving Hellenic moods of thought. This assertion demands, perhaps, a single word of explanation. They misapprehend the work of science who oppose it to speculative philosophy, as if one must choose between them which god he will serve. It may be that our modern science can discover few great truths of which at least some glimmerings were not seen in ancient Greece. The very doctrine of evolution is in that sense not new. But the mission of science is a patient conversion of insight into sight; of dialectic into knowledge. Our advantage is not in a conviction more sure than Aristotle's, that he who can live without society must be either a beast or a god: it is in a minute and relatively precise knowledge of those slow but certain processes of biological and social change by which the transformation of brutality into humanity is effected. And we cannot afford to despise this more nearly perfect knowledge, as but a tedious elaboration of ideas long since familiar and accepted. It is itself a new factor in the social process. In the fateful game of chess with the unseen antagonist of Mr. Huxley's picture, it enables man to play with the cool and calculating joy of one who knows the meaning and the end of every move; knows, too, that on the other side, the play, though real and relentless, is always just, patient, and fair.

Therefore, chief among the relations of cause and effect in the wonderful process that has made us human, is one that

brings together, in a complete truth, the partial explanations that we owe to Athens, with other explanations, no less partial, that have been worked out in our own day. The action of a social medium upon intelligence and character, on the one hand, natural selection and survival on the other, — these influences together have created human faculty. There came a time in the long struggle for existence, as Mr. Wallace has shown, when mental resource counted for more than physical strength. But anthropoid apes and simian men, we have every reason to suppose, acquired mental resources through their social habits, which multiplied experiences and made tradition possible. The intelligence that association created has never ceased to depend on association for perpetuation and growth. Deprived of comradeship by circumstance or law, men go back to the brutality from which they came. Wilfully rejecting companionship, they learn, with Manfred, that man is not yet qualified to act the part of god:

> . . . "There is an order
> Of mortals on the earth, who do become
> Old in their youth, and die ere middle age,
> Without the violence of warlike death."

Therefore it has been the creatures best equipped with social habit and its products that have won and maintained supremacy in the ceaseless contention with physical nature and living enemies. Society is a means to a perfectly definite end, — namely, the survival of living creatures through a progressive evolution of their intelligence and sympathy. There can be no sociology worthy of the name which is not essentially an elaboration of this central principle. The notion that society is an end in itself amounts to an unthinkable proposition. At the same time, the intelligence and the fraternity that association creates react in their turn on society, making it better as a working organization, nobler and purer as a medium of individual life. Thus the interpretation of man as a progressive ethical being, and the interpretation of society as an ever-changing plexus of relationships, must proceed together. It is not enough to know, with the philosophers of Greece, that without society and social duty there can be

no individual moral life. They understood well the problems of social order and the nature of personal worthiness. They knew that excellence is essentially a fact of organization: Plato's demonstration that justice in the state and goodness in the individual life are neither more nor less than the co-ordinated play of mutually dependent and mutually limiting activities, in proportions harmonious with one another, and in perfect subordination to the unity of the whole, has never been equalled, certainly never surpassed, in ethical analysis. They were familiar, too, with a thousand aspects of social and of individual change. But they did not combine these elements into a synthetic conception. They were unable to unite the static with the kinetic factors of their problem, and so to arrive at the peculiarly modern notion of a moving equilibrium. And therefore they failed to achieve an entirely true and sufficient philosophy of either man or the state. For life is not the whirl of a constant number of jugglers' plates, balanced on the sword-points of the players: it is a whirl in which new plates and new motions appear at every instant, compelling ever most delicate readjustments throughout the entire system, and yet without once disturbing seriously the approximately perfect balance of the whole. The large and difficult conception, then, to which we must attain, is that of a world in which there can be no true ethical phenomena except through a process, at once progressive and orderly, of mutual modifications and adaptations of man and society by each other; in which each acquires, stage by stage, a more delicate complexity of organization. Of the many implications of this conception we must now examine some of the more important.

In philosophy of every school the term personality stands for the highest synthetic product of mental evolution. True personality is a well-unified, self-conscious mental life, harmonious within itself, capable of indefinite expansion, and sympathetic with surrounding life because realizing and comprehending in itself the manifold possibilities of life. It is the type at once of the concrete and of the universal. One who thoroughly understands this will never make the mistake

of believing, on the one hand, that utility is the fundamental word of ethics, or, on the other hand, that ethics can be complete without including utilitarianism. The fundamental word of ethics is integrity — wholeness. There can be no utility apart from a consciousness capable of wants and satisfactions. The integrity, the unity, the internal harmony of that consciousness is, therefore, the first necessity. The strongest ethical terms — as right, truth, obligation — stand in direct relation to integrity rather than to utility. The joy of activity also, including the supreme satisfaction that one may find in self-sacrifice, is related to integrity first of all, for it implies the consistent action of the whole personality; while utility is a quality, not immediately of conduct as spontaneous activity, but rather of its reactions. Therefore, if integrity and utility come into direct conflict, utility must for the moment give way; since self-conservation is preliminary to self-expansion; and because the vitality and the qualities of conduct, by which all its own consequences are conditioned, are governed by its internal unity of purpose. But there can be no enduring integrity without development, no permanent conservation without progress. Therefore, ethics cannot stop at integrity. It must expand into utilitarianism, and work out the laws of that cumulative happiness which is the reward and the confirmation of well-doing.

Put this conception of personality side by side with our view of intelligence as a product of social conditions. Is it not evident that personality, in this philosophical sense, comes into being only in the relatively perfect society, which has passed beyond the limitations of tribal existence, and even of a narrow nationalism, into a sympathetic relation to mankind in all its varied phases of development? If so, it is a product of progressive, as distinguished from both stationary and anarchistic, or disintegrating, society; and the theory of personality can be worked out only in terms of a theory of social progress.

In detail this means that a society in which the highest type of mind can appear is one that has had, first, such a vigorous ethnical or national existence, and, second, such

varied contact with surrounding peoples, that it has become plastic without losing its distinctive character. In the nomenclature of evolution, it has acquired internal mobility without losing cohesion. By admixture of bloods, a variable but not unstable physical nature has been produced. By numberless comparisons of one mode of civilization with another, a mental temper at once critical and catholic has been created. Prosperity and a rapidly increasing population have brought the young and enterprising to the front in the conduct of affairs. Selection has weeded out those who could neither learn nor forget. Force and authority in the social organization have so far given way to spontaneous initiative that the individual can find scope for the development of his latent powers, but not so far as to permit disintegration. Contact and converse being the conditions of progress, its phases are an increase of material well-being, an inclusive sympathy, a catholic rationality, and a flexible social constitution, adapting itself readily to changing conditions, yet of enduring strength. And since the conservation of energy is a fact of social as of physical phenomena, the essential nature of progress, beneath all conditions and phases, is a conversion of lower — that is, more simple, imperfectly organized — modes of energy into higher. Economic activities transform the energies of physical nature into social force, of which there is no other source whatever, since artistic, religious, educational, and political activities are but a further transformation of the results of economic effort. In the medium of all these activities is moulded their final product, the human personality, which could come into being in no other way and under no other circumstances.

Such are a few of the sociological facts that underlie ethical problems. It is interesting to reflect that in a vague way the great truth which they contain, that without social progress there can be no human personality, and, therefore, no ethics, has always been present in popular consciousness. The experiences of individual life, of course, afford a basis for it, since the years from childhood to maturity are nor-

mally a period of increasing personal power, in which every ambitious man believes that he was born to accomplish some desirable transformation of the community. But social experiences in the mass have doubtless built the superstructure. Studies in ethnology and comparative religions are pointing to the probable conclusion that faith in progress has been an essential element in every religious belief. Under some circumstances it may be the only element. Charity-workers in the slums of Paris and London report that an undefined, shadowy belief in a better state of things is the last trace of religious consciousness discoverable in whole classes of the very poor. What has been the genesis of the conviction? Everywhere social advance has been brought about through successive waves of conquest. Naturally enough, in the minds of the conquerors, the good order, the right order, has been identified with the new order of things which they have sought to establish. The evil order has been the old way of life that was followed by the subjugated enemies who are now reduced to serfdom. Good spirits are those who favour the plans of the enterprising and successful, in whose control are the shaping of public policy and the dictation of orthodox belief. It is true that orthodoxy is no sooner born than it turns conservative and seeks to maintain itself against further change. But the effort is vain. Another conquest, or a new generation, brings new men and new issues to the fore, and a new orthodoxy stands ever ready to crowd the old relentlessly to the wall. The conquered and oppressed, on their part, have a doctrine of progress also. It is a faith in a future in which justice shall be done, when they shall be delivered from their captivity and in their turn put their ruthless enemies under foot. In time a closer intercourse and a finer feeling soften and blend these conflicting faiths into a belief in the ultimate happiness and perfection of all classes.

Crude and even visionary as it may be, this perennial faith in progress is the motive power of moral life. Science must rectify it at a thousand points, but the very first word of an ethical science that is not charlatanism itself must be an

unequivocal declaration that such faith *in se* is the beginning of righteousness. The first law of life is a law of motion. In society, as on the street, the preliminary duty is to "move on." The nation that has no further reconstructions to effect, no new ideals to realize in practice, has completed its work, and will disappear before the warfare or the migrations of more earnest men. But the moving on must be developmental: mere change is not evolution, but confusion; and the nature and limitations of an evolutionary process, imperfectly recognized as yet in ethical discussion, are practically unknown to popular thought. It is here, then, that the rectifying work of science must begin. Human society is not a something-for-nothing endowment order. The vision of a completed society, lacking neither material comfort nor any moral excellence, in which foolishness, want, and suffering could linger only as dim memories of an imperfect past, has had a strangely persistent fascination for speculative minds in every age. Common sense has never accepted the dream for reality; for common sense is a sceptic from the beginning. Philosophy has doubted if evil be not inherent in the nature of the world, and therefore ineradicable. But doubt and scepticism have fallen far short of reasoned demonstration from experience that the vision is inherently absurd. Yet the elements of the demonstration that science has been patiently working out in recent years are simple enough. The available energy of society at any given moment is strictly limited in amount. The total can be increased only by parting with some, in the thought and labour by which larger stores of physical energy, contained in the natural resources of the environment, are set free and converted to human use. All progress, therefore, is conditioned by cost; and if the law of conservation holds good in these matters, as we have assumed that it must, the cost will increase with the progress — not, however, necessarily in the same ratio as the gain, since riper knowledge should enable us to get more from physical nature with a given expenditure of human effort. In this simple form the limitations of progress present an economic rather than a moral problem, and need not

detain us at the present time. But since society is an organic aggregate, the cost of progress takes on various complications, out of which grow ethical problems that are both grave and difficult. As was shown in the illustration of the moving equilibrium, society, as an aggregate that is simultaneously losing and absorbing motion, must experience an incessant rearrangement of its parts. This means two very important things: First, there can be no social gain that does not entail somewhere, on the whole community or on a class, the break-up of long-established relations, interests, and occupations, and the necessity of a more or less difficult readjustment. Second, the increase of social activity, which is the only phase of progress that most people ever see at all, may so exceed the rate of constructive readjustment that the end is disorganization and ruin.

For the further examination of these propositions, let us translate them from physical terms into the language of feeling. This is legitimate; because the destruction of familiar relations and the necessity of establishing new ones are known immediately in consciousness in terms of hardship or suffering, while any disorganization of social or of individual life involves the pain of moral retrogression. The limitations of progress, then, are these: First, there can be no social progress, and therefore no evolution of ethical personality, except at the price of an absolute, but not necessarily a relative, increase of suffering. Second, if the increase of social activity, which is one phase of progress, becomes disproportionate to the constructive reorganization of social relationships, which is the complementary phase, the increase of suffering will become degeneration and moral evil.

Such limitations are not a cheering aspect of social progress; but their reality is fully established in historical and in statistical fact, and they sharply define our ethical obligations. The first of these sobering propositions has to be made a shade darker still. The suffering that progress costs is borne for the most part vicariously. The classes who are displaced, whose interests and occupations are broken up by the relentless course of change, are not the ones who secure

the joys of richer and ampler life. That which enormously benefits mankind is too often the irretrievable ruin of the few. For illustration, one need not be confined to the familiar facts of the wasting of barbarian peoples before the advance of civilization, or of the sacrifice of life in national self-defence. The history of industrial progress affords examples quite as striking, and essentially more significant, since they show that after society has settled down to the quiet occupations of peace, the fundamental conditions of its development remain unchanged. In reviewing them, the sociologist expects to find that the minority which thus suffers the pains of progress is composed mainly of the most unprogressive elements of the population, and he is not disappointed. But he finds evidences also that to some extent the sufferers are recruited by victims of pure misfortune, whose undoing has been caused neither by their nature nor by their conduct.

When in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the growth of towns, money payments, and the commutation of week work loosened the bonds of custom and law that had held the serf to the manor, the entire commonwealth of England experienced an economic prosperity never before known. Population and wealth increased, and the free tenants, as a class, rose steadily in social position. They could cultivate more or less land, or engage in trade and obtain municipal charters. But the economic equality of an earlier day had disappeared. The growth of population brought men into the world for whom there were places enough, and more than enough, but not places already allotted to them in the social order. They were places that had to be discovered by intelligence and enterprise, qualities that are not possessed by all men equally. The full virgate of land was no longer secured by customary law to each family. Since the energetic and strong could control more, the easy-going and weak had to get on with less. In the towns the far-seeing and forehanded quickly monopolized trade and the more profitable crafts. And so, while this comparative freedom of enterprise stimulated activity in a hundred ways that made England, as a nation, richer and stronger, it destroyed the old economic

footing of the less competent members of society, and left them to struggle on, thenceforth, as a wage-earning class.

Two hundred years later, in the sixteenth century, society was again transformed by the results of geographical discovery. Free capital and foreign commerce quickened industry and thought into intense and brilliant life. "It was indeed a stirring time," writes Hyndman, obliged to admit that this period, which he calls the "iron age" of the peasantry and wage classes, was, nevertheless, one of marvellous progress in other respects. "A new world was being discovered in art and in science in Europe, as well as in actual existence on the other side of the Atlantic. . . . Never before had so great an impulse been given to human enterprise and human imagination." But the splendour had its price, a price that socialists like Hyndman have superficially described and most imperfectly understood. Political integration had been going on. The struggle of contending factions had been costly, and the reëstablished national life, with its manifold activities, was more costly. Barons discharged the bands of retainers that were no longer needed in civil strife. To better their fortunes, the great lords enclosed common lands that had been freely used by the yeomanry, and began evicting tenants to convert agricultural lands into the sheep pastures that required little labour and returned a quick money income from sales of wool in Flanders. Now the misery of the people thus displaced and forced into wage labour or vagabondage, was not due to any actual lack of land or of industrial opportunity. There remained land enough and to spare, notwithstanding enclosures and evictions, had it been used rightly; while the development of manufactures and of commerce had only begun. If they had possessed the knowledge and the will to cultivate arable land more intensively, they could not have been driven from the soil; if there had been a free mobility of labour, they could have found employment quickly in the best, instead of tardily in the worst markets, as too often happened; if the organizing ability of employers had been greater, the best markets would more quickly have found them. But the social value of land had become too great for

their wasteful methods: they had to change or go. That knowledge might increase, that freedom to come and go might be established, that the organization of enterprise might be perfected, it was necessary that just these economic and social changes, which accomplished so much ruin, should take place. Consequently, if the world was to become a larger and a better place for the alert, on-moving many, the sacrifice of the sluggish had to be.

The industrial revolution at the close of the eighteenth century again occasioned displacements of labour, that bore more distinctly the character of misfortunes to those who were injured by them. No degree of skill, enterprise, or assiduity could have enabled the handicraftsmen to hold their own in competition with power-machinery and the steam-engine. They could do nothing but leave their shops to wind and weather, and begin life over, on new terms, in factory towns. How many thousands of them never fully reëstablished themselves, how many succumbed to illness or even to actual starvation before economic reorganization was fairly completed, the reports of parliamentary inquiries bear witness. Yet an unprecedented increase of population was proof that, on the whole, the masses of the people had never been so prosperous. Before 1751 the largest decennial increase had been three per cent; before 1781 it did not exceed six per cent. Then, all at once, it rose, decade by decade, to nine, eleven, fourteen, and finally, between 1811 and 1821, to eighteen per cent. At the present time the displacement of manual labour by machinery is incessant, and less than in any previous period is the suffering visited on the least valuable portion of the population, since not infrequently it is men of a higher standard of life who are forced out by the competition of a lower type. Nevertheless, so enormous has been the net gain from improved methods of production that the consequences of displacement are immeasurably less serious than they were a century ago. The chances of finding reëmployment quickly are, for competent men, far greater than they have been at any former time; and the period of search is made endurable by accumu-

lated savings and varied forms of aid. All in all, industrial history discloses a progressive diminution of the proportion of inevitable suffering mixed with the gains of progress. But the absolute increase remains. The personnel of the displaced class changes more rapidly than in earlier times, but the class, as a class, is endlessly renewed. As a class, it can never disappear, so long as progress continues.

Such, in its simplest statement, is the law of the cost of progress. "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." Whatever augments well-being destroys some livelihood. As an abstract proposition, no well-informed student of social phenomena would call this truth in question. But, unfortunately, the law-makers, the social reformers, and the moralists have not bound it upon their fingers nor written it upon the tables of their hearts. They legislate, reform, and advise, forgetful that their wisest endeavours can be at the best only "something between a hindrance and a help"; and the world goes on, therefore, not only deceiving itself with dreams, but wasting its resources on impossible undertakings.

For this principle is one that would make the instant quietus of many vain questionings if it were an ever-present element in our thinking. The poor have been always with us. Must they be with us always? Or may we hope that economic prosperity and social justice will one day mete out comfort, if not abundance, to all? Not unless we can attain "finality in a world of change." Not unless there is a definite limit to the intellectual and moral progress of the race; for the conditions that would eliminate poverty from the earth would infallibly terminate the life that is more than meat, in society first, and afterwards in individuals. Unless all men could be made equally prudent, equally judicious, neither an increase of wealth nor changes in its distribution could prevent the occasional sweeping away of possessions by the social rearrangements that progress demands. The relative dimensions of poverty will contract and its misery will be alleviated, but there is no reason to believe that it will ever wholly disappear.

Will multitudes of human beings remain always in prac-

tical subjection to individual or corporate masters? Can we not abolish economic slavery, as we have abolished legal bondage? Aristotle's argument that slavery inheres in civilization has shocked the sensitive and amused the shallow, while both have quoted it to show what foolishness a philosopher can teach. But to the wise it will ever remain a profound though mournful truth. Essential slavery has aptly been described as the estate of a man who "can't get any freedom." We have changed the legal conditions under which millions of men and women perform ill-requited tasks of daily toil. To some extent we have diminished the total magnitude of their misery, if not in every individual case its extreme intensity. But we have not enabled them to get actual freedom. We have made it unlawful to buy and sell their persons. The master can no longer obtain control of the labourer's time and strength, and therefore of his freedom, from any legal principal but the labourer himself. The labourer cannot even sell his own freedom in perpetuity. But he can sell any portion of it, or all of it subdivided into portions, for a limited period of time, or for his whole life subdivided into periods. Practically, therefore, any man or woman may sell his or her entire freedom for life, and practically thousands of both men and women are compelled by hunger to make the sale on terms that are personally degrading. Yet that interpretation of this melancholy fact which attributes it to the wickedness and greed of a capital-owning class is a tissue of economic and sociological fallacies. Another interpretation, which explains it as unavoidable misfortune, becomes a perversion of history when, in the desire to prove that the world has grown better, it assumes that ancient legal slavery was a consciously devised oppression. Neither oppression nor greed has been at any time the first cause of legal bondage or of economic dependence. Both are secondary causes, induced by experiences with a slavery already existent.

Modern civilization does not require, it does not even need, the drudgery of needle-women or the crushing toil of men in a score of life-destroying occupations. If these wretched beings should drop out of existence and no others stood ready

to fill their places, the economic activities of the world would not greatly suffer. A thousand devices latent in inventive brains would quickly make good any momentary loss. The true view of the facts is that these people continue to exist after the kinds of work that they know how to perform have ceased to be of any considerable value to society. Society continues to employ them for a remuneration not exceeding the cost of getting the work done in some other and perhaps better way. The economic law here referred to is one that has been too much neglected in scientific discussion. It ought to be repeated and illustrated at every opportunity, for at present it stands in direct contradiction to current prepossessions. We are told incessantly that unskilled labour creates the wealth of the world. It would be nearer the truth to say that large classes of unskilled labour hardly create their own subsistence. The labourers that have no adaptiveness, that bring no new ideas to their work, that have no suspicion of the next best thing to turn to in an emergency, might much better be identified with the dependent classes than with the wealth-creators. Precisely the same economic law offers the true interpretation of ancient slavery. In strictness, civilization did not rest on slavery. It was not in any true sense maintained by slavery. The conditions that created the civilization created economic dependence, and they are working in the same way, with similar results, to-day. Ancient civilization accepted the dependence and utilized it in the crude form of slavery. Modern civilization accepts and utilizes it in the slightly more refined form of the wages system.

Certain great social tasks of creative organization have always confronted our race. The enforced effort to achieve them has been history's great competitive examination. The slaves and serfs have been those who have failed. The first great necessity was social unity — the power to act together in a disciplined way — and the first slaves were those who could not create a sufficiently coherent social organization to sustain a growing civilization. They had to make way before others who were equal to that great achievement, and they

became slaves, not solely nor chiefly because of a conqueror's tyranny, but primarily because slavery or serfdom was practically the only economic disposition that could be made of them. To-day social unity has been in good measure established, and the world has entered on yet larger undertakings. The condition and assurance of freedom to-day is the ability to devise new things, to create new opportunities, to make not only two blades of grass grow where one grew before, but to make a hundred kinds of grass grow where before grew none at all. Accordingly, the practically unfree task-workers of this present time are those who, unaided, can accomplish none of these new things. They are those who might do well in old familiar ways, but who have nothing to turn to when their ways cease to be of value to the world. To live, they must force depreciated services upon society, on any terms that society can continue to allow. They are unfree task-workers, not because society chooses to oppress them, but because society has not yet devised or stumbled upon any other disposition to make of them. Civilization, therefore, is not cruel: rather it is ever supporting and trying to utilize the wrecks and failures of its own imperfect past.

But it may be said: All these negative conclusions are based on the assumption that the régime of individualism is to continue. Might not redemption from poverty and dependence be possible under the reign of a beneficent socialism?

Two systems of socialism have been proposed, if we classify them according to plans of organization, and two if we classify with reference to a proposed division of wealth. According to one plan, industrial administration would be centralized; according to the other it would be decentralized. Either of these systems might be communistic, incomes being made equal throughout society, or either might be non-communistic, the services of different men being valued unequally.

Decentralized socialism would merely substitute competing communities for competing private organizations. It would follow that some communities would prosper more than others; and that some, therefore, would presently come under subjection to the others. A centralized socialism would probably

attempt to establish a rigid and final system of occupations, in the hope of preventing industrial derangements. If successful, the attempt would make an end of progress. If no such attempt were made, men would be thrown, as now, from time to time, out of that ideal arrangement in which each did the work to which he was best adapted; and therefore, if rewarded in proportion to their services, the unfortunates would receive, as now, only the pittance that would barely support life. The one difference would be that society in its corporate capacity would assume the responsibility of finding new work for them; but, rewarding them according to performance only, it would practically have them in absolute subjection. They would only have exchanged masters, and slavery to individuals for slavery to society.

If, vainly hoping to escape from this dilemma, society should not only assume the responsibility of finding new opportunities for the displaced, but should undertake to compensate them for the buffetings and losses that they had suffered by reason of industrial changes, and regardless of their resulting worth to the commonwealth, it would radically transform the character of its socialism. Rewarding no longer according to service, the socialism would become communism. Men of unequal power to work and to use, of widely varying capacities to enjoy, would share alike the common product of their labour. Only one result could follow. Men of animal natures, having as large incomes as men of a higher mental and moral development, would spend inevitably a disproportionate share on the grosser sorts of gratification. Materialism of life, with all its moral debasement, would be the unprofitable substitute for economic hardship. Income can never be greatly disproportionate to the social value of a man's work, talents, culture, and virtues, without degrading him. If it be said that at present many men whose whole social value is of the slightest do have, in fact, fabulous incomes, which socialism would diminish, the reply is that there are not, accurately speaking, many such men, and that there would be no apparent advantage in substituting a systematic breeding of dull sensualists for the sporadic genesis of more brilliant de-

bauchees. Be that as it may, the men and women of this class exemplify and verify the law. Their lives lend the sting of truth to the saying, "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!"

Shall we, then, conclude that an unrestrained individualism, eagerly working out those social changes that seem advantageous to their promoters, can achieve limitless progress, and that only harm could come from any checking of the rate or intensity of its activity? Shall we assume that the inevitable costs of progress, in economic loss and human suffering, must be uncomplainingly borne by those on whom they fall, because all private reforms are utopian, and all public regulation of industry or assumption of its losses, in accordance with any form of socialism or of communism, would be worse than folly? Must we acknowledge that society has no moral responsibility for the consequences of the processes and changes by which its own well-being and ethical life are maintained? Shall we give ourselves over to the belief that *laissez faire* is the last word of social science and the first law of ethics? Assuredly and most emphatically, no! Nothing in the conditions of progress, as set forth in the foregoing study, so much as hints at other than negative answers to these questions. On the contrary, if the law of evolution as exemplified in human society has been rightly understood, we shall be prepared to find certain very real limitations of the number and extent of the social, political, or industrial metamorphoses which, within a given period, can combine in genuine progress. We shall look to discover a growing necessity for integral social action. We shall expect to hear the ethical consciousness of humanity declaring that society is morally responsible for the costs of its existence.

In dynamic phenomena of every kind results are a function, as the mathematicians express it, of time. With a given amount of energy, you can go in an hour or a day a given distance. Prolong the time, and you can increase the distance. In the inconceivably complicated dynamic phenomena of life, growth, organization, and development, are all functions of time. Force the rate of transformation, and you simply

prevent the establishment of some relations of integration, differentiation, or segregation, necessary to complete organization. And if organization is incomplete, there is a limit to the life-possibilities of the organism: it can perform less and enjoy less while it lives, and its dissolution will begin earlier. Society on a great scale, as the individual life on a smaller scale, exemplifies all these laws. If social evolution is to continue, and the ethical life of man is to become larger and richer with increasing happiness, social organization in the future will be, not simpler than it is now, but immeasurably more complex. In its larger being, individualism, socialism, and communism will not be the mutually exclusive things that they now seem to be. There will be not a narrower but a wider field for individual effort, not less but more personal liberty. At the same time, more enterprises will be brought under public control; and more of the good things of life will be distributed, like the sunshine and the air, in free and equal portions. The displaced men and women will be more quickly reëstablished than now, their services will be made of greater value, and society will assume a larger portion of the burden of their misfortunes. All these things are implications of the second of the limitations of progress to which attention has been called, — namely, that if the increase of social activity becomes disproportionate to the constructive reorganization of social relationships, the increase of suffering will become degeneration and moral evil. Some of the facts in evidence must be briefly noted.

Dazzled by the magnificent results of material progress already achieved, men throw themselves into the great enterprises of modern life with the zest of an ambition that knows no bounds. The rate of industrial, professional, political, and intellectual activity becomes proportionate to the swiftness of electricity and steam. The intense struggle for success causes three great demographic changes which profoundly modify the social conditions of existence.

The first is a phenomenal increase of population, following an enormous production of wealth. We have already seen how improved industrial conditions in England, in the first

part of this century, were followed instantly by an unprecedented increase of population. At the present time, the increase of population in England and Wales, by births in excess of deaths, is not less than one thousand souls daily. The expansion of the population of the United States from 3,929,214 in 1790 to 62,622,250 in 1890, while the population of Europe, in spite of enormous emigration, has been rapidly multiplying, is a phenomenon that Longstaff accurately describes as absolutely unique in history.

The second change referred to is a rapid concentration of this increasing population in large cities, where the great prizes of worldly success are striven for and won. This movement and its consequences are already attracting the serious attention of sociologists to the grave problems they present. Of the 1000 daily births in excess of deaths in England and Wales, 408 are born in the seventy-six largest cities and towns, and 592 in the country; but only 437 remain in the country-places of their birth: 112 migrate to the cities, and 43 to foreign lands. In the United States, in 1790, 3.35 per cent of the population lived in cities of 8000 or more inhabitants. Now 29.12 per cent live in cities of equal or larger size; while in the Atlantic coast division, comprising the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, more than one-half of the population are urban inhabitants. This means that population is flowing into the cities much faster than the reorganization of the manifold phases of town life, including municipal government, is making urban conditions as wholesome as those of the country. The result is that continual drain upon the fresh vitality of the country, to meet the incessant destruction of vitality in the towns, which makes the depopulation of rural sections so grave a matter for the future of civilization. "By a curious perversion," says Longstaff, "the advantage of towns is said to be 'life.' There is in truth more life in a given space, more high pressure, more rush; but it is the rush of a clock running down."

A displacement, in certain industries, of men of a relatively high standard of life by cheaper men of a lower standard,

more rapidly than the better men can find places in industries requiring relatively intelligent labour, is the third demographic consequence of intense activity. The normal displacement, as has been shown, is of the dull, mechanical, non-adaptable man by a more versatile competitor. But industries are not all of the same character. Some are more progressive in their methods than others, because they contribute to the satisfaction of continually developing wants, which create a varying demand, while others minister to wants that are relatively stationary. In some, therefore, the high-priced man is the cheap man; in others the low-priced man is the cheaper man. Economists who have contended that high wages mean a low cost of labour, and those who have affirmed the contrary, are alike half right and half wrong. They have been observing different classes of industries. Under a perfectly uniform, self-regulating circulation of labour, the versatile man, of the high standard of life, would displace the cheaper man in one class of industries, and the duller, cheaper man would displace higher-priced labour in the other class. Under normal progress the major displacement would be of inferior by superior men. But unless economic evolution, creating new wants and varying demands, and reorganizing industry to supply them, is going on more rapidly than the growth of social unrest, or of those political policies that so often force vast hordes of destitute people into migrations that have no definite destination — as in the case of the Russian Jews — there may be a cruel and ruinous substitution of the lower for the higher grade of workman, prematurely and far beyond normal limits. It would not be unfortunate that the Irishman should displace the native American, that the French Canadian should in turn displace the Irishman, and that finally the Hungarian or the Pole should displace the French Canadian, if the men of the higher standard of life could immediately step into industries of a higher grade. But when this is not possible, when they can live only by sinking to the level of their more brutal competitors, it is an evil of great magnitude.

Under such circumstances, the intense competition of the

struggle for success, due partly to ambition, but primarily to the quickening rate of industrial and social transformation, piles up in the community a frightful wreckage of physical and moral degeneration. Every sociologist, every statistician, has been struck with the seemingly anomalous fact that suicide, insanity, crime, and vagabondage, increase with wealth, education, and refinement; that they are, in a word, as Morselli says, phenomena of civilization. But the fact is not altogether anomalous, after all. These things are a part of the cost of progress, forms that the cost of progress takes when the rate of social activity exceeds the rate of constructive reorganization. Quicken the pace of a moving army, and the number of the unfortunates who will fall exhausted by the way will be disproportionately increased. Besides quickening the pace, let discipline lapse and organization break up, and the number of stragglers will be more than doubled. Increase the strain of any kind of competitive work and derange the conditions under which it is done, and the percentage of failures will rise. That this is the far-reaching explanation of the physical, intellectual, and moral degeneration that we behold on every side, notwithstanding a marvellous multiplication of all the influences that make for good, is not to be doubted by one who will patiently study the facts recorded in moral and vital statistics. Thus, the number of suicides in Italy was 29 per 1,000,000 inhabitants in 1864, when her people were just entering on a new and larger life under national unity; while in 1877 it had risen to 40 per 1,000,000. In France, in 1827 the number was 48 per 1,000,000; but before 1875 it had risen to 155. In England a rate of 62 in 1830 had risen to 73 in 1876. In Saxony a rate of 158 in 1836 had risen to 391 in 1877.[1] Is it any wonder that Morselli, from whose laborious monograph these figures are taken, says that "in the aggre-

[1] Later figures, given by Maurice Block ("L'Europe Politique et Sociale," deuxième édition, 1893, p. 460), are as follows: Italy, 1888, 53 per 1,000,000 inhabitants, 1889, 47 per 1,000,000; France, 1889, 212 per 1,000,000; England, 1889, 80 per 1,000,000. In Massachusetts the proportion was 69 per 1,000,000 in the period 1851–55, and 90.9 in the period 1881–85. See "Statistics of Suicide in New England," by Davis R. Dewey, *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, June–September, 1892.

gate of the civilized states of Europe and America, the frequency of suicide shows a growing and uniform increase, so that generally voluntary death since the beginning of the century has increased and goes on increasing more rapidly than the geometrical augmentation of the population and of the general mortality"? Elsewhere he says, and his figures prove, that "it is those countries which possess a higher standard of general culture which furnish the largest contingent of voluntary deaths," and that the proportion of suicides is greater in the compact population of urban centres than among the more scattered inhabitants of the country.

The phenomena of insanity follow the same general laws, with the difference that the abnormal loneliness of isolated country districts, drained of their population and social resources by migration to the cities, is as deleterious as the overcrowding and fierce competition of towns. According to the figures of the eleventh federal census, the inmates of public asylums and hospitals for the insane were 2.10 per 1000 inhabitants in the North Atlantic division and 2.25 per 1000 in the Western division. It is in these sections that life is most intense. In the North Central division the ratio was 1.28 to 1000, in the South Atlantic division the ratio was 1.27 to 1000, and in the South Central division it was only 0.71 to 1000. Some allowance must be made for the larger number of deranged persons not committed to public institutions in some sections than in others, but this will not greatly affect the interpretation of the figures — an interpretation fully borne out by the researches of specialists. Maudsley, for example, says, "I cannot but think that the extreme passion for getting rich, absorbing the whole energies of life, predisposes to mental degeneracy in offspring, either to moral defect, or to intellectual deficiency, or to outbursts of positive insanity."

That crime is an effect of poverty it is no longer possible to believe, since it varies independently of poverty, and directly with other social conditions and with the strain of progress. Thus, serious crimes, including theft, are not more frequent in poor than in wealthy countries. On the contrary, in England the trials for theft are 228 per 100,000 inhabitants annu-

ally, while in Ireland they are but 101, in Hungary 82, and in Spain 74. Everywhere, too, crimes are less frequent in winter, when the hardships of poverty are most grievous, than in summer, when they are more easily borne. Again, crime is not a monopoly of the poor, since all classes contribute to our jail and prison population in very nearly exact proportion to their total numbers; and Professor Falkner has shown that in the United States serious crime is more frequently committed by the native than by the foreign-born. On the other hand, keener competition is everywhere followed by increasing criminality, as is most strikingly shown by the statistics of criminality among women. The crimes of women have been heretofore in small proportion to the crimes of men, but with the opening of hundreds of new industrial and professional opportunities to the sex hitherto shielded from the fiercer contentions of the social life-struggle, the figures of arrests and commitments of women show a sad increase. "In all countries where social habits and customs constrain women to lead retiring and secluded lives," says Morrison, "the number of female criminals descends to a minimum." Thus in Greece, in 1889, there were only 50 women in a total prison population of 5023. In England, on the other hand, women constitute 17 per cent of the whole number of offenders; while in Scotland, where the industrial emancipation of women is most complete, no less than 27 per cent of the offences tried in criminal courts in 1880 were committed by women, and in 1888 that percentage had risen to 37.

Of the rapid increase of vagabondage with social unrest and industrial evolution, but a word need be said. Professor McCook, of Trinity College, Hartford, who has made an exhaustive study of this question, finds that we are supporting in this country an army of 48,848 tramps. At the lowest estimate, it costs to feed these absolutely worthless wretches $7,938,520 a year. Adding their hospital, jail, and prison expenses, the total becomes $9,000,000.

The end of these things would be social disintegration and paralysis, but for a reaction that they start in the public mind. The ethical consciousness of society is aroused and unified by

such evidences that civilization and progress are not an unmixed good. More imperative daily becomes the demand for a public and private philanthropy that shall be governed by the results of scientific inquiry; which shall work no longer at cross purposes, but shall merge their plans and efforts in a unified policy to ameliorate, as far as possible, conditions that man can never wholly remove, but which he can easily make worse. How far can this demand be met?

The practical solution of the problem depends on a difficult combination of two very difficult things. The first is to convince one set of people that society ought to assume the costs of its progress, and, as far as possible, take openly the responsibility for replacing the displaced. This is the element of truth in socialism. We have, indeed, made some progress in this direction. Practically and theoretically society admitted the obligation when, in the reigns of the Tudors, it began to supplement private and ecclesiastical charity by systems of public relief. In a hundred forms of legislation and administration, in public education, in the multiplication of asylums and hospitals, in a thousand modes of private beneficence, the duty is being more adequately discharged by each later generation. But we are yet very far from comprehending its full extent. We realize but faintly how far the incompetent and impoverished have been made such by social movements that have cut them off from any possibility of personal improvement. The second difficulty is to convince another set of people of the fallacy of a cardinal socialistic notion — namely, that industrial derangements can be prevented in a progressive world; and, further, to convince them that the greatest possible compensation of thousands of able-bodied human beings who are relatively useless to the community, and, therefore, poor, depends upon their being held for the while in practical subjection to other individuals or to the commonwealth.

We have heard a great deal in recent years about Christian socialism, and one of the most interesting developments in the ecclesiastical world is the growing belief that Christianity ought to prove its pretensions by demonstrating its power to

solve social problems. It is, however, noteworthy that in all this discussion the most important single doctrine that Christianity has to contribute to social science has been forgotten or ignored. The doctrine referred to is that of the distinction between those who are free from the law and those who are under bondage to the law. The key to the solution of the social problem will be found in a frank acceptance of the fact that some men in every community are inherently progressive, resourceful, creative, capable of self-mastery and self-direction, while other men, capable of none of these things, can be made useful, comfortable, and essentially free, only by being brought under bondage to society and kept under mastership and discipline until they have acquired power to help and govern themselves. If one should say that we all believe this doctrine — that it is in no sense new — the necessary reply would be that we nevertheless habitually disregard it in every matter save the juridical distinction between the law-abiding and the criminal. We accept *laissez faire* as the expedient rule for all men and all industries alike, or we denounce it as bad for all alike. We advocate socialistic methods for the entire field of industry, or we pronounce them impracticable for any part of it. We denounce compulsory education for any class in the community, or we insist on forcing it upon all classes. And in all these sayings and doings we confound unlike things, and show ourselves irrational in the last degree.

What, then, in concrete detail, are some of the ethical obligations placed upon individuals and upon society by the conditions of social progress?

The law that the progressive, self-governing members of society should lay on themselves must include at least three groups of duties. First, they must resist, personally and in their influence, the tendency to subordinate every higher consideration to that mere quickening of competitive activity which so easily goes beyond its normal function of means to end, and becomes an irrational, unjustifiable end in itself. Especially in the education of children who are seen to be

ambitious should everything that savours of competition be absolutely put away. The competitive examination of such children is nothing less than essential crime, essential insanity, essential idiocy, for all these things will be among its results. Second, they must resort more freely, as fortunately they are beginning to do, to country life; and especially must they provide the conditions of country life to the greatest possible extent for children, not only their own but those of the city poor. Third, they must cultivate that true individuality in the consumption of wealth, which is not only the mark of genuine manliness or womanliness, but which surely reacts on economic demand in ways that give a competitive advantage to the higher industrial qualities of men whose own standard of life is high.

The duties that society must discharge in its relation to the general conditions of progressive activity, and to its members who are undeveloped or degenerate, fall also into three groups. First, society must assume the regulation of international migration. Each nation must be made to bear the burden of pauperism, ignorance, and degeneracy caused by its own progress or wrong-doing. Society must also assume the regulation, by industrial and labour legislation, of those industries in which free competition displaces the better man by the inferior. Perhaps in time some of these industries may advantageously come directly under public management, as socialism proposes. Second, society must act on the fact that a proportion of its population must always be practically unfree, by extending compulsory education to the children of all parents who are unable or unwilling to provide in their own way a training that the commonwealth can approve. This education should be as perfectly adapted as knowledge, money, and sincerity of purpose can make it, to the work of fitting the children of the poor for life in a changing, progressive world. Third, society should enslave — not figuratively, but literally — all those men and women who voluntarily betake themselves to a life of vagabondage. The time has passed when food and shelter should be given by kindly sentimentalists to the tramp, or when the public

should deal with his case in any partial way. Every tramp within the borders of civilization should be placed under arrest and put at severe, enforced labour under public direction.

These are the positive obligations of individuals and of the state that seem to be disclosed by a study of social progress. But we must not forget that the same conditions impose a negative duty also — an obligation of restraint. For all reform, all philanthropic work, is itself a phase of social progress, and, like all others, has a cost in effort and suffering. Therefore, if philanthropic reform is hurried, or pursued by too radical methods, it may convert the absolute increase of evil, which progress costs, into a relative increase, and so wholly defeat itself. Those distinguished Italian students of criminal anthropology, Lombroso and Laschi, have lately pointed out that political crime (the crime, that is, of those who unsuccessfully resist governmental authority) consists essentially in the attempt to accomplish in crude and violent ways desirable changes or reforms for which society is not yet ready. Devotion to the cause of progress these authors call philoneism; while the dread of change they call misoneism. Society is, on the whole, misoneistic; and therefore we can mend its ways but slowly. For, whatever happens, we must keep in touch with our fellow-men, remembering always the fine, true words of Marcus Aurelius: "The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly, it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, coördinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one another the things which are the best."

VI

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

VI

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Under all disguises, and in all its forms, the labour movement is a struggle for control. The objects that the wage earner desires are not different in kind from those that appeal to the employer and to the professional man. All men alike desire material goods and personal freedom. Every wage earner who is dissatisfied with his lot, however, believes that his share of goods is small and that his real freedom to follow his own will is curtailed because the organization of industry is monarchical or oligarchic. He therefore hopes for the success of some scheme that will make industry, like politics, democratic. The plan that he favours may be nothing more than a perfecting of trade unionism; it may be coöperation; or it may be socialism or anarchism. But whatever it is in name and form, in essence it is an attempt to put the wage earner in control of the conditions under which he works.

Historically and practically, the most important gains that workingmen have made in their struggle for control, have been secured through political activity; and, in all probability, law and government will continue to be the most effective instrumentalities that industrial democracy can employ.

The first writer who fully comprehended this truth was Ferdinand Lassalle. Lassalle's "Workingman's Programme" has aptly been called the gospel of the labour movement. No one who has not read it has grasped the issues of discontent in their historical connections, their motives, and their tendencies. Before Lassalle, social questions interested the few —

theorists, students, and social experimenters. Karl Marx's ponderous work on "Capital" would never have been read by many labouring men had not their enthusiasm been kindled by the brilliant Lassalle, a man perhaps less learned than Marx, but standing higher in social life, and endowed with that rare gift of so stating the most momentous propositions that they fascinate and quicken the dullest minds. The "Workingman's Programme" was one of a series of addresses delivered in Berlin in 1862, and for its bold utterances its author paid the penalty of a term of imprisonment. On the score of radicalism, these utterances would scarcely attract attention in the United States to-day, for the most audacious of them was the demand for universal suffrage; but in Germany in 1862 they were revolutionary.

The strength and charm of the "Programme" lie in the historical treatment adopted. Dogmatic statements are carefully avoided. Starting from the premise that the working class is only one of many classes of which the modern community of citizens consists, Lassalle traces the course of social evolution from the Middle Ages, to discover in what way social classes have been marked off from each other, in what way power and privilege have been distributed among them, and by what conditions their relations to one another have been determined; the retrospect disclosing a progressive broadening of the basis of power and privilege, accompanied by moral not less than material gains.

Going back to the Middle Ages, Lassalle finds the same social grades as now, but not well developed or defined, and one grade and one element — the landed interest — dominating all the others. The cause — a simple one — he discovers in the economic conditions of the time. Agricultural produce was the staple wealth. Trade was but slightly developed, manufacturing still less, and movable possessions were so little thought of in comparison with possession of the soil that chattels were alienable without the consent of heirs, while property in land was not. Four highly important social consequences resulted from this predominance of the landed interest. First, a vast development of the feudal system, with its obligations

of service in the field; second, the limitation of the right of representation to the owners of real estate; third, the exemption of landed proprietors from taxation, on the principle that a ruling, privileged class, invariably seeks to throw the burden of maintaining the existence of the state on the oppressed classes that have no property; fourth, the contempt with which every labour or profession not connected with the land was socially regarded.

The overthrow of this mediæval constitution of society began with the Reformation of 1517, and was completed by the Revolution of 1789; but neither religion nor revolution was the cause of the transformation. The cause was the accumulation, through trade, of capital — movable property as distinguished from landed property — in the hands of the bourgeoisie. By law the nobles and the clergy continued to be the ruling classes; but in fact they became more and more dependent upon the rich bourgeoisie, or they were even obliged to abandon their class notions and themselves resort to trade to obtain wealth. The age became one of materialism, characterized by a voracious struggle for money, in which all moral ideas were prostituted. The causes of such a remarkable increase in movable wealth, Lassalle enumerates at length; but they all reduce to one, the enormous extension of the market for movable goods by the discoveries of America and the sea route to the East Indies. The Revolution of 1789 merely gave legal recognition to a change that was already accomplished in fact. Lassalle takes pains to emphasize the truth that this is the character of all revolutions: they cannot be made to order; they only give form and countenance to what already exists.

The bourgeoisie became, then, legally and constitutionally what they had, for some time, been in fact — the ruling power.

How did they use their power? For a time they professed to use it in the interests of the whole of humanity; but they soon discovered that, after all, they were only a fragment. As a class, they began to separate into two subdivisions, one made up of those who were dependent on their daily labour for subsistence, the other composed of the possessors of large

capitals. It was the latter that now became the ruling class, which straightway began to devise a system of social arrangements advantageous to itself and oppressive to all others, exactly as the landlords had done in the Middle Ages.

The first step was the restriction of suffrage and representation to the possessors of capital, as measured by their payment of direct taxes. Lassalle gives numerous examples of the extent to which this device was carried in European countries. In France, where the rights of man had been so enthusiastically proclaimed, two hundred thousand electors, in the reign of Louis Philippe, bore rule over thirty million inhabitants. By the graduated system of suffrage established in Germany by the Electoral Law of 1849, one rich man exercised the same right of voting as seventeen who had no property.

The suffrage having been narrowly restricted, the capitalist class next imitated the oppressions of the mediæval landed class in throwing the main burden of taxation upon the poor. This was accomplished through the device of indirect taxation. While suffrage and representation were based on direct taxation, great care and ingenuity were exercised to raise the greater part of the revenues of the state by taxes on articles of family consumption, of which men with no property but with large families must be the chief purchasers. Again, the capitalist class imitated the landlord class, by visiting social dishonour upon those whose sole maintenance was labour. But as the trader of the Middle Ages could become somebody by buying land, so the rag-picker could find welcome into the highest social circles if he became a millionnaire. Finally, the capitalist class carried out its dominion by supervising public education in its own interest, and especially by similarly controlling the press.

But this period of history also, Lassalle declares, is virtually closed, little as outward appearances seem to show it. The dawn of the new period began on February 24, 1848, when a workingman was called into the provisional government of France, which declared that the object of the state was the improvement of the lot of the working classes, and

proclaimed the right of universal manhood suffrage. Power has descended at last to the fourth estate, which is coextensive with mankind. The fourth estate contains in its heart no germ of a new privilege and "its interest is in truth the interest of the whole of humanity."

Lassalle's historical survey is incomplete: many details necessary to a perfect understanding of European social evolution are omitted or ignored; and his assumption that the fourth estate contains in its heart no germ of a new privilege, is an absurd untruth to which we must again refer. However, it is certain that, in substantially the way which he has described, power — a great deal of power — has descended to the fourth estate. Consequently the workingman's programme is of general interest.

As formulated by Lassalle, the programme demands, first, universal suffrage. This is no magic wand; but it is the only means which, in the long run, of itself corrects the mistakes to which its momentary wrong use may lead. Second, the workingman's programme calls for the reconciliation of class interests, through the equal distribution of power, and the consequent moral regeneration of society. Power coupled with privilege necessarily creates selfishness and wickedness. Power exercised apart from privilege and by all humanity must be for all humanity; and the very contemplation of this idea is purifying and ennobling. Third, the workingman's programme contemplates the expansion of the state and its people, enabling them to acquire an amount of education, power, and freedom that would have been unattainable by them as individuals.

Such was the workingman's programme, as conceived and presented by a brilliant and courageous socialist in 1862. If now we compare with it the actual accomplishments and present tendencies of the workingman's movement in the United States, where political liberty affords the widest scope for peaceful revolution, two deeply significant conclusions emerge. We have gone a long way toward the realization of the programme; but the results have not been altogether

what Lassalle anticipated, and some unlooked-for results have followed, that are in direct contradiction to his predictions.

We will first observe the extent to which the programme has been realized. Familiar with these historical facts, we may next venture to consider some of the criticisms that have been offered, or that may be offered, upon the use that workingmen have made of their political power. This done, it will be worth while to examine some of the non-political methods whereby workingmen, largely in consequence of the political movement, now share in industrial control. And, finally, we must notice certain expectations that have radically failed of realization.

The universal manhood suffrage that the workingman's programme calls for, exists in most of our American commonwealths. Direct taxation, even in the form of an insignificant poll-tax, is no longer a prerequisite to voting. The conception of the state, too, which the programme offers, has found wide acceptance. Beyond the disciples of Henry George, and the believers in theoretical anarchism, very few workingmen now subscribe to the old Jeffersonian notion that the only legitimate duties of government are to protect life and property and to enforce contracts. For more than half a century, the wage-earning classes have been busily engaged in securing legislation and administrative activity in their own interests. The modifications of law and government that they have thus brought about have been of every kind and degree, from the abolition of ancient statutes curtailing their freedom of movement and of bargaining, to experiments in positive socialism. It is worth while to examine some of these products of the political activity of workingmen, noticing their character, the reasons for and against them, and their probable consequences.

The wage earners, no less than the political economists, have long understood that the "labour question" is not the idle inquiry, "How may we stop the price-making action of supply and demand?" So long as water finds its level, abundance will mean cheapness, and scarcity will mean dear-

ness, be it a material commodity or a human service that is offered in the market.

But the law that water will find its level is only approximately true. The water in the pipe never rises quite so high as the water in the reservoir: it is retarded by friction and the pressure of the air. For a similar reason, the equalizations of supply and demand are never perfect. Economic movements are retarded by various forms of social friction, and by that kind of pressure known as coercion. The Pennsylvania miner, for example, if his demand were unimpeded, would buy his groceries of a village store at competitive prices. But being constrained by a pressure of many times the atmospheric normal, he buys at the company's "pluck-me store," where he is systematically defrauded.

The ownership of capital is the best known lubricator of social friction and, when skilfully used, an energetic coercive force. The owner of abundant capital is able to save and make at every turn by buying supplies and labour, and selling his product, at the most advantageous points within a market of thousands of miles radius. The workman who has no capital save his clothes and tools, and who is dependent upon the immediate sale of labour for bread, is limited to the market which lies within walking distance. Within this narrow market, the relations of supply and demand may be all against him. Five hundred miles away they may be in his favour; but of what benefit is that?

It follows that, when an employing capitalist makes a bargain with men who have to sell their labour for a living, it is easy for the former to throw upon the latter the losses that economic friction and coercion create. Those who have little may be compelled to pay tribute through every operation of purchase and sale, toward the further enrichment of those who already have much.

A certain sort of employers have not been slow to see this; and for centuries it has been their constant study to increase the economic friction and restrictive pressure upon wage labourers. It was for this that an English statute was enacted in 1348, commanding labourers to work for the wages that

had been customary before the relations of supply and demand had been turned in their favour by the "Black Death." It was for this that the Statute of Labourers forbade a labourer to seek work beyond the parish in which he was born. It was for this that the ancient guilds of artisans were sometimes rudely destroyed, and workingmen were forbidden to combine under penalty of indictment as conspirators. But until very recent years, no law was ever enacted to prevent combinations of employers. "Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination because it is the usual and, one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy until the moment of execution; and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people." So wrote Adam Smith more than a hundred years ago.

Workingmen have not been blind to the ways and means by which their freedom to profit by an unimpeded movement of supply and demand has been restricted. For generations the more intelligent among them have been watching for opportunities to organize counteracting agencies. Universal suffrage and, in the community at large, a broadened sense of justice, which political liberty has fostered, have put them in control of the law-making power so far as its relations to their own liberty are concerned. Beginning with the abolition of ancient statutes that restricted their freedom of residence and punished as conspiracy all attempts to organize in opposition to employers, they have secured practically absolute freedom to go and come, the right to organize trade unions and other labour associations — on any scale which they find practicable and advantageous — and, most important of all, the

right to organize combined resistance in the form of strikes. In addition, they have in the United States secured federal statutes prohibiting the importation of foreign labour under contracts that often were little better than slave buying; and, in many commonwealths, they have abolished by law the truck system of payment, and have restricted the sale of convict labour at prices far below normal wage rates. Thus they have turned upon the employers precisely that agency which for centuries was used against themselves. And all these measures have had in view the one perfectly definite object, of enabling workingmen to bargain with their employers on terms of approximate equality.

These measures, however, have been but the beginning of the legislation through which workingmen, in the enjoyment of political power, have attempted to better their condition. Almost as important as the conditions under which the labour contract is made are the conditions under which the day's work is performed.

It is one of the fundamental contentions of industrial democracy that the wages system, however ameliorated by labour legislation and by the influence of labour organizations, remains inherently defective from the standpoint of democratic principle. It is interesting to find one of the most vigorous champions of a radical individualism — one to whom the very name of socialism is an offence — in perfect accord with radical socialistic teachers on this one point. Throughout his "Principles of Sociology," Mr. Herbert Spencer has contended that social evolution has been a progress from coercion to freedom, from status to contract. Having shown this progress in the development of domestic, ecclesiastical, and political institutions, in the concluding part of his final volume he carries the thought into the interpretation of industrial arrangements. To some of his readers the unexpected, and to all of them the most interesting, phase of this interpretation, is Mr. Spencer's contention that the wages system is not a perfect substitution of contract for status, and that it cannot be regarded as final. He says, "So long as the worker remains a wage earner, the

marks of status do not wholly disappear. For so many hours daily, he makes over his faculties to a master or to a coöperative group for so much money, and is, for a time, owned by him or it. He is temporarily in the position of a slave; and his overlooker stands in the position of a slave-driver."

Nevertheless, inherently defective though it may be, the wages system is, after all, greatly modified and mitigated when the wage earners themselves, to a great extent, fix the conditions under which their labour is performed, instead of submitting to conditions dictated wholly by employers. And this, to a very great extent, modern industrial legislation has accomplished. In all commonwealths, we now find laws limiting the hours of labour of children and married women, and, in some instances, those of adult males also; laws prescribing times and methods of wage payment, extending and defining the liability of employers for injury by accident, and strictly prescribing sanitary conditions; and administrative agencies, such as boards of factory inspectors, to carry such legislation into effect. Thus, to a very great extent, workingmen have already modified the régime of status which survives in the wages system, by themselves determining and enforcing the conditions under which their daily labour is performed.

If the greater equality in bargaining and the improved conditions of work which wage earners have secured through the exercise of their political power were the only results of their enfranchisement, it would be admitted that an important part of the workingman's programme had been carried into effect. In reality, it is necessary to admit more than this. In addition to these things, the workingmen have greatly modified the conditions under which they live.

They have done this, in the first place, by the restraints of law which have been brought to bear upon all corporations in their relations to the consumer. The past twenty-five years have been a period of incessant activity by legislatures and courts, in prescribing the duties and limiting the powers and privileges of railway and express companies, telegraph companies, industrial combinations, and trusts. Discrimina-

tions have been forbidden, many forms of combination in restraint of trade or of competition have been pronounced unlawful, and even the rates or prices charged have been either fixed absolutely or limited to certain maximum figures. So far, indeed, has this kind of legal activity been carried that many business enterprises have been brought to ruin, and the limits beyond which public control of corporate business cannot pass without destroying the business itself have been gradually coming into the view of both courts and legislative bodies. There is every reason to expect that, as these limits are more clearly perceived, the rule of live and let live will be accepted by all parties in interest. The general fact, nevertheless, will remain true, that the masses of the people have discovered their power to control the conditions of corporate business activity; and that, while endeavouring to use this power justly and expediently, they will not permit the power itself to be abridged or forgotten.

In the second place, the working classes have enormously ameliorated the conditions under which they live, through the exercise of the taxing power of the state. The evolution of taxation has not, indeed, been exactly what Lassalle expected. He would have predicted that one of the first acts of an enfranchised fourth estate would be the overthrow of indirect taxation. Yet it is precisely in the United States, where the fourth estate is a more important political element than in any other country, that indirect taxation is most firmly established. Nevertheless, by means of taxation, the fourth estate has obtained comforts and opportunities that were hardly within the reach of the bourgeoisie at the beginning of this century. The system of public school education has everywhere undergone an enormous extension, so that to-day, in many states of the American Union, a child of the people may pass, at the public expense, through every grade of instruction from the kindergarten to the completion of the university or professional course. Expenditures for parks, streets, baths, sanitation, and adornment also are everywhere increasing at so rapid a rate that not only the outward appearance of all large cities is being transformed, but their actual

comfort and healthfulness are being materially increased. In addition to these things, public revenues are being more and more extensively used to create public property, either outright or by the purchase of the property of private corporations. Street railways and lighting facilities are in many places passing under municipal ownership; and no one can predict to what extent this movement may continue. No one can say with certainty that a popular demand for the public ownership of all means of transportation and communication may not ultimately make the state the sole owner and operator of railroad and telegraph systems. As in the case of the legal control of corporate business, however, a limit to the further extension of this mode of activity appears to be not distant. The increase of municipal and state indebtedness has become a formidable fact of modern public finance, and it is more than doubtful whether rates of taxation can be raised much further, without bringing about a powerful organized resistance, or some radical change of method. When, as in the city of New York, the rate of the property tax has risen above two and a half per cent on a continually rising assessment, and threatens to approach one-half of the average annual income from investments, it is apparent that not much further progress can be made along this particular line of advance.

Such are among the achievements of industrial democracy, as it has thus far been developed through the exercise of political power by those large classes in the population which, until the present century, had no share in the making of laws or in determining the activities of government. Such extensions of governmental functions, and such new dispositions of public revenue, have not been accomplished without provoking earnest protest on the part of classes whose powers and privileges have been abridged, or without calling out emphatic warnings from thoughtful men who have seen in these new developments grave dangers to social order and human welfare. We need not trouble ourselves to consider the objections that spring from class interests; but it is

desirable to glance at some of the rational arguments that may be brought against the programme of industrial democracy, and endeavour to discover the principles, if such there be, which determine to what extent the workingman's programme may be accepted as expedient and right.

Among negative criticisms, the one that undoubtedly has the greatest strength and has been most forcibly presented, is founded on the relation which public burdens of every kind bear to the welfare of the middle class. Doubtless it is to Professor William G. Sumner that we owe the clearest conception of this problem, which he has presented in a great number of discussions and in a great variety of lights. It is a matter of no importance, Professor Sumner thinks, that a society presents extremes of economic condition; but it is of great importance that the middle class between the extremes shall be well developed. No society that consists of the two extremes only is in a sound condition. In an ideal society, the great mass of the population would fill the middle range. Whatever crushes out the middle classes, makes the rich grow richer and the poor poorer. And Professor Sumner affirms that all social burdens, such as military service, taxation, insecurity of life and property, have this tendency, since they cannot be distributed in proportion to ability to bear them.

Many historical facts seem to confirm this contention. In the Roman Empire, the burdens of military service and taxation divided society into the two classes, creditors and debtors; and in time the debtors became slaves to the creditors. While one man found himself just well enough established to endure the burden without being crushed, another found that the time demanded, or the wound received, or the loss sustained from an invasion, forced him into debt and sealed his fate. The disorder of the Middle Ages enabled the man who was just strong enough to maintain himself, to become a lord. The man who was just too weak to sustain himself became the lord's vassal. A like effect has always resulted from taxation. The lowest sections of the middle class, consisting of those who are struggling out of wage service into independent self-employment, with a small capital

accumulated by saving, are liable to be thrown back by any increase of their burdens.

From facts like these, Professor Sumner concludes that all unnecessary action by the state necessarily has the effect of increasing the evils that social democrats most deplore. It inevitably makes the rich grow richer and the poor poorer, since the state has nothing and can give nothing that it does not take from somebody. Consequently, in his judgment, and in the judgment of thousands who accept the reasoning which he follows, we have nothing to hope for from a governmental management of means of transportation and communication, from a municipal ownership of the means of street lighting and street railways, and from an elaboration of the system of public education. Furthermore, and perhaps of greater importance, governmental interference in the relations of employer to employed, such as the limitation of the hours of labour, the prescription of kinds and modes of payment, and all interference with individual freedom, must be condemned on the same general ground. All these things, whatever their value, have a certain cost which the public must bear; and that cost, unequally distributed, necessarily falls on the weaker members of the independent middle class, and always may operate to throw some of them back into the condition of wage earners.

In reasoning of this kind, it is important to scrutinize the minor premise. It always is possible that any particular case does not properly fall within the class to which it is assigned.

Whether taxation and the extension of state functions have the effect that has been described, depends not at all upon an *absolute* increase of a social burden. A burden that is absolutely large may be relatively small, when compared with the benefits secured. Thus no one would maintain that the taxation which supports the agencies by which civil order is established tends on the whole to make the rich grow richer and the poor poorer. By Professor Sumner's own showing, it has the opposite effect. We must admit, then, that quite possibly other governmental action also may, on the whole, diminish social

burdens more than it adds to them. Beyond any doubt the government post-office does this. Private corporations carrying the mails would discriminate in favour of rich sections and rich patrons, just as railroad corporations do; and, to that extent, they would help the rich to grow richer and the poor poorer. In and of itself, however, this fact does not prove that railroads and telegraphs also should be turned over to government management. When that question is raised there are many other considerations to be examined. At the same time, it is obvious that a governmental function, when criticised with reference to its tendency to increase or to diminish economic equality, cannot be condemned solely on the ground that it is a financial burden which will be unequally borne, until a careful inquiry has been made into the distribution of any benefit which it may confer.

Again, while the taxation that simply transfers money from class to class, as the English poor law administration did, is always a social burden that makes the poor grow poorer, because it discourages exertion; the taxation that encourages exertion by stimulating powers, providing opportunities, and improving the common environment, is a social benefit that tends powerfully to equalize conditions. Common school education has enabled thousands to rise to the independent middle class for every one that it has pulled down by taxation. Almost as much can be said for public libraries. Sanitary improvements — such as the supply of pure drinking water, effective sewerage, efficient street cleaning, the opening of parks and playgrounds, and efficient restrictions upon overcrowding in tenements — have a similar tendency.

So there is a distinction to be made between the state action that simultaneously increases social burdens and diminishes the power of the people to bear them, and the state action that diminishes social burdens and develops individual energies. The latter is not socialistic, but societarian. It recognizes the state and the individual as coördinate powers, and brings them into coöperation to their mutual advantage, aiming to make society serve its individual members, and to make individuals better members of society. Socialism recognizes

only the social aggregate, the mass, and represses the individual; while, on the contrary, societarian action, reciprocal service between society and its individual members, is a process of the highest social evolution, and the chief agency in helping the poor to grow richer by their own endeavours.

That this way of regarding state action is becoming daily more general among the people will hardly be denied. To this extent, at least, industrial democracy is making headway. To this extent, at least, the workingman, with others, is participating through his rights as a citizen and voter in determining the conditions under which his labour is performed.

There are two other replies that may be and have been made to such criticisms of industrial democracy as that by Professor Sumner, which we have been considering. One of these is theoretical, the other is practical; but both are of the dangerous sort that we often describe as half truths.

The first or theoretical answer, is one that Professor Karl Pearson has drawn from a study of the relations of natural selection to socialism. Professor Pearson's own sympathies are with the socialistic movement. His argument in support of it is on the whole the ablest and, within the limits of its legitimate application, the soundest that has anywhere been offered. Replying to the contention of Mr. Herbert Spencer and of other pronounced individualists, that natural selection is necessary for progress, and that industrial stagnation, intellectual mediocrity, and perhaps physical degeneration, would follow any successful attempt to prevent the supplanting of the weak by the strong in human communities, Professor Pearson insists that progress now depends upon a rigorous limitation of intra-group competition in the interest of a successful extra-group competition. The supremacy of England, for example, does not now depend upon an increasing difference between the more highly developed and the less highly developed classes, but rather on England's ability to hold her own with other great national powers in the struggle for territory and markets. In this struggle, social cohesion, rather than individual development, is of the greatest importance. A civil contest between the cultured and the ignorant,

the rich and the poor, might be the fatal weakness that would give success to her rivals. As Professor Pearson very happily puts it, a nation would be crushed which proceeded on the assumption that it is better to have a few prize cattle among innumerable lean kine than to have a decently bred and properly fed herd, with no expectations at Smithfield. Accordingly, while legislation conferring special industrial privileges upon wage earners in general, and upon women in particular, is a limitation of intra-group competition, it is nevertheless justifiable, in Professor Pearson's belief, if it strengthens social cohesion and so improves the national chances in the extra-group struggle.

The sound conclusion from all this is different from that which Professor Pearson offers. While a too radical individualism would remove all restraints upon intra-group competition, ignoring the perils of the extra-group struggle, socialism, in view of extra-group competition, would suppress the competition between individuals and classes. The common sense of mankind has always seen that either of these extreme policies would be disastrous. A measure of intra-group competition and natural selection is necessary for progress; but social cohesion is no less necessary for success in the world struggle. A sound social policy therefore always endeavours to maintain social cohesion with a minimum restriction of individual liberty.

The other and practical answer to objections like Professor Sumner's, made to the programme of industrial democracy, is found in plans for the radical rearrangement of taxation, and especially in schemes for the appropriation of land-rent, for the taxation of franchises, and for progressive taxes on property. It is evident that, if public revenue were derived entirely or chiefly from land-rent, from franchises, and from the estates of millionnaires, the increase of public financial burdens would not fall as an increasing weight upon that class, described by Professor Sumner, which is struggling to an independent position. These schemes, however, raise the totally different question of their ethical validity.

All values are created by the coöperation of three primary

factors, namely, nature, society, and the individual. These three factors, however, enter in greatly varying proportions into different groups or classes of values. There are products to which nature contributes much and man little. There are products which we owe almost wholly to individual inventiveness and industry. And there are products which are created almost wholly by the law-making authority of the state. Again, there are products which we owe chiefly to the coöperation of society with nature, rather than to the coöperation of the individual man with nature. This, of course, is true of speculative values in land. It is preëminently true also of the water-front values of great maritime cities ; of the values of the terminal facilities of great railways ; and of the values of those narrow strips of land which, in towns and cities, are occupied by street railway lines.

Values that in the past have thus been created by the cooperation of nature and the state with the efforts of individual men have largely passed, by the authority of the state, into private ownership. But similar values, in vastly greater amounts, which are being created and which are yet to be created, have not yet been unconditionally appropriated. Of the moral right of the state to reserve for public uses prospective values, hereafter to be created by an increasing demand upon limited natural resources or through the enjoyment of privileges that the state itself has instituted (as, for example, in creating the corporate form of organization), there can be no rational doubt in the mind of the ethical philosopher ; and there is not likely to be much denial in the practical discussions of a democratic people.

These truths do not yield, as a legitimate deduction, the doctrine of the single tax — a doctrine which ignores other truths quite as important — but they afford the practical principle that the revenues of the state should not be drawn in large part from accumulated property or from wealth which is being created chiefly by individual effort, until that wealth which is being created chiefly by the coöperation of society with nature has been set apart for public uses. While we may continue to believe that it is legitimate to tax

the property of the individual, if such a tax is necessary, we ought not to look with approval upon taxes on those articles of consumption which are the necessaries of life to the poor, or on the property of the farmer or of the business man, who is struggling to pay off mortgages and rise to a position of economic independence, while enormous values created by the progress of society and the authority of the state are allowed to pass without protest into the ownership of multi-millionnaires, to be enjoyed practically without tribute to the public revenue.

Such a proposed reservation by the state of values yet to be created, under conditions which the state names and defines in advance, is, however, a totally different thing from the confiscation of existing private property, to the accumulation of which the state itself has been a party by authorizing, encouraging, and protecting individual ownership. A radically progressive taxation of existing property, as such, or a general taxation of land at its full rental value without compensation of present owners, as Mr. George proposed, is indefensible unless clearly demanded — as a devastating war might be — by the further progress and general good of mankind in coming generations. The question thus raised is substantially that of the ethical rightfulness of an ultra type of socialism, which would deal with all members of society on a practically communistic basis.

It is significant that, in recent years, this question has been a good deal discussed, not only in works on economic policy, but also in constructive works on ethical theory. This is simply one phase of a large movement of thought which democracy has provoked. With the political and economic rise of the masses, ethical philosophy has advanced from a narrow and dogmatic individualism to a comprehensive view, in which society and the individual are seen as correlative terms, neither of which could exist apart from the other. Thus, there is a deeper reason for a serious discussion of socialism in a modern treatise on ethics than would be afforded by the mere fact that socialism has a great popular following and threatens to become a practical issue. The moralist is

confronted by the question whether the philosophical ground of ethical truth itself does not afford philosophical standing to some sort of socialism also.

Out of an examination of socialism from the ethical side much good should come. Unfortunately, the true nature of the inquiry is not always perceived and remembered. The ethical problems of socialism are not always distinctly marked off from the sociological and economic problems; and too often, therefore, the real core of the ethical problem is not reached. A great deal of recent economic literature, emanating from the extreme left wing of the historical school, which takes a curious pride in advertising its ratiocinative limitations, has made a sorry confusion of the "is" and the "ought," of what Marshall happily calls the indicative and the imperative moods of thought; and this confusion, unhappily, the ethical writers have not avoided.

The first question that ought to be raised in regard to socialism is the sociological question — a question of the "is." Is society a product of that universal evolution which brought man himself into existence, and conditions all his thoughts and doings? If so, we may be very sure that there are certain general laws to which social evolution has conformed in the past, and to which it will conform in the future. If it be held that conscious motives, deliberately formed purposes, play an increasingly large part in social affairs, no true sociologist should object; if it be claimed that the human will is a free metaphysical entity, no true sociologist, as such, should demur; because, in any case, it must remain true that, if deliberate purposes are reasoned purposes, reasoning beings, exposed to like conditions, must tend, in proportion to the accuracy of their reasoning, to reach like conclusions. There are uniformities among purposes, and social phenomena conform to law in the indicative mood, varying with the variation of cosmic conditions. All this does not, indeed, prove the antecedent impossibility of socialism; but it does prove the antecedent absurdity of any scheme of socialism, or of any prediction as to a socialistic future which is based on such knowledge of social psychology

as we possess at present. Any scheme of socialism based on the psychology of the individual is nonsense; and as yet we have almost no psychology but that of the individual. For the construction of the psychology of men in masses, in social groups, in organic relations, scientific ground has barely been broken.

But while at present we can make no general prediction as to a socialistic future, we can predict that conscientious men will antagonize any socialistic propagandism that seems to them ethically wrong. Ethical teachers ought, therefore, to state with all possible distinctness the ethical problems involved in the socialistic propositions now before the public, and give us, if they can, a reasoned solution.

These problems may apparently be reduced to two: First, if not all men are converted in thought and feeling to socialism, can a majority have any ethical right to compel a minority to surrender individual initiative and submit to dictation of occupation? Second, what is an ethical distribution of product among the workers that create it?

Doubtless not a few students of political science will say that the first question has been answered affirmatively to weariness; but in this assumption they are mistaken. The reasoned answers founded on purely ethical data, are negative answers, of which the brilliant example is Mill's "Liberty." The affirmative answers are either mere assertions, enlivened by diatribes against natural rights, or they are not strictly ethical. The argument of the long row of great works from Hobbes's "Leviathan" to Mulford's "The Nation" is essentially political or essentially theological. The utilitarianism of Bentham might be made the basis of an elaborate and ingenious, if not convincing, argument for the unlimited power of majorities; but Bentham himself and most of his disciples have drawn chiefly negative conclusions. The argument from the denial of natural rights is no argument at all. If individuals have no natural rights, majorities have none. Plato and Aristotle laid the foundations for a rationalistic argument from purely ethical premises, showing that majorities may rightfully do more than enforce contracts

and keep the peace; but the modern restatement and completion of that argument remains to be made.

Many students of economics probably will say that the second question has been sufficiently answered. Here, again, the assumption is erroneous. In the distribution of wealth, are ethical requirements satisfied when each receives according to his performance? Not necessarily. Justice may then be satisfied; but ethical requirement may include more than justice in our modern sense of the word. Men have potential as well as actual abilities; and to give them more than they now earn, as a means of developing a greater earning power for the future, may be an ethical obligation. There is then no necessary conflict between the individualistic principle, "To each according to his work," and the communistic principle, "To each according to his needs." Normal needs are of repair or restoration of the energies and utilities expended in useful performance, and of upbuilding and development for future useful performance. In a normal, well-balanced state of things need and performance must correspond.

But in socialistic literature distribution according to needs easily degenerates into distribution according to desires. Then, with the aid of the minor premise, conveniently assumed for the purpose, that men are equal in desires, the conclusion may be drawn, as by Mr. Edward Bellamy, that socialism cannot stop short of equality of incomes. It is at this point that clean-cut thinking by ethical teachers is wanted. Modes of human equality there are which must be recognized as among the most important of all social facts — equality of political status, equality of civil rights, equality in the enjoyment of public utilities. Much may be said, also, for a certain approximation toward economic equality; for all extremes of inequality are among the gravest of social dangers. But the equality that is necessary or desirable in society must not be confounded with that absolute equality of incomes which communism demands. It is possible that a strong argument could be made in support of the proposition that an ethical distribution of wealth would be one that should afford equality of satisfaction, throughout society, of the

desires that are ethically commendable. But is it biologically and psychologically possible for men to be equal in desires that are ethically commendable? Men will never be equal physically. Will they, then, be equal in perception, in reasoning, in imagination, in sympathy? Will they equally find pleasure in the beautiful and the good? Or will deficiency in one set of faculties be exactly balanced by the superiority of some other set? If not, equality of income must inevitably create a class of sybarites and debauchees. There has been no more curious psychological phenomenon in recent times than has been the wholesale hypnotizing of clever literary people by Mr. Bellamy's dazzling vision. When they come out of the daze and begin to assume their literary self-direction, they may be trusted to discover that equality of income and equality of satisfaction of legitimate desires are two different things.

Thus far we have considered the practical fulfilment of Lassalle's predictions, and have examined the economic and moral character of some tendencies of industrial democracy. It is evident that industrial democracy is an established fact, and that its enterprises have approached the margin of expedient political activity. But it has some further characteristics not foreseen by Lassalle, and some that stand in striking contradiction to his predictions.

One of these we have already noticed, namely, the failure of industrial democracy to abolish indirect taxation. More remarkable than this, however, has been the failure of the wage-earning class to convert all its own members, and its still more conspicuous failure to convert society in general, to the notion that political activity is the only, or, under all circumstances, the best method of ameliorating the life conditions of the fourth estate. Most happy has this failure been for the working classes themselves and for the entire community.

The political activity of the working classes has provoked a vast deal of private activity, which has taken the forms both of coöperative self-help by wage earners, and philan-

thropic effort by employers and ethically minded individuals generally, irrespective of their industrial relations. Efforts to equalize the terms of bargaining, and to improve the conditions under which men live and labour, have very clearly shown to all observers endowed with moral sensitiveness that the labour question is fundamentally a moral no less than an economic problem. It has ceased to be necessary to argue that writers who ridicule as unscientific any recognition of an ethical element in concrete industrial problems are themselves of all men most unscientific. They are the ones who know why water must find its level as a theoretical truth, but who always fail to tell us why it never does find its level in fact.

The answer to the labour question, therefore, must in part be sought among facts and principles of the moral order. Often it has been through a disregard of all considerations of fairness and humanity that the relative immobility of labour, as compared with capital, has been taken advantage of by employers to the detriment of wage earners. It will be in part through the subordination of selfishness by moral considerations that better relations between labour and capital will be promoted.

One or the other of two rules can be adopted by every employer in dealing with his help. Either he can say: "I will buy labour at the lowest prices at which the men who are nearest starvation will consent to work;" or he can say, "I will pay my help the highest wages that I can afford." Both of these rules are perfectly consistent with the law of supply and demand. But in their moral quality and their consequences they are as opposite as the poles. One leads to irreconcilable antagonisms; the other affords the ground for arbitration, profit-sharing, or any coöperative expedient promising good results. The former rule, systematically applied for a series of years throughout the entire community, means a progressive degradation of labour, and ultimately the righteous destruction of employers' profits. The latter rule means progressive elevation and increasing prosperity. Under the former, the labourer becomes discouraged, and his standard of living is lowered. The consequence of this is

impaired efficiency and a diminished production of wealth. In a lessened demand for labour and a further reduction of wages the cycle of causation is completed. This is what took place in England during the first half of the present century under the teaching that unmitigated selfishness was economic morality. In the United States it has more than once occurred, — in the Hocking Valley of Ohio, in the mining regions of Pennsylvania and of Illinois. Under the other rule, of paying the highest wages that can be afforded, the labourer is encouraged and stimulated, his standard of living is raised, he creates more wealth for conversion into capital, and accumulating capital, by increasing the demand for labour, tends further to raise the rate of wages.

Out of these purely ethical considerations largely, though not without reënforcement from considerations of expediency, have developed most of the schemes of arbitration, conciliation, and profit sharing. These have multiplied rapidly in the United States and elsewhere within the last twenty-five years, and many of them have met with substantial success. Experience, it is true, has demonstrated that it is impossible to find any one plan of voluntary adjustment of the relations of employer and employee which is suitable to all circumstances. Yet, in general, the spirit of conciliation and the numerous devices of profit sharing are flexible enough to meet rather varied conditions, and it is probable that their methods are to undergo yet further development.

Nevertheless, the maxim, which the experience of all ages has verified, that the best help is self-help, holds true of the details of industrial organization no less than of that general control which the working classes have been able to exercise over the industrial situation through their political activity. However much they of the fourth estate may accomplish through legislation and governmental agencies, they can never put themselves on a plane of perfect equality with employers in any other way than by becoming themselves employers. This truth is fully recognized by all intelligent leaders of the labour movement, and the only fundamental difference of belief which divides them is upon the question whether work-

ingmen can more certainly accomplish this aim through the organization of voluntary coöperation or through the perfection of a socialistic organization of industry, in which their elected government agents would act as industrial managers. The complete centralization of governmental management within the area of its establishment, even if the socialism were of the so-called municipal or decentralized type, would put the weaker, more ignorant elements of the working population so completely at the mercy of the politically adroit that any real increase of industrial liberty would be at the best extremely doubtful. This consideration is fully realized by those leaders of the coöperative movement who have most earnestly striven to convince wage earners generally that their only means of securing complete economic emancipation lies in a development of voluntary coöperation, step by step with progress in the control of general conditions through democratic government and law.

From the point of view of the theoretical critic, this contention of the coöperators seems to be entirely sound. The socialists are right in maintaining that coöperation would stand little chance of success in competition with vast trusts and monopolistic corporations in control of transportation, and that it is therefore necessary for the masses of the people through governmental agencies to establish a general control over all business transactions. But this, as we have seen, industrial democracy is accomplishing without proceeding to the extreme of complete socialistic organization. The coöperators are right in maintaining that complete socialistic organization would destroy individual initiative and the freedom of voluntarily formed groups.

Therefore, it is only through the development of free cooperation, within a state which, in a general way, is controlled by industrial democracy, that we may expect to see a relatively perfect realization of the two most cherished dreams of both socialists and coöperators, namely, a considerable diminution of the present wastes of the competitive system, and a complete transformation of the wages system ; and all without endangering social stability or destroying individual freedom.

It is now three-quarters of a century since the first enthusiastic attempts were made by the disciples of Fourier and Owen to reorganize industry on a coöperative basis. The disappointments and losses that have attended subsequent efforts in this direction have been many and great. But so also have been the successes; and the most sceptical observer, when he looks at the facts, must admit that there has been enough substantial progress to warrant further efforts.

In these efforts it will be of the first importance to keep in view a definite conception of the objects of coöperation and clearly to understand the methods which experience has shown to be best, each in its relation to the special object that it is specially adapted to and in its relation to coördinate objects.

The primary object of the coöperative movement always has been, by a better organization of economic activities, to achieve all the useful results of competitive methods with less of waste and other evils.

Competition tends to reduce the prices of goods to the cost of production and of handling; but sometimes it makes the cost of handling excessive, and sometimes it cheapens human life. In many ways it stimulates improvement; but in many ways also it is wasteful of resources.

Distributive coöperation on the plan of the Rochdale Pioneers has approximately solved the problem of furnishing goods to the consumer at cost, while reducing the expenses of handling to the lowest amount. This is done by dividing among purchasing members all the profits on sales after deducting actual expenses, including interest on capital, and, under a true coöperative system, a sharing of profits with employees. Productive coöperation in alliance with coöperative distribution, in a measure prevents the losses that may at any time follow the speculative production of goods for an imperfectly known demand. This is the object of that federation of coöperative undertakings which has made important progress in Great Britain. A wider and more nearly perfect federation may ultimately diminish waste to an almost unimagined degree. The aim will be to bring the production

and distribution of goods into such relations that certain stores will take all the product of certain farms and factories, the latter always to be steadily at work a certain number of hours each day.

It must never be forgotten, however, that the saving of waste by the federation of coöperative enterprises, like the saving of expense by combinations, pools, and trusts, is limited strictly to the field of the continuous production of goods which are for a relatively long period not changing in form or in quality, and by methods and machinery which, in like manner, are for the time being satisfactory. The moment that change of any sort is introduced in the conditions of production, the entire organization of distribution must, in a measure, change its operation also. Moreover, competition in some form is a permanent factor in life and in industry. Individuals and combinations of individuals will always be as unequal in power as they are unlike in aptitude and in purposes. While competition can be diverted from one to another channel, can here and there be suppressed, and can be compelled to take unobjectionable rather than destructive forms, the competition itself persists. For this reason the federation of coöperative undertakings, if it is to be successful, must at all times be flexible, always giving opportunity for enterprises that wish to introduce new methods or new goods to come into the field on advantageous terms, and providing for winding up, with a minimum of loss, those concerns that have ceased to be profitable, through the discontinuance of a former demand or the passing away of old methods and mechanisms.

But distributive coöperation in coördination with coöperative production does not of itself help workers in their earning capacity. It aids them merely as consumers, while competition in another form may be reducing their wages, deepening the poverty of the many, and concentrating great fortunes in a few hands. Not that coöperative distribution must cause a fall of wages, as Lassalle assumed when he said that "so soon as the coöperative stores more and more embrace the whole working class, it will be seen as a necessary consequence that wages, owing to the cheapness of the

necessaries of life, 'the result of the coöperative stores,' will fall in precise proportion." There is no such "necessary sequence" if, as a result of more generous subsistence and of the discipline of coöperation, the worker becomes at once more efficient and more prudent, raising his standard of living in all that pertains to mental and moral well-being as rapidly as he reduces the cost of obtaining the bare necessaries of existence. Competition permanently lowers real wages only when it impairs the workers' moral and physical powers. That, however, it must be admitted, often happens. A more equal distribution of wealth is followed by a decreased production only when there is no corresponding development of manhood. But that sometimes happens.

In either case, a way to prevent the unhappy consummation, without impairing the general scheme of coöperation, must be found in some plan of industrial partnership applied to both productive and distributive enterprise. By industrial partnership is always to be understood an arrangement much more radical in character than that which is commonly known as profit sharing. Most of the profit-sharing schemes involve nothing more than the distribution of a bonus in addition and in proportion to wages. The bonus is theoretically supposed to be, and in practice usually is, the approximate equivalent of additional wealth produced by the employees through increased diligence, carefulness, and attention to detail. Under the direction of a competent and just employer the profit-sharing arrangement often results in great benefit to employees. Their powers are stimulated, their productive capacity is increased, and, in reality as in theory, their interest is identified with the prosperity of their employer. If, however, the dividend to labour is merely a bonus, and the worker's relation to the corporation or proprietor is that of an employee only, he has no share in controlling the conditions under which he works, and the chief aim of industrial democracy is not realized.

To give to the workers the desired share of control is the object of the true industrial partnership, in which the workers are no longer merely employees, but are also stockholders.

This relation may exist from the first if the enterprise is started as a coöperative undertaking, the workers paying in the capital in the first instance; or it may be developed gradually out of the profit-sharing scheme, as was done under Godin's direction in the famous experiment at Guise in France, by converting the dividends to labour into certificates of stock.

Even under industrial partnership, however, as it has almost invariably been organized, the wages system has remained. The coöperators have been in one capacity employers, in another capacity employees. They have as individuals hired themselves to the corporation in which they are stockholders, and have accepted the prevailing rates of wages as the major part of their remuneration. Any bonus in addition has been distributed either as a percentage on wages or as a dividend on stock. Thus the wages system has been continued; certain essential features of the régime of status have remained; and possibly, as Mr. Spencer contends, these have been one cause of the frequent failure of coöperative undertakings.

The remedy which Mr. Spencer proposes is as simple as it is ingenious; and should it prove to be effective in practice, it would, beyond a doubt, be that perfect substitute for the wage system which a régime of free contract, from which all survivals of status were eliminated, would call for. It consists in the substitution of payment by the piece, or of sub-contracting, for wages. The first thought of a reader familiar with the prevailing views of workingmen is that this is an astonishingly impractical suggestion, because no one feature of modern industrial life is more generally and intensely hated by the working classes than the system of piece payment. It is simply a device, they hold, to stimulate the worker's powers to the utmost tension until the limit of his productive capacity is discovered, and then to cut the piece rates to so low a figure that only by the most intense activity can the worker earn a normal day's wage. Mr. Spencer, however, has fully considered this fact, and shows that it has no bearing whatever on the problem when the piece price is ap-

plied to coöperative undertakings. Piece payment has been rejected by coöperators because, as workingmen, they have carried with them their prejudice against it without reflecting that all the conditions which make piece payments burdensome and odious when managed by a private employer or an employing corporation, would disappear under coöperation. Perhaps Mr. Spencer's most original and valuable contribution to industrial theory is his clear analysis of the conditions that have created the prejudice against piece payment, and his proof that none of them would exist under coöperation. To see exactly wherein the difference lies, we have only to suppose that coöperators in their capacity as employers should apply to themselves as employees the methods which piece-price-paying corporations commonly apply to their hired workingmen; that, namely, of continually cutting the payments for piece work. They would thereby simply increase the dividend to be distributed among themselves as owners of the business; and since this dividend, after the payment of interest on capital held in the form of stock, would be distributed according to each worker's production, each would fare exactly as he would if the piece rate were high. Thus, under this plan of coöperation, each man would work under conditions as nearly as possible like those enjoyed by men conducting small business enterprises — such as farming or shop keeping — on their own responsibility, and making more or less income according to their individual abilities.

With reference also to the adaptability of coöperative organization to changing industrial conditions, the piece payment or sub-contracting system would be highly advantageous, inasmuch as it would give free play to the rivalry of individual abilities. It would permit individual competition to work itself out productively in the most beneficial ways.

Of course the sceptical question must be raised, Can any mere device, however admirable it may be in itself, enable workingmen to substitute an industrial democracy for the wages system? And to this we must answer both "no" and "yes." Smoothly working administrative devices are essential to human coöperation, and many plans doubtless fail for

lack of them. Experience alone can determine whether Mr. Spencer's suggestion is one of those apparently trifling inventions that sometimes transform great potentialities into great actualities in social as in material machinery. But Mr. Spencer himself is careful to say that the working of any social machinery depends on character. Democracy will ultimately succeed in productive industry if workingmen have the requisite intelligence, patience, and reasonableness; otherwise it will not.

This last consideration brings us naturally to a problem of industrial democracy which is nearly fundamental. Obviously, there can be no true industrial democracy unless the risks of enterprise, as well as the possible profits, are shared by all who share in industrial control. The objection to profit sharing which has often been urged by business men unconvinced of the justice of the scheme, that profit sharing should carry with it as its necessary correlative some measure of risk sharing, is absolutely sound in principle, and the principle is as broad as the entire plan of industrial democracy itself.

It is, however, a great mistake to look upon risk sharing as an offset to the benefits of any form of industrial partnership. From the standpoint of the general welfare of society, risk sharing is the chief beneficial feature of any experiment in industrial democracy. Progressive minds and conservative, prudent minds are alike products of the adjustment of human life to conditions that involve the element of risk; and no portion of the population that is shielded from those conditions can contribute to a progressive evolution of industry, or play the part of sober-minded citizens in a republic.

Indeed, the time has come to call attention sharply to the superlative importance of risk sharing by the wage-earning population. It is because so large a proportion of this population has no concrete and definite stake in industrial methods that it so often resists advantageous changes in machinery and processes; and it is when a large part of the wage-earning population has no concrete and definite property stake in the stability of society that society is confronted by real

danger. It is proper to study the means by which to increase the income of the working population, and by which to increase its control over the conditions under which it must labour; but the effort must not stop here. It is even more essential to increase the workingmen's sense of responsibility.

Wages have been rising for half a century; but the natural connection between labour and ownership, as the means by which labour is made effective, has been severed in the larger manufacturing industries. This connection was a real one in the days when it was possible for any workman of good parts to become the owner of a shop. It is still a real one, most fortunately, in the agricultural industries of the countries where working farmers own the land. There is no stronger defence against socialistic radicalism in France or in the United States to-day than this very fact that, throughout the agricultural population, the interests of capital and of labour are, to a great extent, identified in a normal way. Under existing industrial conditions there is no way in which this identity can be reëstablished in the manufacturing, mining, and transportation industries except by some form of industrial partnership or by a definite relation between the employing corporation and an incorporated labour organization; some arrangement, in fact, which transfers to the workers a measure of control, with a definite prospect of profit or loss to result from wisdom or mistake. Any arrangement should be welcomed which restores to workingmen their due proportion of the responsibilities that should rest on all members of organized society.

There remains now to be noticed, in conclusion, a final limitation of industrial democracy, and a failure in one particular of Lassalle's predictions, which is perhaps more significant than any that we have thus far discussed.

The class which Lassalle thought incapable of any further subdivision has proven to be no more nearly coextensive with humanity than the bourgeoisie was; and it is separating into two subdivisions as the bourgeoisie did, one of which is

undertaking to domineer over the other, as the rich bourgeoisie domineered over the poor. Workingmen have separated into organized and unorganized labour; and organized labour stands in just the same attitude toward unorganized labour that the mediæval landlords maintained toward the traders, and the European capitalists of half a century ago toward the workingmen. Organized labour insists that it alone shall dictate the conditions of employment. It levies a tax on the individual workingman, and requires his allegiance, as the conditions on which it permits him to earn a living; and it carries its imitation of the conduct of landlord and capitalist to the last degree by heaping obloquy on the man who refuses to belong to a labour organization, and dubbing him a scab.

As a matter of course, it follows that the rule of the fourth estate has not yet harmonized class interests and affected the moral regeneration of society. It is the rule of a class, as each régime that preceded it was the rule of a class. The weakness and the limitation of democracy, whether in the political or in the industrial sphere, is not essentially different from the weakness and the limitation of aristocracy. A majority may be as despotic as a minority. In either case, society is divided against itself. Instead of perfect confidence and coöperation between classes, and an appeal to reason and fair play for the adjustment of their differences, there remains a degree of jealousy and conflict.

Because of facts like these, it is practically certain that socialism, could it be established, would not be democratic, in that sense of the word which appeals to the wage earner of to-day. It would not be a control of industry by men who are the wage earners now. A popular notion that the "masses" are wage earners and nothing more, is not true. The "masses" are property-owning farmers, small tradesmen, business men, and professional men. Under socialism, these men collectively could outvote all others, just as collectively they can outvote all others now. Socialistic writers not only admit this, but they actually are socialists instead of coöperators because they know it to be true. They believe that

socialism would succeed where coöperation fails because socialism would command the services of all the best brains. Yet they want to bring socialism about in order to give the "proletariat" a chance to manage industry. Such is the paradox of this curious creed.

It is interesting to notice that, during those years when in Germany Lassalle was proclaiming the workingman's programme — in France, the country where the idea of social revolution had its birth, a profound sociologist, Frederick Le Play, who by travel and residence among the most diversely constituted communities of Europe and Asia had studied social institutions at first hand more thoroughly than any other man of his generation, was trying to convince his countrymen that the way toward happiness and social welfare lay in the opposite direction from democratic tendencies. He claimed that the greatest prosperity and comfort existed in those communities that cherished traditional customs and preserved a semi-patriarchal, semi-fraternal constitution; the many yielding a loyal allegiance to the superior few, and the few using their authority for the good of the many. He believed that, when the democratic movement had run its course, there would be a return to earlier institutions.

Society will not go back to the patriarchal type; yet there was an element of truth in Le Play's views. The course of evolution will be midway between the extremes that Le Play and Lassalle predicted. The equalization of power will go on, and it is desirable that it should. There will be an increasing control by workingmen, not only in government, but in the industrial organization itself. But it will be offset through a still further equilibration of social forces, by a greater deference than exists at present to natural leadership — to the minority who have the capacity to direct and to organize. That deference in the past was to some degree enforced. The leaders at times had absolute power and compelled obedience. It will exist in the future as a voluntary allegiance, and power and leadership will therefore be conditioned by responsibility. Its reëstablishment on

these terms will be a very gradual process, but a certain one: slow, because it can go on only as fast as the captains of industry acknowledge and act upon their responsibility to the majority; certain, because they can retain their own due share of influence and power in no other way.

VII

THE TRUSTS AND THE PUBLIC

VII

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THE trust presents problems of the most important character to the business man, to the lawyer, to the statesman, and to the political economist, and the subject is much too large to be discussed, in an all-round way, in a single brief paper. In what I now have to say I shall speak only from the standpoint of the student of economic theory, leaving to others the consideration of the trust in its relation to political and legal expediency. Moreover, I shall speak neither as an advocate nor as an opponent of the trust on grounds of economic expediency, but solely as an observer, who is interested to see what the trust does in fact do and what in fact it does not do, as an influence acting upon the production, the consumption, and the prices of goods.

At the outset I make two assumptions. The first is that the trust as a form of business organization could never have become the great factor in the commercial world that it is to-day, and could never have taken the hold upon the minds of business men that it has taken, if it had not been an efficient device for dealing with existing industrial conditions. Combinations of human forces are soon disorganized unless they produce results which justify them. It is therefore idle to say that the trust is an incubus upon the commercial world so long as it grows and multiplies as it has done in recent years.

My second assumption is that intelligent and educated men do not really believe the often repeated saying that a rule or policy may be sound in theory but bad in practice. There is no conflict between practice and sound theory. Any theory that is

not confirmed and fortified by practice is false theory, and as such should be discarded. If a bridge which has been constructed in accordance with a certain engineering theory gives way under the strain that its builders have expected it to endure, civil engineers do not say that the theory is good as theory, but is bad in practice. They say that the theory itself is false. Both business men and economists should regard economic theory in the same way. If experience demonstrates that economic theories which have been taught in the text-books and in the lecture room are not confirmed by business practice, the only conclusion that the clear-headed thinker can draw is that the theories themselves are inadequate or erroneous. I make no further apology, therefore, for assuming that both the business man and the economist have a real interest in discovering a true and adequate theory of the relation of the trust to expansions and contractions of production, and to the course of market prices.

The general public undoubtedly believes that trusts are able to make consumers pay more for all goods which the trusts control than would be paid under conditions of free competition. The economist should be able to say whether this prevalent belief is a great truth or a great delusion. Let us, then, look for a moment at the principles involved, and try to decide whether it is possible to state the economic law of price in a modern way — by which I mean, a way which takes account of modern, as distinguished from old-fashioned and outgrown, business methods.

Imagine a commercial world in which the output of every important product is controlled by a single organization. Imagine that the entire wheat crop is commercially controlled by one trust, the cotton crop by another, the iron and steel output by another, the paper output by yet another, and so on through the entire list of marketable goods. In such a commercial world, so organized, would each of these great trusts be able to fix prices in accordance with its own desire to amass wealth and pay dividends, irrespective of the wishes and efforts of consumers? The prevailing opinion among consumers is, I think, that just such a thing would happen;

and therefore the consumer finds himself regarding the trust as a gigantic power for extortion.

The truth, on the contrary, is that by no conceivable possibility could any such thing happen; and to make the point perfectly clear I will ask you to try to follow me in a demonstration which, in its reasoning, is essentially mathematical, but is not especially difficult. Obviously, if every product were controlled by a single trust, the situation would be precisely the same, as far as prices were concerned, that it would be if each product were controlled by a single individual. Let us, then, designate each product by a single small letter, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, etc., and designate the persons in control of each product by a single capital letter, A, B, C, D, E, etc. The commercial world, then, is made up of the individuals A, B, C, D, E, each of whom is the producer of some great marketable commodity, and each of whom is the consumer of the commodities controlled by his fellow-producers. Now it may seem that A, who, we will suppose, is the producer and controller of wheat, can compel B, C, D, and E to pay extortionate prices for every bushel they demand, because, since no one else in the world can supply wheat, they must buy of A or starve. In like manner, it may appear that B, C, and D, the producers of cotton, steel, and paper, can charge extortionate prices because they command the only known supply. This is the assumption that the general public makes. It is, however, an assumption which has all the characteristics of an inadequate, and therefore a false, economic theory. It would be true only on one condition, namely, that the consumption of goods was strictly limited to those small quantities that are absolutely necessary to support existence. That condition, however, practically never exists in the real world; for human wants are indefinitely expansive, and every known commodity can be applied to a great number of different uses besides the primary one of supporting life. Wheat, for example, is used not only as a food product, but in enormous quantities is converted into starch, dyestuffs, and other chemical products. Cotton is used not only for necessary clothing, but in vastly greater quantities

for purposes of comfort, convenience, and ornamentation. Paper is used not merely for absolutely necessary records, accounts, and communications, but in enormously greater quantities for pleasure, and even for trifling satisfactions.

While, therefore, an individual who absolutely controlled the supply of any given commodity might conceivably compel his fellow-men to pay extortionate prices for that very small percentage of his product which was absolutely indispensable to their existence, by no possibility could he compel them to pay such prices for that vastly greater percentage which they desired merely for purposes of convenience, comfort, and pleasure. This percentage they would buy or not, according as they thought that they could or could not afford it at the price which was demanded.

And this is not all. Our comforts and pleasures are extremely variable things. Very few of us feel in any degree bound to choose one form of merely convenient or pleasurable satisfaction rather than another. We have preferences, of course, but we subject our preferences, after all, to a rather rigid economic control. If, for example, I think that I would like a new set of china for my dinner table, but discover that the price is much higher than I expected to have to pay, while, at the same time, I discover that some other article of household decoration, which I had believed to be quite beyond my means, is offered at a surprisingly low price, the chances are that I shall postpone my indulgence in china and purchase the alternative satisfaction. Now this principle, as everybody knows, is practically a universal law of human nature; and a law of human nature is an economic law, which the producers and sellers of goods are compelled, in the long run, to obey.

What, then, would be the actual situation in which our imaginary producers, A, B, C, D, and E, each having absolute control of a particular product, would find themselves placed? They could, if they chose, limit production to those very small quantities of commodity which men must have or die; but if they did this, A, B, C, D, and E would themselves live and die poor men. No great fortune would ever be amassed

by that policy. The alternative confronting them, then, would be to encourage the development of a multiplicity of uses for their respective products, and a liberal consumption to be met by a large production; and this they could do only by offering their goods at reasonable prices.

This alternative adopted, our imaginary producer would instantly make a most interesting discovery — the discovery, namely, that he was living and producing in a world ruled by competition, and not, as he had supposed, by monopoly. Until now he had imagined that the only kind of competition which he had to fear was a competition between himself and some other producer of the same sort of commodity which he was producing and offering. That is to say, A had thought of competition as coming only from some other A, A,′ A,″ etc. B, in like manner, had thought of competition as coming only from some other B, B,′ B,″ etc. and he had supposed that in getting rid of such competition he had suppressed competition for good and all. But now he discovers that the real competition of the real business world is not the competition between A and A,′ or between B and B′; it is the competition between A and B, between A and C, between B and C, between C and D, and so on. In other words, it is not the competition between one seller of wheat and another seller of wheat, between one manufacturer of cotton and another manufacturer of cotton, that really rules the business world; it is rather the competition between the producer of wheat and the producer of cotton, the producer of cotton and the producer of iron, the producer of iron and the producer of paper, and so on, which really controls the course of prices. This competition is real, it is inevitable, it is controlling, because of the ineradicable fact that each of the producers is appealing to a consuming public whose purchasing power is limited. The consuming public is not at present, and so far as human foresight can now perceive it never will be, in the enjoyment of an unlimited income. Consequently, if the world buys more wheat, more cotton, and more iron, it will, sooner or later, and for a limited time, buy less paper, less china, less furniture, and other things. Every industry,

then, is appealing to a consuming public to which every other industry is appealing, and which cannot buy unlimited quantities of commodity from each industry. This simply means that when one group of producers demands unusually high prices, all other groups of producers can very considerably increase their sales, in virtue of that law of human nature according to which men can and do, to a great extent, substitute one group of conveniences and pleasures for another, postpone certain enjoyments for a time, and distribute their expenditures at all times in such a way as to obtain the greatest satisfaction for a given outlay.

Dropping now this figure of an imaginary world in which each product is absolutely controlled by a single producer, we observe in the actual business world of to-day a certain approximation to the condition of things which has been described. Nearly every important industry is now controlled by a trust or a business organization closely resembling a trust. This means that, to a considerable extent, the competition of A with A,′ of B with B,′ and of C with C,′ has been brought under control. It does not mean and it cannot mean that the competition of A with B, of A with C, and so on through the entire list has been suppressed. It still remains true that the greater part of nearly every commodity is produced to satisfy the demands of comfort and convenience, rather than those of absolute necessity. It still remains true, furthermore, that consumers can and will curtail any particular group of comforts and conveniences when their prices rise beyond a certain limit, and expand the enjoyment of other comforts and conveniences if their prices are lower. It still remains true, in short, that producers organized into trusts, quite as much as producers who compete with one another, are offering their commodities to a consuming public whose annual income is a limited amount of purchasing power, — a public which, therefore, distributes its commercial favours unequally among all these different trusts, and therefore compels the trusts to compete with one another, however perfectly each trust may have suppressed competition among its own producing members.

There need be no fear, then, I take it, that the consuming public is to be brought under economic subjection by the trust. Competition disappears in one form only to reappear in other forms. Economic law is as inexorable as the law of gravitation, and business will never cease to be controlled by it.

The trust, like any other form of human organization, may do evil as well as good; but it is not now my purpose to discuss the trust in its moral aspects. Much harm, I think, has been done already by confusing the moral, the legal, and the political aspects of trusts with their economic function. No sensible man would think of condemning a business career as immoral, as illegal, or as contrary to public policy just because business men have been known to cheat their customers, to defraud their creditors, and to bribe officials. Is it any less irrational to denounce the trust as an unrighteous invention because trusts have been known to do things which the moral consciousness of mankind condemns, and which good citizenship pronounces contrary to public policy? The trust should be dispassionately regarded, and calmly studied as a form of organization which is powerful for both good and evil; and it should then be held by the public to the same moral responsibility to do good rather than evil, which the common conscience of mankind imposes upon the individual. The trust, moreover, is a legitimate source of public revenue and should be subjected to a just taxation. My effort in this paper has merely been to show that, if the trust conducts its affairs within the limits of morality, law, and public policy, it cannot long inflict serious injury on the community in consequence of its strictly economic functions.

VIII

THE RAILROADS AND THE STATE

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In the United States the relation of the railroad to the government has assumed, at some time and place, every possible form, from an uncontrolled private ownership to ownership and management by the state itself. The views of economists, legislators, and business men as to the best solution of the problems presented by the conflicting interests of stock and bond holders, directors, shippers, and the public at large have a correspondingly wide range. The present drift of both events and thought is strongly toward a juridical and administrative compromise, of a kind that is in perfect keeping with the historical characteristics of American political development. However European nations may solve such problems, we shall solve them ourselves in a way of our own.

The conditions that have given rise to these problems have so often been described in recent years that it is unnecessary to rehearse them in any detail. Railroad mileage and traffic have grown with a rapidity that have made all conditions of cost and value unstable, and all methods of management experimental. The expectation entertained in the early days of railroad building, that competition would regulate charges and profits as unfailingly and as simply as it once regulated them in wholesale trade, was entirely disappointed. Competition is found to be a vastly more tremendous force than could have been dreamed of, but it works with ruinous irregularity and inequality, reducing service almost to a gratuity in one place, while failing to reduce excessive charges in another; at one time carried on between different lines with reckless fury, at another time giving place to

combination and pooling. The opportunities for directors to make great fortunes at the expense of investors have been almost unlimited, and they have been diligently improved. Individual and local discriminations for a long time were carried so far that at last they exhausted the patience of a people which, on the whole, submits to imposition more good-naturedly than any other in the world.

Shall these evils be left to correct themselves if they will, or shall the state attempt to correct them, and if so how? The first of these questions has been answered for at least the time being. Faith in a self-correcting virtue has died out. State action has begun, and its continuance is inevitable. There are two forms that it can take, namely, state ownership and state regulation. In regard to each, we may raise questions of moral right, of expediency, and of probability. The question of legal right is a question solely of the sovereign will of the people, which makes legal rights and destroys them, but which is itself always profoundly influenced by considerations of moral right.

The question of moral right is, therefore, fundamental. Is the right to make money by means of certain opportunities conferred by the state, one which the state has no moral right to recover? Are the values of railroad property so entirely a creation of private effort that the state may not interfere in their administration?

The right of the state to take possession of the railroads by honourable purchase at a just valuation, is never questioned except among the few who deny that there is a moral basis for governmental functions beyond the preservation of order and the enforcement of contracts, and by the still fewer who deny the validity of any governmental action whatsoever. Those who hold that government is justified by necessity, if not, indeed, as Aristotle taught, as a means to the moral development of man, will not claim that any particular class of citizens has an irrevocable right, against society as a whole, to such opportunities for money making as railroad transportation affords. The opportunities were conferred by the state; the state, by an honourable bar-

gain, may recover them, and it may then refuse to reconfer them.

The right of the state to impose conditions on private railroad property and to regulate its management is more difficult to state clearly and simply, but it is no less certain. Of no railroad whatever has the value been created by private effort alone. The very first factor in the creation of railroad wealth is contributed by the state. Nothing can be done toward the construction of a line until right of way is secured, and it is doubtful if right of way through ten miles of country farms, to say nothing about city building lots, could be obtained without an exercise by the state of its right of eminent domain, whereby land is condemned to the proposed use, and the owners are obliged to accept a compensation fixed by judicial process. And this is not all. It has become a possibility for one man to own a whole railroad system, but no one man could have built a railroad system in the first instance, and no number of men in the early days of railroading would have risked their capital in a railroad system under the law of ordinary partnership, which makes each partner individually liable for the total obligations of the enterprise. Another form of organization was necessary, which should have special legal powers and privileges, and in which an individual's liability should be limited in some proportion to his investment. That form was found in the joint stock corporation, an artificial legal person, created by the state for no other reason whatever than the expectation that it would promote the public welfare, and over which, therefore, the state has at least as much moral right of control, to any extent necessary to insure the public welfare, as it has over natural persons. And this moral right has abundant expression in legal right.

Aside from special constitutional and statutory provisions in each commonwealth for the government of corporations, there is a body of common law of fundamental importance defining the rights and obligations of common carriers, which the courts are expected to enforce, and in full knowledge of which railroad enterprises are undertaken. These laws are

the substantial basis of an indefinite control that may be exercised by each state within its own boundaries.

That wider control, which only the nation can exercise, is vested in the Federal Government by the constitutional provision expressly conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce between the states.

The question of the comparative expediency of state ownership of railroads on the one hand, and of governmental regulation on the other hand, opens up considerations so many and so involved that volumes would be necessary for any thorough discussion of them. In an article like this it is possible only to point out a few of the more important conditions on which the answer turns.

It is held by many economists that a business which is by its nature a monopoly is properly a function of government, while business that is self-regulated by competition is properly a function of individuals.

Any business tends to become a monopoly when consolidation of plant and management secures such important economies that the public can be better served by one concern than by two or more. That this is true of railroads, few well-informed persons any longer doubt, and not many competent students any longer deny that business of this nature either should be owned by the public or should be subjected to administrative regulation by the government. Public opinion has rapidly settled toward this conclusion, but there is still a wide divergence as to whether public regulation or public ownership is the wiser plan. Thus, for example, while many cities are experimenting with municipal ownership of gas and electric lighting plants, Massachusetts has placed all her gas and electric lighting companies under regulation by a commission.

Public ownership involves great difficulties and some dangers that cannot be ignored. For one thing, we cannot be sure that it will stop with those businesses that have the monopolistic character now. The growth of trusts suggests the possibility, at least, that the production of nearly all the great staples of commerce may drift under centralized man-

agement. But even if this does not happen, the objections to public ownership and management, of even a comparatively few great business undertakings, are serious, from an economic no less than from a political standpoint.

President Hadley has summarized the economic objections in his proposition that it seems to be difficult for a government to manage a great business interest so as to combine economy with a progressive policy. There are examples of careful economy with low prices of service, as in the state railroads of Germany, but the service in these cases is inferior to that offered by private corporations in the United States. The usual superiority of private management in this matter becomes conspicuous in great emergencies. The energy displayed by the Pennsylvania railroad, in reëstablishing its through traffic after the Johnstown flood, was something not to be expected of any governmental business management that we are acquainted with at present. On the other hand, governments may give, on the whole, better service than private companies, but at the expense of taxpayers. It is possible that state administrations will yet solve the problem of uniting economy with enterprise more successfully than private management can do it. If it does, one great objection to state ownership of railroads will disappear.

We need not dwell on the political difficulties involved in an enormous extension of the civil service and in the temptation to conduct a public business that touches vitally every locality and almost every individual in such a way as to influence elections. But there is one difficulty which is so peculiarly an American difficulty, and which is, nevertheless, so often left out of consideration, that it calls for explicit statement.

As a people we are deficient in certain characteristics and habits that would seem to be essential to a successful governmental management of railroads. We have not been used for generations to having governments do many things for us, least of all to manage great industrial enterprises for us. The popular thinking has not been trained into a form to enable it to guide wisely, to criticise judiciously, an admin-

istration undertaking such functions. We have a belief — be it true or false, still a firm conviction — that the American is peculiarly qualified to manage great undertakings by private enterprise, and a popular willingness to look on at this sort of management, wonder at it, and see what will come of it.

It is, indeed, no more true of us than of other nations, that all industrial undertakings can be better carried on by individuals than by governments. But just what undertakings will be better handled by government, and what by individuals, is peculiarly one of those matters that will always be determined for each state or nation largely by its own character, habits, and traditions. In this country the competition of waterways has hitherto been a chief factor in determining railroad tariffs; and it happens that through various causes, some of them historical, the development of inland navigation has never enlisted the earnest effort of private capital; it has always been a matter for governmental administration, and in all probability it always will be. In the case of railroads, on the contrary, Americans have manifested a remarkable genius for private administration, and none at all for governmental management. We should seriously consider whether this is not the real secret of the failure successfully to manage so important a property as the Hoosac tunnel and its connecting railroad by a state like Massachusetts, which has done more than any other state in the Union, by means of various administrative commissions, to hold corporations of all kinds to their public responsibilities. To one who watched the history of that enterprise year by year until the tunnel and the state road were sold to a corporation, it seems absolutely certain that the failure of state management, whether inevitable or not on account of any inherent difficulty in state management of railroad property, was at any rate inevitable, as requiring a kind of skill that the people of the state in their civic capacity did not possess, and as contrary to the spirit of their politics.

If we were Frenchmen or Germans or Russians, and had ingrained in our mental constitutions the traditions and aptitudes of centuries of French or German or Russian govern-

ment, perhaps we might expect to succeed in doing some things which Europe does, if not well, at least not altogether ill. But the major premise fails, and to assume that we shall revolutionize our political aptitudes and ways of thought, is to beg the whole of a large question.

Thus it will be seen that the question of expediency is one not at all likely to be answered *a priori* or conformably to any preconceived theory. It will be answered only after much experience, only by much experiment, only through a great multitude of tentative rules and decisions. And this brings us directly to the question of the probabilities in our own country: Are the chances in favor of a return to *laissez-faire*, of a movement toward state ownership, or of a growing administrative and judicial regulation?

The one thing reasonably certain is that, either by regulation or by state ownership, the state will play an increasing part in railroad affairs. There will be no return to the wholly unregulated private management of former years. But what form of control will finally be adopted no one can predict with certainty. If the present form of regulation by commission proves effective, it may be continued indefinitely. On the other hand, if it is unsuccessful, if the railroads prove able to defy regulation or to control the government's policy, the populist feeling may easily become strong enough and widespread enough to bring the railroads under state ownership.

Even if regulation by commission proves effective, political or military exigency may transfer ownership to the nation. It was for political and military reasons chiefly that the post-office was made a government monopoly; and for like reasons the telegraph may at any time follow. Should the imperial government of Great Britain or the Dominion government of Canada take possession of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, it is not at all improbable that the United States would take possession of the Pacific railroads of this country. On the contrary, if the railroads should one day become public property, political exigency might at any time compel the government to sell them, as Austria sold hers on account of her financial straits subsequent to 1849. Still again, it might happen that

government ownership would be so debased to partisan ends that the people would go back to the system of ownership by corporations.

In the absence of any of these causes of revolutionary change the probabilities are against state ownership. The experiment of entrusting elaborate industrial functions to a democratic government is one never yet made on a great scale, and to a majority of voters it will probably seem wiser not to enter upon a policy that all their habits of thought and all the traditions of our political life conspire to make them regard as radical. One has only to look into the growth of common law to get a sense of the instinctive obedience of the English and American people to the principle of continuity. We do, indeed, make changes by revolutionary proceedings sometimes, but never when we can avoid it. Rather by tentative modifications, by patiently feeling our way, we develop the new from the old. It is, therefore, altogether probable that in the United States the relations of the railways to the state, for a long time to come, will be developed along lines already existing. The railroad corporations will probably continue to be semi-private, semi-public bodies; and by the further development of administration through commissions with discretionary powers, and through the further growth of a body of pertinent judicial decisions, the satisfactory discharge of their public obligations will be more and more nearly secured.

The discretionary powers are necessary because experience has shown that preconceived theories of what regulation is feasible and what is not are extremely liable to be wrong.

The theories of shippers and of the travelling public, embodied in legislation, repeatedly have been found impracticable or worse, as in the granger legislation of 1870–77; and the theories of railroad managers have been wrong as often as have been those of the public.

The case of the car stove illustrates the fallibility of the railroad man's judgment. Public opinion insisted that the car stove should go. Railroad managers, with one voice, replied that the car stove could not go, that no other means

of heating was practicable. But New York and one or two other states declared that nevertheless the stove should go; and then the better roads quickly discovered substitutes that at once were found so superior that managers would as soon have returned to link and pin couplings as to stove heating. It is because of this extreme liability of all the parties in interest to make costly mistakes of judgment, and the consequent impossibility of enforcing very many hard and fast rules, that commissions with discretionary powers have become of so much importance.

State commissions of a workable type began with the creation of the Massachusetts Commission in 1869. The Federal Interstate Commerce Commission was not created until 1887. The state commissions and the national commission deal to some extent with the same problems, but to a greater extent they are concerned with different problems, and, as time goes on, their functions will undoubtedly become more and more specialized. They all undertake to enforce publicity in railroad matters as far as public welfare demands it, and this is more and more clearly seen to be one of the feasible forms of railroad regulation, and one of fundamental importance. Mere publicity itself corrects some of the worst abuses to which railroad management is liable. To the state commissions properly belongs the immensely important function of deciding whether or not public necessity or convenience requires the construction of a proposed new road. The Massachusetts Commission has for some time had this power. Had it been possessed and fearlessly exercised in other states thirty years ago, an enormous amount of loss and corruption would have been prevented. Many more special but not unimportant matters are within the jurisdiction of state commissions. Among these are local train service, train connections, the location of stations and highway crossings. The experience of Massachusetts has shown that in regard to all these things an able and upright commission is powerful to protect the public interest.

The greater problems of rates, freight classification, and discrimination come by force of law and circumstances more

and more before the Federal Commission. Short as its history has been, this commission already has created and enforced a remarkable body of railroad law, and the limits of governmental regulation are beginning to be defined. The prohibition of pooling was of very doubtful expediency, and it is evident that the principle of equality of service cannot be construed to mean that tariffs must be proportionate to cost of service. High class freight must be made to contribute more toward the fixed charges of a railroad than bulky freight can be made to pay, even though it costs the road more to move the latter than to move the former. But charging more for a short than for a long haul and the worst forms of discrimination have to an increasing extent been prevented.

Therefore, we have every reason to expect that, without any revolutionary change, the relations of the railroad to the state will be brought into increasingly harmonious adjustment. This becomes the more probable when we reflect that, while the present evils of railroad management could not be expected to correct themselves, many of them must disappear with the causes that gave rise to them. Evils due to a marvellously rapid growth of mileage and transportation, to an exaggerated estimate of a new thing, to a great uncertainty as to the future values of stocks, and to instability of policy, are evils that can no longer exist when the great trunk lines and tens of thousands of miles of feeders have been definitely established once for all; when the volume and course of traffic can be anticipated from year to year with a fair degree of certainty; when values have become relatively stable, and an equilibrium has been established between bonds and stocks, and when policy has become much less a matter of experiment, much more a matter of tradition, than it is at present.

IX

PUBLIC REVENUE AND CIVIC VIRTUE

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The maxim that a direct tax should be apportioned among taxpayers in proportion to their property or to their incomes, is wholly undemocratic. It is a relic of feudal days, when men served their overlord in proportion to benefits conferred, or paid for protection in proportion to the protection given.

Not less undemocratic is indirect taxation, in all its tortuous and vicious forms. It is a survival of the age of emancipation, when the labourer, no longer compelled as a serf to do task work for the owners of the land, was practically compelled to pay for his freedom in proportion to his utilization and enjoyment of it, that is to say, in proportion to his consumption.

In a perfect democracy there could be no indirect taxation, — which conceals or misrepresents every relation of the citizen to the government, and bemuddles his mind on every public question — and there could be no inequalities of direct taxation. In a perfect democracy every citizen, having an equal voice with every other citizen in all public affairs, would also pay the same tax as every other and would pay it directly, knowing exactly how much he was paying and why. The only examples of a perfect democracy are found in organizations like clubs or trade-unions, in which all members enjoy precisely the same privileges, and pay therefor exactly equal assessments.

It is perfectly consistent with these truths that indirect taxation and great inequalities of direct taxation have always been regarded by sober thinkers as detrimental to civic virtue. Of all forms of government or of the state, democracy is that one which is most closely bound up with an enlight-

ened and virile morality. The perfect ideals of democracy can be grasped only by enlightened and sensitively conscientious men, and their approximate realization is possible only to an instructed and virtuous people. Indirect taxation destroys moral responsibility by concealing the relations of cause and effect in public affairs, and by tempting enterprising men to enrich themselves at the expense of the ignorant, through a perversion of law and administration to private ends. Inequalities of direct taxation destroy the sense of right and wrong in public matters by tempting the poor to vote large appropriations at the expense of the rich, — often ignorantly, regardless of necessity or of fitness, and without check upon the methods of expenditure.

It is difficult to say which of these abuses is on the whole more destructive of civic virtue. The inequalities of direct taxation alike in great cities and in rural towns have for many generations been the prolific cause of waste, wanton extravagance, and accumulating indebtedness. Indirect taxation has begotten in the nation the policy of protectionism and its ill-visaged brood of briberies, log rollings, and legislative deals. On the whole, protectionism has probably been in our own country the more insidious and dangerous foe of public morality. Able men have differed and doubtless will long continue to differ about the economic value of a protective tariff; but in recent years not many self-respecting men have had the hardihood to deny that, in the actual tariff policy of the United States — taking into account not only administration and legislation, but also the means by which these have been shaped — any industrial advantage that we may have secured has been purchased at a heavy sacrifice of straightforward conduct, of that stern adherence to common honesty upon which the prosperity of nations, as of individuals, must ultimately rest. In the nature of the facts, these injuries to civic morality have been inevitable. Protectionism imposes taxes not only for purposes of public revenue, but also and avowedly to create profits or wages in particular industries. When a man can make himself believe that this is morally legitimate — when

he can persuade himself that it is morally right to increase his own profits, or even to raise the wages of his employees at the expense of other men who protest that they are in no way benefited — he can hardly remain sensitive to the methods by which the discriminating tax is imposed, or by which its favours are apportioned.

It is because these moral aspects of a financial system are really of supreme importance that the American people should ever hold in grateful memory the name of Henry George. By proposing a confiscation of land values which clear-headed men in general have pronounced dishonest, while himself denouncing the dishonesty of a protective tariff, Mr. George compelled his fellow-men to give a measure of attention to the moral, not less than to the economic, aspects of their revenue systems. Happily there are no signs that this attention will cease. The popular discussion of the ethics of taxation has now been carried on with great earnestness for more than twenty years, and among its results have been, not only an increase of knowledge, but also a quickening of the moral sense.

There are three possible ways of making the revenue system of a state conform approximately to democratic standards.

The first is to raise all public revenue by means of a poll tax. The poll tax is a direct assessment of citizens and conforms to the democratic requirement of equality, exactly as does the impartial assessment of club or trade-union members. The poll tax, however, has never been popular, and instead of displacing other taxes it has nearly disappeared from our financial resources.

A second way to accomplish the same result would be to derive all public revenue from the public ownership of lands, mines, waterways, railroads, and other productive enterprises, and to distribute any surplus over the necessary expenses of government in equal dividends to all citizens, exactly as a corporation would distribute its earnings in excess of expenses in equal dividends to its stockholders if all held equal amounts of stock. Under such a system the citizen might

now and then receive, not his anticipated quarterly dividend, but an assessment — a tax bill — and in his wrath he might demand an investigation of the administration. Such a system therefore might create in the great body of voters a keener interest in the functions and methods of government than is felt at present. Possibly there would be fewer extravagant appropriations and fewer mistakes of administration. Such a system, however, would approach too near to state socialism to be seriously entertained by the American mind.

The third way to make the revenue system approximately democratic would be to obtain the major part of the state's income from public property and from franchises, and a minor part, fluctuating in amount, from excise taxes. Inasmuch as all citizens are equal owners of an undivided public property, and equal sharers in all public rights, a revenue derived from public property and from franchises must be regarded as equivalent to a tax equally imposed upon all citizens. An excise tax could be laid upon a few selected articles in such wise that it would fall with approximate equality upon adult persons. Moreover, an excise tax fluctuating in amount would, in a measure, serve to keep the attention of voters fixed upon the policy and conduct of their government, and thus would keep alive the sense of civic responsibility. Far better, however, would be the moral results if the marginal revenue could be raised by a fluctuating poll tax, and if the bill therefor, sent to every voter could invariably be accompanied by an itemized statement of all governmental receipts and expenditures.

All these schemes, however, are at best nothing more than ideals; perhaps they are merely visions. Our nation and our commonwealths — as yet far from perfectly democratic in organization and policy — will long continue to struggle with their crude, uneconomical, and immoral systems of taxation, trying little by little to improve them, and to make the best of what cannot at present be mended. By keeping the moral as well as the economic issues continually in the public mind, important reforms can be achieved from time to time.

Through the decay of protectionism, and through the gradual substitution of franchise taxes and revenues from public property for our barbarous taxes on personal property, we shall make some approximation to standards that are democratic and moral. To the extent that we accomplish this we shall permit our now half-strangled civic virtue to breathe freely — to grow and wax strong.

X

SOME RESULTS OF THE FREEDOM OF WOMEN

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Among the results of the democratic movement of the nineteenth century the great increase of the freedom enjoyed by women and the multiplication of their legal rights and industrial privileges are in many quarters regarded as of much importance for human well-being. It is assumed that the change has already affected the production of wealth, and predictions are freely made that it will affect the family as an institution, the increase of population, and the manners and social standards of the community. In this paper I purpose to touch on two only of these results, namely, the production of wealth as affected by the greater freedom of women to enter industrial employments, and the effect of these industrial activities of women upon the increase of population.

According to the Federal census of 1880, there were in the United States in that year 18,735,980 males ten years of age and over, of whom 14,744,942 or 78.70 per cent were engaged in gainful occupations. In the same year the population included 18,025,627 females, ten or more years of age, of whom 2,647,157 or 14.69 per cent were engaged in gainful occupations. In 1890 the total male population ten years of age and over had increased to 24,352,659, of whom 18,821,090 or 77.29 per cent were engaged in gainful occupations. The total female population ten years of age and over had increased to 23,060,900, of whom 3,914,571 or 16.97 per cent were engaged in gainful occupations. It thus appears that there was an increase of 2.28 per cent in the total number of females over ten years of age engaged in gainful occupations, and a falling off of a little over one per cent in the number of males of corresponding age so employed. The absolute number of females added

to gainful occupations during the decade was 1,267,414; while the absolute number of males so added to the industrial population was 4,076,148.

From these figures two rather important conclusions must be drawn. The first is that the positive addition to the wealth of the community, in consequence of the increasing industrial freedom of women, is — quite contrary to a general belief — of comparatively small importance. Not only is it not large when measured in absolute numbers, on the basis of the face value of the figures, but it is still less when we take into account the probability that, as the leaders of organized labour generally insist, the competition of women has to some extent diminished the earnings of men. This appears from the figures as given above, and is more definitely shown in the eleventh annual report of the Commissioner of Labor, published in 1897, presenting a comparative study of the work and wages of men, women, and children. Of the whole number of persons employed in gainful occupations in the United States in 1870, 85.32 per cent were males and 14.68 per cent were females over ten years of age; while in 1890 the proportions were, males 82.78 per cent and females 17.22 per cent.

This general conclusion is fully borne out by a special report on the employment of women, rendered in 1894 to the British Board of Trade, prepared for the Labour Department by Miss Collet. The main conclusion drawn from a detailed statistical presentation of the employment of women and girls is stated as follows: "The current view that women's employment is rapidly extending, and that women are replacing men to a considerable extent in industry, is not confirmed. On the whole, the proportion of women who are returned as occupied remained practically stationary in the decade 1881–91. The employment of married and of elderly women has, on the whole, diminished; and the employment in casual occupations has also declined. There has been an increase in the employment of women and girls under twenty-five which has, however, been concurrent with a similar extension of the employment of young men and boys." Or, to be more specific, the figures were: In 1881, in every one hundred women and

girls above ten years of age, 34.05 were returned as occupied; and in 1891, 34.42 were thus returned — a merely fractional increase.

If, however, the industrial activity of women contributes little to the annual production of wealth, it may nevertheless be more than insignificant as a factor in social relations, and in the general well-being of the wage-earning classes. A great disproportion between the economic and the social consequences of female industry may, indeed, be inferred from the irregularity with which the industry of women is distributed among the various gainful occupations. Thus, in 1890, of all persons employed in agriculture, fisheries, and mining, in the United States only 7.54 per cent were females over ten years of age, and this proportion would have been yet more trifling but for the large numbers of negro women who work in the fields of the South. In trade and transportation the percentage of females over ten years of age was 6.87 per cent, a gain of 5.26 per cent from 1870, due chiefly to the entry of girls as clerks and saleswomen in the large department stores and business offices. In domestic and personal service the proportion of women and girls over ten years of age was 38.24 per cent; in professional service it was 33.01 per cent (such occupations as stenography and nursing being included in professional services); and in manufacturing and mechanical industries it was 20.18 per cent. It is obvious that such inequalities of distribution must result in unequal effects upon the wages of men in different occupations, and this phase of women's activity it is that has chiefly interested the leaders of organized labour.

Even more important, however, may be another effect of unequal distribution if it be found that the occupations which chiefly absorb the labour of wage-earning women demand women within certain age classes only. If such is indeed the fact, and if the industrial period corresponds to the first third or more of the child-bearing period, it may appear that the one really important consequence of the increased industrial activity of women is its reaction upon the reproduction and upon the standard of living of the wage-earning classes. To this possibility we may now give further attention.

No theorem was ever more warmly debated than was Malthus's proposition that population tends to multiply beyond the limits of subsistence. Yet it was only in political economy that it had scientific recognition. To-day its real magnitude begins to be apprehended. Besides the part it plays in economic thought, it underlies the whole theory of civilization; for the fact itself, that mankind tends to a relative overmultiplication, is related to human progress in a way that earlier writers only dimly perceived. In the discussions of half a century ago, it was assumed by the disputants on both sides that overpopulation is an evil, and an evil only. We know now that it is only the overmultiplying population that makes progress. Wealth, art, learning, and refinement, presuppose a certain density of population and active competition. Where these coexist the struggle for existence has been known in full severity. Social sympathies and powers of abstract thought have not appeared until men have had to stand by one another and have learned to live by their wits, and these beginnings of wisdom have come to birth only when numbers have pressed hard upon subsistence, — not upon resources, not upon potential subsistence, but upon that actual subsistence obtained by the industrial methods at the time in vogue.

Yet the fuller knowledge of our day has not cancelled the list of miseries that Malthus enumerated. It has added new and even worse ones. The struggle that sharpens thought, that brings out the beauty and the power of human life at one extreme, leaves at the other extreme more than that poverty which is the mildest penalty of failure. It leaves much physical and moral wreck. "They judge wrongly," says Dr. Morselli, "who think that the evils of civilized society, such as misery, disease, prostitution, madness, suicide, are accidental and avoidable. These social evils represent the inevitable result of the struggle for existence."

We must not too hastily conclude, however, that everything which makes life beautiful and worthy to be enjoyed by those whom nature has chosen to favour must for all time be purchased at the ruin of the outcast. Without over-

populating vigour and resulting struggle there is no progress; nevertheless, some mitigation of failure is possible.

The population problem is being studied to-day, not only more comprehensively than it was in Malthus's time, but by better methods and with different and more specific results. Crude as social statistics are in many respects, they yet are sufficiently exact in regard to a few things to enable us to say positively that it will not do to generalize in this matter of population ratios and results, irrespective of social classes and modes of life. Birth rates and death rates are not the same in country and in city; in the richer and in the poorer classes; among the native and among the foreign born. Moreover, the evil and the good results of a tendency to increase beyond the existing limits of subsistence do not spring from the increase of all classes indifferently. Late statistical results and studies in medical demography go to show that the different social classes are in some measure different stages in the development of the same stock. Thus, the existing working populations of the cities have not descended unmixed from the urban wage classes of past generations. In part they have sprung from unsuccessful individuals of the mercantile and professional classes, and in part from unsuccessful elements in the agricultural population of the country. The mercantile, manufacturing, and professional men of the present day are largely descended from country stock, not largely from an urban ancestry. Apparently no stock not reënforced from without survives for unlimited generations under the conditions of city life. Sooner or later it runs a downward course and disappears, leaving its place to fresh energy from country homes.

The agricultural population, then, is the perpetual seed bed of human society. An overflow from the country builds and dwells in cities, and develops there the higher forms of industry and intellectual life. It creates civilization, but at a heavy cost. The price of success in urban enterprise is a nervous strain that only the strongest and keenest endure. Of the defeated, numbered by thousands, those that are shattered in nerve fill up the insane asylums and the

morgues; the wicked seek careers of vice and crime; the honest drift into the ranks of the industrious wages class. The well-to-do class of the cities does not overmultiply. It marries late, and too often its few children start in life with impaired vitality. The working class, on the other hand, often multiplies beyond the demands of the labour market, and the overflow becomes the great body of the unemployed. From the urban unemployed, reënforced by vicious and idle elements from the country (for the country generates not only the best, but in its neglected solitudes and thriftless villages some of the worst of human stuff), are spawned forth the tramps and the permanently pauperized wretches of the lowest slums.

In these facts we have a key to many of our social problems. It is in the highest degree desirable that the better part of the country population should be maintained in overmultiplying vigour, so that, generation after generation, it may feed the cities — and in the cities the great enterprises, the professions, sciences, and arts — with fresh vitality and power. It is equally desirable that the birth rate of the poorer half of the urban working population should be greatly reduced; for this half is too largely composed of the doubly unsuccessful in the social struggle, and its vitality is often so near the point of exhaustion that it falls an easy victim to inebriety and every lower form of vice. If social evils are to be not palliated, but in a measure prevented, the increase of the wages class should be kept within the social demand for labour.

Are not all tendencies, however, the other way? Is it not the choicest country stock that tends to become sterile, or to consume itself in towns, and does not the most hopelessly inefficient portion of the wages class exhibit the greatest lack of procreative prudence? Here, again, we have questions that get somewhat different answers from later data than would have been given to them a generation ago.

In nearly all the classical discussions of Malthusianism, the question is regarded from the standpoint of the prudence or the imprudence of men. Thus the Rev. Dr. Thomas

Chalmers wrote that he knew of no "right or comfortable or efficient way" of restraining population other "than by the establishment of a habit and a principle among the labourers themselves. If they will in general enter recklessly into marriage, it is not possible to save a general descent in their circumstances." Now as a matter of fact birth rates depend very little on the age at which men marry, while they depend directly on the age at which women marry. A young woman who marries at sixteen may easily enough have a dozen children or more. If she marries at twenty-seven she is not likely to have more than two or three. This most obvious fact in the whole problem has received the least attention. Economists and divines have vied with one another in preaching prudence to men, while all the time the rate of population increase has actually been determined by the economic position of women.

John Stuart Mill alone had some perception of the truth. The desirable result that population should bear a gradually diminishing ratio to capital and employment "would be much accelerated," he affirmed, "by another change which lies in the direct line of the best tendencies of the time, the opening of industrial occupations freely to both sexes"; and he added more specifically, "I shall only indicate, among the probable consequences of the industrial and social independence of women, a great diminution of the evil of overpopulation." But even Mill did not foresee the facts quite as they are. He anticipated that great numbers of self-supporting women would forego marriage altogether. He did not understand better than other writers of his day that the really important influences lie in the conditions that determine, not whether women shall marry at all, but at what age they shall marry.

Now it is precisely upon these conditions that the industrial activity of women is expending its most important influence. The marriage age of working women is being raised to an extent that promises a real diminution of social ills. Much has been written about the probable influence of the higher education of women upon the birth rate of the cultivated classes. The discussion is a good example of how a conspicu-

ous thing may overshadow a momentous one. The momentous thing is that, for every score of girls of the cultivated classes who receive a college education, a thousand girls of the working classes are postponing marriage for a time on account of the opportunities now open to them for self-support. In order to live they are no longer obliged to marry and begin bearing children as soon as fathers or mothers have ceased to provide for them. The burdens of maternity coming only when they are ready to assume them, their families can no longer be large in the old-fashioned sense of the word.

Evidence supporting this conclusion is found in the report of the United States Commissioner of Labor on "Working Women in Large Cities." The information was obtained by personal interviews with 17,427 women, employed in twenty-two cities, and is fairly representative of many thousand more. Of these 17,427 only 745 were married; 1038 were widowed, leaving 15,387 single. The average age was twenty-two years and seven months. More than 75 per cent of the whole number were less than twenty-five years old, and of these 8302 were more than seventeen years old. This means that nearly or quite one-half of the working women are at present single during several of the years in which in former generations women of the same class were rearing children.

To realize the full significance of this delay of motherhood another important consideration must be called to mind. The girl who marries at sixteen or seventeen (and how very common such marriages have been in the English-speaking working classes no reader of industrial history needs to be told) has enjoyed no opportunities for self-improvement. The prospect is far from good that she will be able to make a home in which children will learn foresight and self-control, and grow up with that strong regard for the decencies of life which is the sole guarantee of thrift and prudence. But if marriage be delayed for even four or five years, the whole intellectual and moral life may be lifted and expanded. An effective desire to live respectably and worthily may be awakened, and the woman who has once known this desire will

never permit her children to sink into indifference or worse, without an effort to quicken their finer sensibilities. She will think twice before giving her hand in marriage, and will demand a reasonable assurance that she is not to step down to a lower standard of living.

Here, then, would seem to be a strategic point in the attack on social evils. To aid in multiplying the opportunities for young women to earn their support and to surround them during their wage-earning years with uplifting and refining influences, these plainly seem to be important duties. The multiplication of opportunities has been brought about thus far almost wholly by the unconscious processes of economic evolution, and it will go on in the same way. All that conscious effort can do is to combat the ignorance and the prejudice that hinder or waste. But in providing educational influences and wholesome environments, the field for organized effort and individual self-sacrifice is unlimited. And it is not being neglected. Perhaps in no other field of ethical activity has there been for many years more earnest work expended, or any work that has been more richly rewarded. The working girls' societies have grown beyond the experimental stage. They have become an influential factor in the life of working women, affording, by means of their meetings, discussions, and classes, a large measure of that education which teaches the value of sanitary surroundings, cultivates a love of books, music, and art, and awakens a sense of the moral responsibilities underlying social relations. Such work is being done also, with growing success, by university and college settlements, and by similar organizations under many names. The movement for university extension, too, may in time helpfully touch the lives of working women as well as of working men.

The sober student of sociology can be neither pessimist nor unqualified optimist in his estimate of human progress. What he sees going on is a slow betterment of conditions, and a gradual lifting of the many no less than of the favoured few. The improvement is slow, not only because it demands unfailing endeavour and self-sacrifice, but also because so much

of the best-intentioned philanthropy is misdirected. A practical service of sociology is to reveal points at which educational work will tell. At present all conclusions seem to indicate that if society would expend its ameliorative resources to the best advantage, it should not neglect to raise the standard of living of the self-supporting young women of the wages class.

XI

THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF POLITICAL MAJORITIES

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Sir Henry Sumner Maine's gloomy forecast of the future of popular governments has made less impression on contemporary thought than any equally serious study of political conditions in modern times. His conclusion that "there is not at present sufficient evidence to warrant the common belief that these governments are likely to be of indefinitely long duration,"[1] is accepted by few scholars, even among the "remnant" that would gladly agree with him if they could; while to the Philistines of democracy his demonstration from history of the weakness of their cause is but "the glory of their strength." The incoherence of the argument is a little too obvious, when we are warned at the outset that a wide suffrage "would produce in the long run a mischievous form of conservatism"[2] and "arrest everything which has ever been associated with liberalism,"[3] and assured in conclusion that "the natural condition of mankind (if that word 'natural' is used) is not the progressive condition," the normal state of society being "a condition not of changeableness, but of unchangeableness."[4] And, again, from the fact that "if modern society be not essentially and normally changeable, the attempt to conduct it safely through the unusual and exceptional process of change is not easy, but extremely difficult,"[5] we are asked to conclude that government by the many must be transitory, though at the same time it is asserted that "there is no belief less warranted by actual experience than that a democratic republic is, after the first and in the long run, given to reforming legislation."[6]

[1] "Popular Government," p. 53. [3] Ibid., p. 35. [5] Ibid., p. 171.
[2] Ibid., p. 35. [4] Ibid., p. 170. [6] Ibid., p. 67.

That popular governments will be henceforth more enduring, if not more magnificent, than the monarchies and aristocracies of the past, is the more probable as it is the more common belief. The belief is growing, too, that popular power will be less and less regardful of constitutional limitations, less tolerant of ingenious checks and balances. Popular power will be majority power, or, more likely, plurality power. The masses have long believed this. To an increasing extent the scholars believe it, though many of them regret it.

Regret and apprehension spring naturally from the political ideas transmitted from the great teachers of earlier days. On the whole, the political philosophy of successive generations has held rather closely to the middle way of the Aristotelian doctrine, and it has led us to expect almost anything of popular governments except undue conservatism. Not reactionary thinkers alone have dreaded the tyranny of political majorities. It is especially noticeable that American writers of intensely democratic sympathies have feared the power of mere numbers, when unrestrained by local feeling or institutional life. The strongest and clearest presentation of their view was made by Calhoun in his "Disquisition on Government," an essay seldom referred to now, but better deserving of study than some more pretentious works. Its argument is based on a distinction between numerical and concurrent majorities. The concurrent majority is an agreement of several specific majorities, each representing one of the many diverse interests that are included in a large political society. The underlying thought, however, is in part different from that of Mill's later argument for minority representation. Both insist that it is neither democratic nor just to exclude one or more parts of the community or one or more social interests from representation in the government, as, in their belief, government by mere numerical majority does. Both deny that one class, or party, or section, will be more regardful of the rights and interests of the unrepresented in a democracy than in an aristocracy. But Calhoun adds that government by concurrent majority is different in nature from that by majority of numbers. The numerical majority

can be absolute, it can rule by force; concurrent majority presupposes rational compromise, since it is in the power of any interest to veto the action of the others; and this is the exact meaning of constitutionalism.

"It is this negative power — the power of preventing or arresting the action of the government, be it called by what term it may, — veto, interposition, nullification, check or balance of power — which in fact forms the constitution. They are all but different names for the negative power. In all its forms and under all its names it results from the concurrent majority. Without this there can be no negative, and without a negative no constitution. The assertion is true in reference to all constitutional governments, be their forms what they may. It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, and the positive which makes the government. The one is the power of acting, and the other the power of preventing or arresting action. The two, combined, make constitutional governments."[1]

We have before us now two very different beliefs about political majorities: one traditional and familiar, that they require restraint; the other — a very recent one, drawn from highly special historical studies — that their inertia will destroy popular governments by preventing progress.[2] My first purpose is to call attention to the assumptions on which these two beliefs rest. They both assume that political majorities have a nature that can be known, and that, acting according to their nature, their conduct will follow courses that can be predicted. But this is only another way of saying that the action of political majorities in the great work of legislation and administration is itself subject to some form of natural law, and that under normal conditions it will not overstep

[1] Works of John C. Calhoun, vol. i, pp. 35, 36.

[2] If any reader thinks that I have misrepresented Maine, whose pages contain numerous admissions that the immediate and transient action of democracy may be radical, I reply that these admissions as they stand are inconsistent with the chief thought. The two are nowhere reconciled and coördinated. Maine had dwelt so long on the psychology of Eastern and ancient communities that he had become incapable of understanding the psychology of modern democracy.

certain bounds, whether artificial limits are imposed or not. If all this is true, the great task of political science for the future will be to discover what the inherent tendencies and self-imposed bounds of popular political action are, and the duty of the statesman will be to shape his policy with reference to them. It is important, therefore, to examine in a scientific spirit the things that have been taken for granted. The reason why this has not been done before now is not difficult to find. Though the assumptions in question have been made in one form or another, not in two or three essays only, but in almost every political treatise in existence, they have been made almost unconsciously. Their implications have not been seen, much less thought out. It could hardly have been otherwise, because the facts and principles that would enter into a more thorough inquiry have only recently begun to attract attention. They do not fall strictly within the province of political science, in the narrower sense of the term. They belong rather to sociology, inasmuch as they are facts of human feeling and conduct, as conditioned by social relations, by movements of population, and by the interaction of society with its environment. They are thus typical of the postulates of the social sciences generally. All build in the same way on easily made assumptions in regard to the psychology and physiology of social relationships. The assumptions may be true, or partially true, or wholly imaginary. Their proper character will come to light when sociology, in the course of that systematic study of the fundamental phenomena of social activity that we may look for in the near future, takes them up for detailed examination.

Now these particular assumptions in regard to the nature and conduct of political majorities are among the most interesting, as they are among the most important, that the sociologist can study; and therefore my second and chief purpose with the political notions of Maine and Calhoun is to subject their underlying and unexpressed assumptions to a preliminary examination that will show on what lines a more exhaustive study might be made, and, incidentally, to afford a concrete example of sociological interpretation. Let us

then try to answer, in general terms at least, the questions: What is the social nature of a political majority? How is it composed? What is its psychology? How is it affected, if at all, by variations of environment and by movements of population, and what conduct will this nature impose? Do freely acting majorities rush into radicalism, or sink into stagnation, or tend to become moderate and progressive? Does the majority rule absolutely, by sheer force of numbers, or do we find that practically a numerical majority is a concurrent majority after all — a highly composite product of association, brought and held together by that very process of rational compromise that Calhoun extolled?

First of all, then, we must observe that a political majority is a consciously formed association for effecting a consciously apprehended purpose; yet it never is an unmixed product of perfectly independent, reasoned action on the part of all its members. Multitudes of adherents have ranged themselves by personal feeling or class prejudice, or a social instinct that prompts them to act in political matters as in other things, with this group of individuals rather than with that. Thus the membership of a political majority exhibits a complete gradation of mental development, from a quick and sensitive intelligence at the margin, where independent voting occurs, to stupid bigotry in the unstimulated interior of the mass. Consequently, there is a reasonable presumption that the temper of the whole is neither extremely radical nor ultra-conservative, but very moderately progressive. For a like reason the cohesion of a political majority is conditioned in two very different ways. So far as the party is formed and informed by reasoned opinion, it is affected by all the possibilities and all the difficulties of winning attention and establishing conviction; and these vary immensely, from time to time, with the temper of the public mind, as well as with the character of the question or policy submitted. On the other hand, so far as cohesion is a fact of feeling or prejudice, it is conditioned by a thousand circumstances of geographical grouping, occupation, and economic inequality — of inheritance, education, and religious belief.

Accordingly, it is at least probable that a numerical majority is not formed and maintained without much conciliation and mutual concession, and that while it is far from being that concurrence of all interests which Calhoun desired, it is yet the concurrence of so many interests that its conduct can hardly become arbitrary without peril of disruption or of complete disintegration.

These probabilities we have now to test by more particular observations. Even as probabilities, not to claim more for them, they would not necessarily hold good of small or of very backward, undifferentiated populations. There the radical or the conservative element might be out of all proportion to counteracting influences, and majorities themselves be almost homogeneous. It is extremely significant, therefore, to find that both the advocates and the opponents of democracy habitually draw conclusions from relatively simple or from special or exceptional social conditions. The prophets of manifest destiny point to the New England town or quote Freeman's account of the Sunday morning meeting of Swiss freemen. Sir Henry Maine assumes that very nearly all the world thinks and feels like a village community under a rajah. On the other hand, predictions of the dangerously radical action of popular power are commonly based on observations of the politics of compact city states, like ancient Athens, or of modern municipalities, like Paris. They dwell on majority action as it may be seen in versatile populations, living by trade or industry, and often in times of social upheaval. Burke said that a perfect democracy was "the most shameless thing in the world," also "the most fearless";[1] but as his conclusion was avowedly drawn from the French Revolution, a commentator might add that there has seldom been a more fearless induction from inadequate and exceptional facts. Bluntschli in Germany and Lieber in America, as teachers of political science, have warned thousands of pupils that "the populace cannot long retain its virtue after having drunk the intoxicating wine of power,"[2] and that "the doc-

[1] "Reflections on the Revolution in France" (Clarendon Press Edition, p. 110). [2] "The Theory of the State," p. 437.

trine *vox populi vox Dei* is essentially unrepublican."[1] But Lieber's example of all that is unrepublican is France, and by France he means Paris, and by Paris he means Jacobins; while Bluntschli hardly gets beyond Athens. In fact, he says that "democracy found its most logical expression in Athens, and its nature can nowhere be better studied than in the Athenian constitution."[2] We may accept these examples for all that they can possibly be worth. We may admit that wherever the Athens of Aristophanes or the Paris of Dumas *fils* is reproduced, there democracy will be shameless; but this gives us no warrant for saying that democracy among the Pennsylvania Dutch or in the Hoosier counties of Indiana will be shameless in quite the same way — certainly none to say that it will also be fearless.

So it is unscientific to argue about political majorities as if their nature and conduct were always the same, irrespective of social evolution or of the size and complexity of states. I want to make my meaning at this point very plain. I do not mean merely that in the large and highly developed state majorities will be constrained by facts of outward circumstance to act as they would not act in the small or backward state. This every one admits. I mean — what has not been so distinctly recognized — that the majority will desire to act in the one case as it would not act in the other. Its character will be different: it will think differently and feel differently.

Whatever popular power may have been in the past, the political majorities that we have to study to-day are coextensive with every stage of social evolution. For political purposes, Paris is no longer France. In the United States, the popular vote in the last presidential election[3] was 11,392,382, of which 5,538,233 votes were cast for Cleveland and 5,440,216 for Harrison. The Democratic plurality of 98,017 included pluralities in all the Southern states; in the Northern commercial ports of Boston, New

[1] "Civil Liberty and Self-Government," p. 407.

[2] "The Theory of the State," p. 432.

[3] This article was first published in March, 1892.

York, Brooklyn, and San Francisco; in the Eastern industrial states of Connecticut and New Jersey; and in twenty-five manufacturing, mining, and farming counties of the strongly Republican state of Pennsylvania, not to mention counties of most unlike industries, qualities, and densities of population, scattered through the other Northern commonwealths. The division of the total vote by percentages shows still more strongly the fact that a modern political party is created by the concurrence of minds of every type, of every degree of intelligence and power, and motived by every possible interest. In no state did the Democrats fail to poll at least one-quarter of the total vote. The lowest was 26.96 per cent, in Vermont. In only two states did the Republicans poll less than one-fourth of the total vote. These were South Carolina, 17.20 per cent, and Texas, 21.96 per cent. In only twelve states of the thirty-eight did either of the leading parties poll less than 40 per cent of the total vote. These, in addition to the three already named, were: Alabama, Republicans, 32.27 per cent; Arkansas, Republicans, 37.67 per cent; Georgia, Republicans, 28.34 per cent; Kansas, Democrats, 30.75 per cent; Louisiana, Republicans, 26.34 per cent; Maine, Democrats, 39.37 per cent; Minnesota, Democrats, 39.64 per cent; Mississippi, Republicans, 25.21 per cent; and Nebraska, Democrats, 39.75 per cent.

While such figures show conclusively the composite nature of a modern political majority, and by implication the fact that its cohesion is liable to fatal strain at a thousand points, the shifting of majorities on questions of personal fitness or of administrative policy, when neither private business interest nor class feeling is to any great extent involved, shows approximately what is the proportion of voters whose action is governed, to a great extent, by opinion in the true sense of the word, rather than by associations, habits, and prejudices. These are the reasoning, mobile fringe of the party, easily distinguished from the instinct-guided, slowly moving mass. For examples, we may take the gubernatorial elections of Russell in Massachusetts and Pattison in Pennsylvania in 1890,

and of Campbell in Ohio and Boies in Iowa in 1889. Making all comparisons, for the sake of uniformity, with the presidential vote in 1888, the shifting, by percentages, was within these limits: in Massachusetts, in 1888, Cleveland received 44.09 per cent of the total vote; Russell, in 1890, 49.22 per cent. In Pennsylvania, Cleveland, in 1888, received 44.77 per cent of the total vote; Pattison, in 1890, 50.01 per cent. In Ohio, Cleveland received, in 1888, 46.79 per cent of the entire vote, and Campbell, in 1889, 48.91 per cent. In Iowa, Cleveland, in 1888, received 44.50 per cent of the whole vote, and Boies, in 1889, 49.94 per cent. It would be an extraordinary upheaval that should result in more decisive political changes than these elections were; and it would be too much to claim that in these the entire effect was produced by a change of opinion. It is, therefore, fair to conclude that the total possible gain or loss to a political party through strictly independent voting does not exceed, under the most favourable circumstances, five per cent of the maximum total vote of a presidential year, and that the number of voters likely to be decisively influenced by mere opinion, apart from personal, class, or sectional interests, is not more than two and a half or three per cent of the whole.

But other forces than opinion may on occasion play a determining part, and an examination of the geographical distribution of independent voting will show why. The shifting vote may be very evenly distributed by counties, or according to density of population, or it may be massed in particular sections. The contrast afforded by Massachusetts and Pennsylvania is instructive. Governor Russell was elected by a Democratic vote only 11,348 less than was cast for Cleveland in 1888, while his opponent, Mr. Brackett, received 52,438 votes less than Harrison. This Republican disaffection, as shown by the vote by counties, was spread with astonishing evenness from one end of the state to the other. The dense manufacturing and trading populations of Suffolk, Essex, Middlesex, Worcester, and Hampden, and the scattered agricultural and fishing communities of Barnstable, Dukes, Frank-

lin, and Nantucket, were all affected in the same way in their several degrees. Turn now to Pennsylvania. Here it was not by staying away from the polls, but by an actual transference of votes, that Republicans elected Governor Pattison, since his total vote was 464,209 as compared with 446,633 cast for Cleveland in 1888. Let us see, then, what counties changed their pluralities, and in what others considerable Democratic gains were made. Twenty counties changed their pluralities, namely: Butler, Cameron, Crawford, Elk, Erie, Fayette, Jefferson, Lackawanna, Luzerne, McKean, Mercer, Mifflin, Montgomery, Northumberland, Potter, Venango, Warren, Washington, Westmoreland, and Wyoming. A glance at the map reveals the fact that all but six of these counties lie in the northern belt, where the influences of ancestry, tradition, and industry have been conspicuously different from those experienced in the southern belt. The northern counties were settled by immigration from New York and New England, to which was added a considerable intermixture of the Scotch Irish. Their industries, especially in recent years, have been of the sort that develop the instinct of enterprise, and accustom the mind to ideas of change and progress. The counties in this list not in the northern belt are in the southwestern corner and in the middle belt, except Montgomery, near the southeastern corner. The latter contains a large suburban population, whose business interests are in Philadelphia, and a large proportion of the independent feeling that was expressed during the campaign in meetings and in newspaper articles in that city was felt at the polls, not in the city proper, but in Montgomery County and the neighbouring county of Delaware.

The other counties in which important Democratic gains were made were Allegheny, containing the great industrial cities of Allegheny and Pittsburg and lying on the western border of the state, between Washington County and the counties of the northern belt; Beaver, originally included in Allegheny and Washington; Blair, Bradford, Huntington, Indiana, Susquehanna, and Tioga, in the middle and northern belts; Schuylkill, the great anthracite mining county,

lying just within the southeastern limit of the middle belt; and Chester, in the southeastern corner of the state.

There remains, besides the city and county of Philadelphia, the great wedge of land extending from the Maryland border well into the interior of the state. Sociologically, this is one of the most interesting regions of the United States. It was settled by Germans, Swedes, and Welsh, French Huguenots, and people of English descent of a much less aggressive type than those who pushed their way into the state from the north. In many parts of this region the dialect spoken is unintelligible to persons not to the manner born. In others, of course, the English influence strongly predominates; but, in all, the type of feeling and opinion and the modes of life are unlike those found elsewhere. This entire region was scarcely touched by the Pattison wave. In the returns by counties we discover hardly a suggestion of independent voting. In the prosperous counties of Berks, Franklin, and Lancaster the Democratic vote actually fell off, as it might fall in any other non-presidential year, while in Cumberland and York it barely held its own, with gains of less than two hundred in each.

From such facts as these it is evident that different degrees of sensitiveness to opinion may be only one phase of fundamental differences of mental quality characterizing the entire populations of large geographical sections. Feelings, instincts, habits, as well as ideas, may be profoundly different. Consequently, when questions arise that appeal to emotion as well as to intelligence, a disintegration of majorities is possible to an extent that could never be effected by true independent voting.

What is the implication? Obviously it is that if, in many parts of a country, the small portion of a political party which is sensitive to opinion is separated geographically from the portion that is governed chiefly by habit, the cohesion of a majority is almost wholly an affair of feeling rather than of intelligence, since great numbers of voters may be entirely untouched by the currents of opinion that influence others. This is very far, however, from being the whole fact, or even

the most essential part of the fact. The cohesion is not only one of feeling apart from opinion; it is one of feeling into which no radical element enters. It is an affair of a very primitive, slowly changing, in a word a very conservative, feeling, and cannot be anything else; since segregated masses of voters that are untouched by the progressive opinions of more active-minded men are equally unaffected by their more radical feelings. But all this means that the conduct of a majority so constituted is strictly conditioned. It must have and will have a conservative regard for a primitive kind of political instincts. If it undertakes progressive changes, these must be only in matters that do not interest unprogressive communities or disturb their uneventful way of life.

It is desirable, therefore, before going further, to have an answer to the question whether the geographical segregation of the progressive and the unprogressive types of voters is likely to be a general and permanent feature of democratic republics. Sociology can give this answer: The even distribution of the independent vote in Massachusetts is exceptional, and always will be so. It involves either homogeneity of population or a very even distribution of heterogeneous elements. This last is the fact in Massachusetts, but not in many other parts of the country. The unequal distribution seen in Pennsylvania is more typical. Not only did the earlier stocks in our population show a strong tendency to local segregation as they moved westward across the continent, but the new elements brought in by immigration are doing the same thing. The outlines of these groupings may change, but the groupings on the whole will be permanent, notwithstanding the increasing facilities of communication and the more nearly perfect diffusion of knowledge. The people of the eastern shore of Maryland, the Tennessee mountaineers, the Northern and the Southern stocks in Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas, will retain their characteristics in spite of a thousand levelling influences. For population is not a quiescent mass, even after the great movements of migration and immigration have ceased. A sifting process is ever going on, and it fixes types of character for

entire communities. Young men of push and determination, that happen to be born and bred in the community that is satisfied to let well enough alone, get out of it as soon as Providence permits and their savings enable them to do so. Young men of the other sort stay where they find themselves, and add their inertia to the common stock. So the progressive are continually drafted off to where the progressive have already created the better opportunities of life. If, however, the man of progressive instincts is unable for any reason to leave the habitat of his birth, another thing happens. One side of his nature, unused, finding nothing to stimulate its activity, remains undeveloped. He lives as much per day as the men about him permit him to live, and no more. He becomes one of them, to know good and evil no more than they.

This sifting and character-shaping process would be sufficient, though unsupplemented by other influences, to perpetuate the geographical segregation of progressive and unprogressive types. Actually, however, it is supplemented in a powerful way. The progressive vote, geographically localized, may be unable to accomplish the legislative or administrative changes it desires over wide areas, that is, in national affairs, and yet in local affairs it may be in command of the situation. From this fact two momentous results follow. First, under the conditions supposed, democracy, however radical, the numerical majority, however powerful, will never destroy or emasculate local self-government. Affairs that are not properly local may be transferred to the central administration; but there need not be the slightest fear that, in a nation of wide territorial extent, of varied industries and heterogeneous population, the uninstitutional, inarticulate massing of power that Lieber so dreaded will go far enough to destroy independent local action in matters that are of strictly local concern. Second, progressive legislation and administrative reforms in a great many matters will be accomplished, in a country like our own, by some of the state governments long before corresponding changes are attempted by the national government.

State governments will set the example. The abolition of slavery was a perfect historical illustration, because the conditions were exactly of the kind that I have been describing. Banking laws, bankruptcy laws, the regulation of railroad management, are examples from economic interests. But if thus in some states public policy will be far in advance of public policy in the nation at large, it will be even farther in advance of public policy in other states. An examination of the educational, economic, and punitive legislation of the different commonwealths of the American Union always reveals an astonishing range of variation.

Now it is this unequal pressure and influence of public policy that powerfully supplements the natural selection which is all the while increasing the mental mobility of some communities and confirming the conservatism of others. The natural segregations of population types do not often correspond accurately to state lines, but the influence of county, township, and municipal governments is not to be ignored, especially in education and in many economic matters, including taxation. The effect of state legislation, however, in many cases, is to bring about a close approximation of natural divisions even to state lines. It transforms or drives out certain elements; not always directly, by education or by the incidence of taxation, but quite as often indirectly, by modifying the medium of feeling and ideas in which the individual is born and nurtured.

We have now the data for a few final conclusions. A political majority of the voters of a large country, with diversified resources and occupations and a heterogeneous population, will be governed mainly by a conservative instinct and will be modified only very slowly by opinion. It will carefully respect the fundamental political prejudices of "slow" people. Among such prejudices are those in favour of personal liberty in the broad sense of the word, against the increase of direct taxation, against certain forms of sumptuary legislation, and against interference with such traditional political habits as have become a second nature. In America those legal and political practices that we all

agree in regarding as fundamental defences of civil liberty are in little danger from the action of popular majorities. The common law, the traditional forms of procedure, and such rights as those of public meeting are quite strong enough in popular respect to be perfectly secure. Written constitutional limitations are of inestimable value for giving definiteness to the action of conservative forces, but it is by the power of conservative habits that the constitution itself is maintained.

So far, we seem to be in general agreement with the conclusions of Sir Henry Maine. Popular government, it would appear, is likely to be on the whole unprogressive. The feelings and beliefs that hold a majority together are, in substance, a faith that majority action will defend the elementary rights, the common interests, and the established political customs of the people. But mere faith of this sort would impart no power of aggressive action, and without some slight infusion of aggressiveness there can be no progress. Yet that popular governments will be moderately progressive has been affirmed to be probable, and it has been shown that in any majority a progressive mental element is united with the more dominant conservatism. It remains for us to glance at the conditions that enable this element to hold the majority in some degree to a positive policy. While everything must be avoided that conservatism is unitedly or in the mass interested in having let alone, much can be done in matters to which conservatism is indifferent, or which it can gradually be brought to desire.

One means of progress that has played a momentous part in history need not detain us, since its effectiveness is one of the most familiar truths of political science. I refer, of course, to the unifying and stimulating influence of war. Nothing else in the same degree rouses a people to positive action, and its influence is felt in a thousand ways long after the immediate occasion has disappeared. A condition that is more strictly sociological is the flow of population to towns and cities, which bids fair, in time, to give a numerical preponderance to the voters that are in close and constant touch with fresh currents of opinion. But there is yet one other

condition that is even more definitely sociological, and to this I wish briefly to call attention. That the organization of numbers of men for any form of coöperation is subject to psychological laws, has been from the outset our assumption, either tacit or express. A law not mentioned hitherto, but now to be recognized as one of controlling influence, is that of the relation of activity to cohesion and to coördination. In the individual mind a logical association of ideas cannot be perfectly maintained when mental activity slackens. Not more can an association of individuals be held together without continuous agitation or discussion. A church or a club, a scientific association or a philanthropic guild fails to hold the allegiance of its members when it ceases to stimulate their thought. However predominant feeling may be in the social bond, it is never wholly dissociated from ideas and beliefs, even in the most ignorant individuals or communities. Whatever power of thought there is must be enlisted and kept in action, or feeling itself ceases and all interest disappears. The populations of large geographical sections may be absolutely unresponsive to some movements of opinion, and it may often be impossible to put them in touch with the ideas of the larger world; but now and then they must be reached, their power to respond must be put to the test, or they will cease to have any part in the affairs of the world beyond their local borders.

A majority, then, cannot be held together, even by bonds of prejudice and habit, if it follows too long a passive policy. Mr. Spencer has earnestly protested in all his political writings against the overactivity of parliaments. Yet as a psychologist and sociologist he has done more than any other thinker to enable us to understand that, since all organic cohesion is conditioned by growth, a policy of ceaseless activity is necessary, as a fact of social psychology, if any political coöperation is to be kept up. Moreover, the policy must be one that appeals to the people as well as to the leaders. It must awaken popular interest and quicken popular thought.

Summing up our conclusions, we have these net results: a numerical majority in a differentiated society, occupying an

extended and diversified geographical area, is a concurrent majority in composition, though by no means a perfect one. It is held together more by feeling than by opinion, and conservative feeling predominates in respect to all fundamental rights and established political usages. But the cohesion of feeling and habit will not endure if there is no intellectual activity and no growth whatever of opinion. The majority must, therefore, have a policy of the sort that admits of discussion and fosters it. In short, the cohesion of a majority is conditioned at one limit by conservative feelings that cannot be contemned, and at the other limit by the necessity of pushing a policy of activity or progress as far and as fast as the inertia of the mass will permit.

A political majority, therefore, has a nature that can be described in terms of the laws of social psychology, and its conduct is subject to natural limitations. It must follow a mean course between the mischievous conservatism of Maine's prognosis and the shameless radicalism of Burke's, or it will cease to be a majority. As social structure becomes more complex the difficulties of holding the diverse elements of a majority together in a working coördination rapidly increase. All other things remaining the same, the inertia of conservatism would increase, and political stagnation would bring progress to an end. National disintegration would follow. But other things do not and cannot remain unchanged. As the difficulties of maintaining party cohesion increase, the necessity of adhering to a positive policy becomes more imperative. Agitation must be kept up. The "campaign of education" must be vigorously pushed. No fact in the later history of party politics in England stands out more clearly than this. In our own country it has been disguised somewhat by the overwhelming strength of the "spoils system," but it is becoming apparent now even to the most "practical" of politicians. Progress in this form brings its own safeguards with it. As voters become responsive to opinion, they become capable of independence. Consequently, as party policy becomes positive, it is compelled at the same time to become ever more heedful of the teachings of experience.

While conservative feeling will protect elementary rights and useful customs, the slowly acquired power to learn from experience will enable popular governments, as time goes on, to rectify their inevitable mistakes in those difficult affairs of industrial legislation and finance in which undisciplined public opinion at first so easily goes wrong. The unequal geographical distribution of the progressive part of the population will always aid the formation of sound judgments from experience, since many costly experiments will be made at first locally, on a relatively small scale.

XII

THE DESTINIES OF DEMOCRACY

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WHETHER it is more presumptuous for the philosopher to write history or for the historian to write philosophy, is a question that "searcheth the reins" of the scholar. The philosophy that is not verified and made real by an incorporation of historical materials has not even an intellectual value. It is but an esoteric sort of revery, in space of only one or of more than three dimensions, as you please. History that is not organized and interpreted by philosophy is only a dignified form of the tale that is told by an idiot; it signifies nothing. And yet, to combine history and philosophy, and to write, for example, philosophical history, is perhaps the supreme achievement of the human mind. The analytical and speculative intellect is seldom keenly alive to the interest, the freshness, and, above all, the exact values, of concrete facts. The inquisitive mind of either the journalistic or the antiquarian type may be narrowly analytical or loosely synthetical, but it rarely has that true constructive power in which analytic and synthetic genius are combined.

No less degree of genius than that which blends the historical with the philosophical intellect, and is able to apply the highest constructive power to the tremendous task of explaining political progress, will ever give us a true account of the involved relations of liberty and democracy — the most complex, the most momentous, the most fascinating, and the most baffling products of social evolution. Men of unquestioned genius have essayed this achievement and have failed. Neither De Tocqueville nor Bryce, neither Mill nor Sumner Maine, has satisfactorily described either liberty or democracy. True conceptions of liberty are to be

found only in writings on constitutional law; and even in these writings, which the general reader usually passes over as too technical for his needs, liberty is accurately conceived only if the authors in some degree unite the philosophic with the historical temperament. Democracy is nowhere truthfully portrayed, because no writer ever views it comprehensively. Democracy is more than a form of government; it is more than universal suffrage; it is more, even, than popular power.

That Mr. William Edward Hartpole Lecky should write two compact volumes on the development of democracy and the struggle of liberty for existence in the nineteenth century, was as inevitable as that Edmund Burke should have opinions on the French Revolution. Mr. Lecky has throughout his life been deeply interested in the philosophical aspects of social progress. He has studied deeply those developments of rationalism and of morals in which are disclosed the psychological causes of political changes and of institutional forms. He has depicted with admiring appreciation that type of civil liberty and of parliamentary government by a property-owning, leisured class, which was the chief contribution that the eighteenth century made to civilization. At the end of these employments he has in recent years, before and since his election to the House of Commons, been deeply interested in *fin de siècle* democratic politics, and has been impelled to formulate his opinions upon every burning modern question, from land nationalization and municipal tramways to woman suffrage and vivisection. How could he do less, then, than clothe his judgments in the brilliant, the often fascinating language that has made his writings no less literature than history, and, rounding and combining them into an ample whole, make them into a book!

Not less inevitable was it, however, that Mr. Lecky's treatise on these momentous themes should in value fall below, rather than rise above, the great works of De Tocqueville, Maine, and Bryce. Mr. Lecky is philosophical, but he is not a philosopher. He is an historian, but he does not grasp history. In the minute analysis of a special topic his

acuteness is often admirable, but he never partitions his whole subject into its logical, or even into its descriptive, or its chronological divisions. He can put together with fine literary art the descriptive or the narrative elements of a single chapter, but in higher constructive power he is astonishingly deficient. He cannot put together the chapters of a book. There is absolutely no reason why any one of the chapters of "Democracy and Liberty" should stand where it does rather than somewhere else. The work is therefore an admirable, a brilliant achievement in high-class journalism; it is nothing more. Nevertheless, it may easily prove to be more useful for popular instruction than any preceding account of modern political tendencies. Let us, then, try to see exactly what Mr. Lecky attempts to show, and to estimate his success within the limits which he has imposed upon himself, and those which his literary habits and the characteristics of his mind have imposed upon him.

In "Democracy and Liberty" Mr. Lecky distinctly states a definite thesis, and his account of the political and social changes that have been taking place in Europe and the United States during the present century is evidently regarded by him as a demonstration of his proposition. With his flagrant disregard of logical order, however, the statement of his thesis is so placed that only the attentive, line-by-line reader will discover it. Half of his reviewers have missed it, and have, in consequence, praised or blamed him for arguments that he has not so much as attempted to make. The words that should have been put at the beginning of his first chapter are thrown in almost parenthetically at the end of the twenty-fifth page, as follows: —

"One of the great divisions of politics in our day is coming to be whether, at the last resort, the world should be governed by its ignorance or by its intelligence. According to the one party, the preponderating power should be with education and property; according to the other, the ultimate source of power, the supreme right of appeal and of control, belongs legitimately to the majority of the nation told by the head, — or, in other words, to the poorest, the most

ignorant, the most incapable, who are necessarily the most numerous.

"It is a theory which assuredly reverses all the past experiences of mankind. In every field of human enterprise, in all the competitions of life, by the inexorable law of nature, superiority lies with the few and not with the many, and success can only be attained by placing the guiding and controlling power mainly in their hands."

Here we have Mr. Lecky's conception of democracy. It is the political power of the ignorant many, exercised through a formal method of procedure which essentially consists in a count by the head, irrespective of personal qualifications. It is the realization of the theoretical politics of Rousseau. Very evidently we have here, also, Mr. Lecky's profound conviction that ultimate political decision by the ignorant many is equivalent to the rule of ignorance, and is therefore predestined by the laws of nature and the experience of mankind to disastrous failure. His review of the recent politics and legislation of Western Europe and the United States is accordingly made in the belief that they disclose the unmistakable beginnings of the decay of civilization. Incidentally he attempts, also, to establish the secondary proposition that England is probably to suffer more severely than any other nation from the rule of ignorance and the decline of liberty. The enlightenment, the nobility, the sane administration of affairs, which have made her the leader in human progress, are to disappear under the reign of universal vulgarity, narrow-mindedness, and all-conquering folly.

A merely formal criticism of such a work would inquire whether this conception of democracy is scientific, of undoubted philosophical lineage, or only a base-born notion that has been picked up among the people, clothed in literary purple and fine linen, and passed off in intellectual society as of the legitimate aristocracy of ideas. It would next inquire whether ultimate political decision by the relatively ignorant many is necessarily the same thing as the rule of ignorance, and therefore foreordained to failure.

Under criticism of this kind Mr. Lecky's thesis would suffer

severely. His conception of democracy is a bastard idea, half philosophical and half commonplace. Scientifically, democracy must be defined as a form of government, or as a form of the state, or as a form of society, or as a combination of the three. As a form of government, democracy consists in the actual administration of political affairs through universal suffrage. Democracy as a form of government cannot coexist with representative institutions; it admits executive and judicial offices only of the most restricted ministerial type; it demands the decision of every question of legal and executive detail, no less than of every fundamental principle of right and of policy, by a direct popular vote. There is no such thing as a democratic government on a large scale. Democracy as a form of the state is popular sovereignty, — that is, a popular distribution of formal political power. It signifies the right of the masses of the people to participate in the creation of the government or machinery of administration. It may act through representative institutions, as well as directly. These distinctions, which in their essential features were made by Aristotle, have in recent years become familiar. Democracy as a form of society is not so often or quite so easily discriminated. It is a democratic organization and control of the non-political forms of association. It is also something besides. In a perfectly democratic society the masses would possess that indefinite, unformed, but actual political power which lies back of the formal power that registers its decisions through the act of voting. In the poorer ranks of the population there would be a volume of feeling, opinion, and will, that might at any moment assume a political form, either legal or revolutionary. In Professor Burgess's nomenclature, democracy as a form of society is popular sovereignty behind the constitution, as distinguished from popular sovereignty in the constitution. In the language of Professor Dicey, it is popular political sovereignty as distinguished from popular legal sovereignty.

It is easy to see that Mr. Lecky's conception of democracy is not to be identified too exactly with any one of these scientific notions, although in a general way it corresponds to the

second. The real subject of his investigation is democracy as a form of the state. It is the formal sovereignty of the people, expressing ultimate decisions through universal suffrage.

The error in this conception is of that interesting kind which practical men and historians habitually attribute to theorists, but which, in fact, is always committed by the practical men and the historians themselves, and never by the theorists. It consists in accepting an abstract formula, without limitations or reservations, as a sufficient account of a concrete phenomenon. The political theorist knows that his three conceptions of democracy limit one another, and that, corresponding to the theoretical limitations, there are in reality numberless limitations of phenomenon by phenomenon. He knows that democracy as a form of the state always tends to run into democracy as a form of government, but never makes great progress in that direction; and the reason for this curious limitation he finds in the infinitely complex relations that enter into the constitution of democracy as a form of society. In short, he realizes that every one of the three modes of democracy is conditioned by the other two. Mr. Lecky, recognizing only one mode, depicts that one as absolute.

It is for this reason that he makes the fatal mistake of assuming that in politics ultimate formal decision by the ignorant many is necessarily equivalent to the rule of ignorance. In technical language, this is the error of confounding democracy as a form of the state with democracy as a form of society, or, more generally, of confounding the state organized in the constitution with the state behind the constitution. Of course it is conceivable that the ignorant masses might not only vote, but vote independently, endeavouring actually to express, in their voting, their own ignorant opinions; but it is not less conceivable that they might defer to the opinions of leaders wiser than themselves. There is no *a priori* necessity for thinking that a *plébiscite* registers a really popular judgment. Tradition, custom, imitation, industrial conditions, indefinite modes of economic and social pressure, may conspire to make

a popular election nothing more than an indorsement of the policy of a few individuals. Not only may democracy as a form of the state coexist with aristocracy as a form of society, but more profound studies of sociology than have yet been undertaken may one day demonstrate that the political mode of democracy is vitally dependent upon certain non-democratic relations in the non-political modes of social intercourse and organization.

This purely formal criticism, however, must not be allowed to stand as a substitute for that which is more concrete and vital. What we are most concerned to know is, first, whether at the present time Mr. Lecky's imperfect conception of democracy is a true generalization of political facts — whether non-political society no less than the state has become democratic, whether popular sovereignty is, in fact, the rule of ignorance; and secondly, whether, if democracy is indeed at the present time a rule of ignorance, its tendencies and conditions compel us to believe that it will never be anything better.

Taking the concrete view, then, candour forces the frank admission that Mr. Lecky has sustained a serious indictment of the political democracy of the hour. Stated in the fewest words, the charge is the old one — as old as the "Politics" of Aristotle — that democracy is not always favourable to liberty, and that it breeds jobbery, extravagance, and disregard of justice. To heighten the picture through the device of contrast, Mr. Lecky begins his story with an account of English representative government in the eighteenth century. Of this preliminary sketch it is the critic's unpleasant duty to say that it is not altogether truthful. It would be hard to find in political annals a more extreme development of corruption, including a more wanton debauchery of the civil service, than England had attained under her rotten-borough Parliamentary system a century ago. This aspect of his subject Mr. Lecky touches very lightly, while he enlarges upon the merits of a system which brought into Parliament a great number of men of extraordinary ability, which secured to ministries a persistent support that could be relied upon, which was surrounded by traditional reverence, which upheld the institu-

tions of property, religion, and civil liberty, and which, all in all, "had unquestionably worked well." These merits of the English Parliamentary system the framers of the American constitution sought to perpetuate in that instrument, and on this fact also Mr. Lecky dwells. In theoretical opposition to this English parliamentarism, which represented classes, vested interests, and concrete institutions, to the utter neglect of an abstract political equality, stood the speculative, or French, type of democracy, which aimed to level all inequalities of privilege and of power by giving to every man one vote and to every vote the same value. Little by little this speculative democracy of Rousseau has been passing out of the realm of ideas into the world of political facts, and inch by inch it has been conquering the ground once held by the Parliamentary system. The second half of Mr. Lecky's first chapter is devoted to an account of the progress of democracy in France and in the United States since 1848, and to some of the more obvious consequences, particularly the decreasing stability of governments and the gigantic increase of taxes and public debts.

From this sketch of his argument Mr. Lecky passes at once to the several counts of his indictment. To mention only the more important of these, they are that democracy confiscates property; that it restricts liberty in the alleged interests of morality and of the working classes; and that it tends to give the balance of power in society to the emotional, rather than to the rational, elements of the population.

The proof of confiscation is a record of facts of very unequal values. The meaning of the steady growth of taxation by cruder and ever cruder methods and of the reckless expenditure of public revenues is not to be mistaken. Alike in France, in Canada, in the United States, and in Australia public finance is and has long been a monstrous scandal. But the Irish land legislation, which Mr. Lecky evidently regards as a rather blacker act of governmental robbery than any other which he recalls, will not be admitted in evidence by all among his readers who are in general agreement with his opinions. It is not absolutely certain that this legislation was not in

essence, although in a barbarously crude form, an act of long-delayed justice. Still less can it be admitted that the popularity of the single tax is an evidence of a widespread desire to confiscate private property. Mr. George himself did unquestionably in "Progress and Poverty" advocate the confiscation of land values; but it was not until his original proposition was converted into the essentially different doctrine of the single tax that it won many adherents. Far more telling, in the charge against the ethics of democracy, are the examples of recent attacks upon literary property. The popular majority that will not or cannot see the justice of copyright laws has no sense of the moral grounds of property in any form whatsoever. The most humiliating examples of all, Mr. Lecky might have drawn, had he chosen to do so, from the repudiation of public debts and from the greenback and silver "crazes" in the United States.

That democracy is ready to sacrifice individual liberty to ends which it believes that it can attain directly through restrictive legislation, is not a novel proposition. Mr. Lecky's chapters in proof of it are in substance not unlike Mr. Herbert Spencer's papers on "The New Toryism" and "The Coming Slavery." Their force is due to their comprehensiveness and their wealth of detail. Even the hardened reader of individualistic tracts will experience a new sensation as he turns Mr. Lecky's pages and follows through one continuous narrative the astonishing story of modern legislation against gambling, liquor-selling, cigarette-smoking, and other modes of vice and of the yet more elaborate legislation in behalf of "labour," consisting of laws limiting the hours of employment, regulating the internal affairs of the factory and of the workshop, fixing the times and modes of wage payments, prescribing the details of tenement-house construction and management, forbidding the competitive employment of convict labour by the state, and even fixing a minimum wage for municipal labourers. If any enthusiastic believer in "the rights of man" has supposed that, because in its later developments democracy has refrained from interfering with the individual by the murderous methods of the French Revolution,

it has been any the less disposed to regulate his life for him, he must be prepared to see his illusion dispelled when he ventures to read Mr. Lecky's pages.

There is one great class of interests, however, in respect of which democracy has apparently fought persistently and irresistibly for liberty. Democracy is as hostile now as it was under the Directory to all restraints upon liberty imposed in the name of religion or by ecclesiastical authority. There are no more brilliant pages in Mr. Lecky's volumes than those in which he traces the continuous encroachment of the civil upon the ecclesiastical power, the extension of secular education, the substitution of civil for ecclesiastical marriage, and the growing disregard of Sunday laws.

But, as Mr. Lecky warns us, it will not do to become too confident that we discover here a form of liberty that democracy will under all circumstances defend. There are significant limitations. In the first place, it is not liberty as such that democracy has contended for in its alliance with secularism. Its real concern has been to throttle a hostile power. This has been sufficiently proved by the excessively illiberal dealing of French democracy with the Roman Catholic Church, especially in educational matters. Another and much more interesting demonstration, however, has not escaped Mr. Lecky's survey. This is found in the history of American legislation against the Mormon Church and its institution of polygamy. Mr. Lecky leaves his readers in no doubt that, while he is no apologist for either Mormonism or polygamy, he is unable to reconcile certain radical features of the Edmunds Act with the principles of the Federal Constitution. In the second place, the Roman Catholic Church has undoubtedly a much deeper sympathy with democracy and with certain forms of socialism than it can possibly have with a scheme of law and government which frankly accepts the principles of private judgment and individual responsibility in affairs of conduct, and the policy of unrestricted competition in industry. The membership of the Roman Church corresponds far more closely to the wage-earning masses than to the business and professional classes. No intelligent

observer can have followed the recent developments of Roman Catholic policy without discovering that the church is preparing to give up its struggle against the forms of civil government and to exercise its authority henceforward through them. It has no intention of surrendering the smallest fraction of authority as such, but it expects more and more to express authority through a spiritual ascendency in the mind of the voter. Instinctively or rationally the Holy See has discovered the true relation of the state behind the constitution to the state within the constitution. Could there be for its purposes a better instrument than a democracy which is disposed to rule absolutely, substituting for the authority of a monarch by divine right, not liberty and individual responsibility, but the authority of a majority by divine right?

To prove that democracy tends to give the balance of power in society to the emotional rather than to the intellectual elements of the population, it would only be necessary to show that universal suffrage is in fact the actual rule, as distinguished from the more or less mechanical voting, of the many. It is the exceptional man whose conduct is controlled by reason. Hardly less exceptional is the man whose opinions are moulded by reason. The crowd, the mass, is swayed mainly by example and by feeling. Mr. Lecky is not dependent, however, upon this line of proof. Proof of another kind is ready to his hand, and he does not fail to make the most of it. The democratic movement has not stopped at universal suffrage among men. It aims to extend the legislative franchise to women also. Already it has half accomplished its purpose. English women enjoy the municipal suffrage, and they believe that the Parliamentary franchise is within their grasp. In the United States women of Colorado and Wyoming vote for state officers, for congressmen, and for presidential electors. In New Zealand and in South Australia women vote in all matters on a perfect equality with men. Mr. Lecky's treatment of this question is eminently calm and judicial. Most of the alarmist arguments against the political activity of women he sets aside as puerile; but there is one which he finds to be of unmistaka-

ble force. He calls attention to the passionate interest which women have of late been taking in various "humane" crusades, including anti-vivisection, and then says: —

"There have been ages in which insensibility to suffering was the prevailing vice of public opinion. In our own there is, perhaps, more to be feared from wild gusts of unreasoning, uncalculating, hysterical emotion. 'Les races,' as Buffon said, 'se féminisent.' A due sense of the proportion of things, an habitual regard to the ultimate and distant consequences of political measures, a sound, sober, and unexaggerated judgment are elements which already are lamentably wanting in political life, and female influence would certainly not tend to increase them.

"Nor is it likely that it would be in the direction of liberty. With women, even more than men, there is a strong disposition to overrate the curative powers of legislation, to attempt to mould the lives of men in all their details by meddlesome or restraining laws; and an increase of female influence could hardly fail to increase that habit of excessive legislation which is one of the great evils of the time."

Such are some of the consequences of democracy as a form of the state which are now to be observed in America and in Europe. They are not yet as tragic as were the consequences of democracy in Paris one hundred years ago; not yet as grotesque as were the consequences of democracy in Athens in the days of Cleon the Tanner. Nevertheless, in their essential quality they are not different. They are undoubtedly restrictive of liberty; they reveal a spirit of absolutism; they are stamped with dishonesty and with folly.

But are these the final consequences? Do we yet see the end of the democratic movement? Do we know its destiny, or can we, at least, be sure that we have discovered its persistent tendencies?

To frame a partial answer to these questions we must remember that democracy has only now begun to develop its positive programme. Democracy originates in resistance to oppression. It is the child of liberty. Historically it is always after the property-accumulating middle classes succeed

in establishing the institutions of civil liberty that they extend political privileges to the wage-earning multitude. They do so partly because they realize that their own political rights were forcibly wrested from monarchy and nobility, and they fear that they themselves may be forced in turn to surrender if they do not make voluntary concessions; partly because they have a strong belief that the blessings of liberty are so obvious that men who have once enjoyed will not curtail them; but chiefly because the division of the electorate into parties has created a powerful inducement to extend the suffrage as a means of increasing the voting strength of the party that happens to be in power. Thus liberty has led inevitably to universal suffrage. But it has done so only because the masses have suffered from wrongs and neglects that have called for remedy, and because the ruling classes have desired to carry out policies that could be accomplished only through the political aid of the masses. The student of political science will never understand democracy until he sees clearly that its origin is not due to the formulation of any positive programme by the masses themselves.

The institution of universal suffrage is, therefore, only the first of two historical stages, the second of which we can but conjecturally forecast. The masses have had political power conferred upon them by their political superiors. They have associated it with the rectification of wrongs from which they have hitherto suffered. Their political conceptions, therefore, have been almost wholly negative. How to use political power positively to further their economic and moral well-being, is a problem to which they have only very recently begun to give earnest attention. That they are beginning to reflect upon it is made evident wherever there is a serious interest in the public school system, or in questions of public morals and of public health.

It is therefore too soon to say that democracy must continue to be the rule of ignorance. That it may so continue, is not to be denied. But there are two possibilities of better things, to each of which attention must now briefly be given. It is possible, first, that the masses, in attempting to formulate

a positive programme for the use of their power in furtherance of their own well-being, will speedily learn the great lesson which the middle classes learned some hundreds of years ago. That lesson is, that the only way in which political power can be made to further the well-being of a community or of a class is through the establishment and the maintenance of civil liberty. Experience has over and over again demonstrated — it will infallibly continue to demonstrate — that a high degree of material prosperity can be attained only through freedom of enterprise and of organization, and that the highest type of personality can be developed only through intellectual liberty and individual responsibility. The middle-class civilization that Mr. Lecky so ardently admires has been developed because the middle classes perceived that liberty was the one means through which they could utilize their power in the creation of wealth, art, science, and moral order. In the development of the internal policy of the great labour organizations there are signs that the wage earners are learning the truth, that whether or not liberty is, as Proudhon said "not the daughter but the mother of order," she is at any rate the mother of progress. If this truth becomes a popular conviction, the democracy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will be very different from that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The second possibility is that the voting masses will follow a rational guidance. Whatever the form of the state that is organized in the constitution, the state behind the constitution can never be absolutely democratic. This is the explanation of phenomena that have puzzled the theorists and the historians for many centuries. It is conceivable, though not probable, that the industrial organization of society, like the political electorate, may become altogether democratic. Coöperative associations may displace the *entrepreneur*. It is possible that all the minor forms of association also may become wholly democratic. But never, by any possibility, can democracy establish itself within the cultural organization. Differences of mental ability and of moral power will always exist among men; and by a law that is as absolute in the

realm of mind as the law of gravitation is in the physical world, inferior men will continue to defer to their superiors, to believe dicta instead of thinking propositions, and to imitate examples instead of originating them. This is why the democracy that has rebelled against the traditional modes or forms of authority, and has become distrustful of the leadership of cultivated men, invariably evolves that most preposterous and contemptible of potentates, the "boss." Leadership of some kind men must and will have.

The destinies of political democracy will, therefore, be determined ultimately by the character of the aristocracy that rules the state behind the constitution. The ignorant masses of Mr. Lecky's formula will not rule through their ignorance. They will rule through their deference to great humbugs, great scoundrels, great priests, or great men. At present they rule through their deference to the great humbugs and the great scoundrels, and so lend support to Mr. Lecky's belief that democracy is the rule of ignorance, and afford apparent justification of Mr. Carlyle's definition of the people as a certain number of millions, mostly fools. If it could be shown that the "boss" is a creation of political democracy, the outlook would indeed be dark. But there are many reasons for believing that popular thought on this question inverts the order of cause and effect. The "boss" is probably not the product of democracy. The misdeeds and follies of democracy are probably due to the independent existence of the "boss." The "boss" flourishes and reigns because men have for the time being lost their faith in the true aristocracy of intellect and conscience. Only to the faint-hearted and to the short-sighted should there be any need to say that a determined effort to restore that faith is to be the most momentous sociological phenomenon of the next fifty years. The initiative may be taken by the Roman Catholic Church. Accepting democracy as the inevitable form of the state within the constitution, the Roman Catholic Church fully and deliberately intends to make itself again what once it was — the ruling aristocracy of the state behind the constitution. If this purpose becomes more and more obvious,

the forces of Protestantism will again be roused to intense activity. The principles of liberty and of individual responsibility will again be opposed to the principle of authority and will again fascinate the minds of rationalistic men.

In all probability, therefore, the destiny of democracy is to be controlled either by religious authority or by a much more earnest and thoughtful type of Protestant liberalism than that which prevails to-day. In a struggle between these forces men of all ranks and conditions, the rich and the poor, the learned and the unlearned, will give their allegiance to worthy leaders. The "boss" with his deeds of ignorance and of evil will sink into oblivion. It should be needless to add that such a struggle, if it comes, will be a contest of ideas. The church that seeks to rule through democracy is of necessity an enlightened church, controlled by men of pure and lofty aims, to whom the imbecilities of A. P. A.-ism are an idle wind that they regard not. For those, however, who understand the true significance of such a struggle, there should be no difficulty in forming an opinion upon the wisdom of further extending democracy within the constitution by including women within the electorate. If we believe that salvation lies in authority, let us by all means give the ballot to that half of the population which instinctively associates all hard-headedness with spiritual untowardness. But if we value freedom of contract and of organization, the right of private judgment and individual responsibility, let us not advocate woman suffrage until we are convinced that through education and a broadened experience of the world women in general have subordinated emotion to judgment, and that good women in particular have emancipated themselves from the evil belief of moral and political absolutism — that the end justifies the means.

XIII

THE RELATION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY TO HIGHER EDUCATION

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THE RELATION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY TO THE HIGHER EDUCATION

A USEFUL tradition decrees that Commencement Day addresses shall deal with the relations of education to life. On other occasions we may discuss educational measures, or methods, or the conflicting claims of subjects, from a professorial or scholastic point of view. In our classrooms we may present knowledge in its own name and right, recognizing that its claim is sufficient, and for the time being supreme, if it appeals to the pure intelligence alone. But when our students have completed the tasks and sustained the tests that we have appointed for them; when we see them about to enter upon that long and difficult graduate course in which "elective" studies bear a painfully small proportion to those that are "required," in which "cuts" can never be made up, and "conditions" can never be passed off; when we are reminded how far the swiftly passing years have borne ourselves beyond the scenes, the standards, and perhaps beyond the ambitions even, of our college days, into which we look back now as into some half-strange other world, — then for the moment we see all the work of education in its due proportions and relations; we feel the vital flow of those strong spiritual currents that move forever from ideals to affairs, from affairs to ideals, refreshing and strengthening the intellectual life, while they broaden also, and deepen, its practical basis.

It is well that we do thus return so often to this outlook upon the broader view, and that we experience from time to time the access of a deeper inspiration. They are needful for the college and useful to the community. They keep educa-

tional methods in touch with the world, and the world in sympathy with educational aims.

But the point of contact between education and life moves somewhat from year to year. The demands that intellectual interests may rightly make upon the public, are not the same at all times. The public duty of the cultivated man or woman assumes one or another phase with changing conditions of politics, business, and morality. In those fateful years when the struggle for human liberty and national integrity was at its height, the supreme obligation of every man whose sympathies had been broadened by liberal study was to contribute of his sincerest thought to the enlightenment of the public mind. There is no need to tell how nobly that obligation was fulfilled; how from Harvard and from Yale, and from every smaller college in the land, went forth an influence which demonstrated that in America now, as in the Puritan England of John Milton's day, "the finest scholarship is but a single grace of the man." At a later time, when a reunited nation began to bend all its energies to the development of its material resources, and to demand that instruction should break away from a too slavish adherence to the traditional curriculum of Latin, Greek, and mathematics, it became the duty of educated men to examine that demand upon its merits, and to make the provision for scientific and technical training which seemed to be required by our expanding life. The result we enjoy in a multitude of well-equipped scientific schools, and in a reconstruction of college courses which has left but little for the boldest innovator to desire more. Somewhat later still, and largely in consequence of the progress of scientific thought, the educational world has been agitated over the question of liberty of teaching. It has been the duty of men who have learned the difference between a belief that is founded on evidence and one that is founded on a complete absence of evidence of any kind, to insist that the difference between the two shall be so far explained that rational human beings can choose between them. The insistence has not been always a pleasure; it has called for courage and for self-sacrifice; for one does not easily maintain serene his faith

in the ultimate supremacy of truth when the moral insurance agents of society agree to regard truth-seeking as an extra-hazardous occupation. There are cheerful optimists among us who are confident that this struggle for the liberty of teaching is practically ended now, and that we have little to fear henceforth from any quarter. The world has grown very tolerant, they tell us; the arms are stacked and the banners furled. I wish that I could share their conviction; but as I look over the past and see that the great tragedy of human history has been an uncomplaining going down into the darkness of men whose one hunger and cry has been for more light, I am unable to believe that the last act of this tragedy has yet been played. I am sure that the men and women who discover new truth in the coming years, and endeavour to give it freely to mankind, will still need all their courage and all their faith: —

> "The age in which they live
> Will not forgive
> The splendour of the everlasting light
> That makes their foreheads bright,
> Nor the sublime forerunning of their time."

But, at whatever cost, the scholar who keeps in touch with life will be faithful to all of these duties. We need entertain no doubt of his patriotism, or of his open-minded hospitality to new studies that are of genuine value, or of his loyalty to truth. But just because these obligations have been most scrupulously fulfilled in the past, educated men and women are confronted at the present moment with questions of practical duty that are immeasurably more difficult than any that they have had to deal with hitherto. It is to these that I will now for a very few moments ask your attention.

"The nineteenth century will be the riddle of history," wrote our most gifted historian, Francis Parkman, fifteen years ago. The subject under discussion was the further extension of the suffrage. Parkman profoundly distrusted all radical types of democracy. Few men have seen so clearly or understood so sympathetically as he did the conditions and the influences that must combine for the production of national

character, and no man has believed more thoroughly in Matthew Arnold's doctrine that salvation must come from the remnant that has not bowed before the idols of the Philistines. He thought that the nineteenth century would be the riddle of history, because in its universal activity every current of reaction seems to have mingled with the currents of progress in a mad swirl of universal restlessness. The most violent and dangerous of these contradictions he pithily described as that of denouncing mediævalism while borrowing its rusty tools to build a new order of things.

Never did words more perfectly characterize any human interest than these words characterize the movement that is called Social Democracy, or Socialism. Socialism is literally, in general and in particular, a denouncing of mediævalism and a borrowing of its rusty tools to build a new order of things. It is an attempt to emancipate everybody by shackling every individual arm. But its inherent absurdity no more prevents its popularity than the absurdity of trying to make a man believe what he did not believe prevented the popularity of the Inquisition. Social Democracy, it may as well be understood, is no longer a project, a plan, an "ism," merely. It is a fact. It is already established, and we have to adapt ourselves to it as best we can. By this I mean that its chief demand has been conceded, and that its chief method has been accepted. The method is that of compelling everybody to meddle with everything that is none of his business, and of forbidding him, under any circumstances, to mind his own business. The demand is that the state, the church, and the university shall more and more shape their activities with reference to the supposed interests of the poor and the ignorant, and that, in doing this, they shall be governed by the advice of the poor and the ignorant themselves. One could make no greater mistake than to suppose that the true social democrat would be satisfied if land and capital and the management of industry were made over to the government. The socialist desires these transfers only on condition that the proletariat shall be the government. To what extent the forms of industry and the state are to be modified by social-

istic legislation no one can predict, but the substance has been greatly affected already. At least one-half of the members of Congress never think of asking what are the characteristics of a sound monetary and banking system; they ask what sort of money and what kind of banks the Knights of Labor and the Farmers' Alliance are demanding. Not a winter goes by in which our various state legislatures do not enact numbers of distinctly socialistic statutes. The London County Council is socialistic through and through, and the British House of Commons but little less so. Nor is it only the proletarian voter and the temporizing politician who are contributing to these results. The younger clergymen in this country, as in England, in ceasing to be theologians have gone over in large numbers to socialism. The literary class also, to a considerable extent, is socialistic in a sentimental, superficial way.

In stating these facts, I am not preparing you for the question whether educated men and women ought to bestir themselves to resist a movement which has made such headway, or whether they ought to take part in it and endeavour in some measure to guide it. This is not the place to discuss the fallacies of the socialistic programme or to dwell on the dangers that it threatens. I wish to ask you to begin to think upon the question which I am sure will soon force itself upon your attention: What effect may we expect the social-democratic movement to have upon the higher education, and, in view of this movement, what is the great educational work or duty of the hour? What will social democracy do for philosophy, for the research that promises no material rewards, for intellectual and artistic beauty, for idealism of life? Or ought we to say that the time for these questions has gone by already, and that these things can no longer be looked upon as the chief concern of life? Has the time come for renunciation? Will the educated class now do its true part in society by subordinating intellect to sympathy? Should it give itself unreservedly to the work of popularizing the knowledge that we now possess?

I think that we can discern a tendency in our universities, as elsewhere, to exalt the popular claim. The ethical spirit

is strong among us. Those who believe that pure scholarship is quite as important as missionary zeal are in some danger of finding themselves disapproved by public opinion, and left without material support. If they expect to maintain themselves against a majority that threatens to become larger and more insistent, they will have to assert themselves with spirit.

I know that thinkers whose opinion is entitled to respect believe that social democracy will exalt intellect and purify art. They believe that a greater approach toward equality of material comfort will temper the lust of wealth and turn the thoughts of men to the limitless satisfactions of beauty and of truth. They ask how either beauty or truth can flourish in a world where an extravagance as vulgar as it is heartless elbows misery at every turn. Writers of the most exquisite perceptions, like Ruskin and Morris, never weary of telling us that immortal genius must keep fresh and pure its sympathy with humble life. Genius, they remind us, is too often born in humble life to permit us to doubt that, among those whom we often too hastily class as the ignorant, there are germs of appreciation of all that is best in the human soul. Fra Lippo Lippi, starving in the streets of Florence, and watching people's faces to know who would fling the half-stripped grape bunch he desired, till "soul and sense of him grow sharp alike," and he could paint life's flash and then add soul, we may easily conceive to be a type of the talent that cultivated socialistic writers would expect social democracy to rescue from oblivion.

It must be admitted that this way of thinking is by no means strange to the American mind, and that it seems to have been a natural one to our English ancestors in earlier centuries. It is well to remember, too, that it has had a large measure of justification in fact. We ought not to forget that the Elizabethan era, so magnificent in literature, was one in which the keenest interest was felt in the extension of educational opportunity to all who could profit thereby. During Elizabeth's reign no less than one hundred and thirty-eight grammar schools were founded in England, including Upping-

ham and Cheltenham, Harrow and Rugby, which were open to sons of yeoman and peasant, if apt in learning, as to the sons of gentlemen; that all who were able might be trained to serve God in church and state. Again, the age of Puritanism, with its Milton to uphold the highest standards of idealism while he fought magnificently for intellectual freedom, was the age in which educational advantages were still further extended to the poor through the founding of charity schools. It was then, too, that for the first time school privileges were offered to girls, for until then girls were not expected to serve God in church and state, and grammar schools were exclusively for boys.

Likewise in the American colonies, the feeling was strong that if intellectual and religious interests were to be sustained at all in the new world, education must be general. "To the end that learning may not be buried in the graves of our forefathers," was the significant preamble of the great Puritan ordinance of 1647 which ordered "that every township after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty householders shall appoint one to teach all children to read and write; and where any town shall increase to the number of one hundred families they shall set up a grammar school, the masters thereof being able to instruct youth so far as they may be fitted for the university."

No one who realizes how vitally all human interests are bound together can be insensible to the importance of passing on to the people the results of special study. Not only does the ethical desire to enable the masses of mankind to share in the gains of progress require this, but, as I have said, it is necessary for the security of the student himself. But it is one thing to stand superior to those whom you wish to instruct, and to insist that what they receive shall be knowledge that is genuine, discipline that is real, cultivation that bears the stamp of refinement, stimulation that improves the whole moral tone of life; it is another thing to be so carried away by the desire to popularize knowledge that you insensibly pass over to the point of view of those whom you wish to improve, and, adapting your standards to theirs,

begin to emasculate your teaching, in the hope of making it thereby more acceptable to the multitude. The men who founded grammar schools in Elizabethan days, and those who established the common-school system of New England, had no thought, we may be sure, of asking the artisan's apprentice or the labourer's son what sort of things he would like to have taught him. They did not submit the question of what knowledge is of most worth to a majority vote under universal suffrage. But to-day popular instruction does undoubtedly borrow its standards and take its tone from the thinking of the uninstructed, whose tastes are unformed, and whose critical faculty has never been called into play. The newspaper is written avowedly for the men and women who want news rather than ideas, and sensation rather than information. Our magazines are clever rather than fine in their quality. True dramatic art is made to give way to the amusing and the spectacular.

It is impossible to look about us and not see that in popular education, using the term in a broad sense, there is already far more zeal than judgment, far more catering to the preferences of the ignorant than stiff insistence that the ignorant shall be taught the things that it would be worth their while to know. And that this subserviency of the high to the low will increase as the years go by is the great danger that I fear from the further success of the social-democratic movement. I cannot see that we are lacking in sincere willingness to carry light to those who sit in scientific darkness. I do not believe that the scholarship of to-day is narrow or exclusive. I will not admit that he who lives the true intellectual life is one whit less sympathetic with his fellow-men who earn their bread by manual labour than is the professional reformer who proclaims his sympathy from the housetops. On the contrary, I fear that the greatest danger which threatens the labourer, and not the labourer only, but our country, is a surrender of the intellectual career by gifted men and women in the mistaken conviction that devotion to mere scholarship is a selfish and exclusive aim, and that they ought to find ways to employ their powers which will bring them into more immedi-

ate contact with wrongs to be righted, or suffering to be relieved.

If, then, you who are about to go out from the college classroom into the life for which you have been preparing, should ask me what in my judgment is the chief duty of the educated class to-day, I should be unable to answer, as so many earnest teachers for whose opinion I have the most profound respect are answering, that it is to popularize learning. I should have to say, rather, that I am sure that the greatest duty of all is to maintain and to raise the standards of education, and to insist that studies which can never by any possibility be popular, or appeal even to any large number of students, but which have demonstrated their power to enlighten and to ennoble those who do pursue them, shall not be given up in obedience to popular clamour, and merely to make way for other things that seem to be of more immediate utility. In the long run we shall not help the cause of public education by making concessions. I am unable to see what is to be gained by carrying the forms and the phrases of knowledge to those who are unwilling or unable to acquire the substance of knowledge, and to submit themselves to the discipline that true cultivation implies. Our first business is to be sincere. If we must have university extension, our first duty is to make sure that we have universities to extend.

Nothing seems to be easier than for those who ought to know better to mistake the true purpose of a college education. The college does not exist chiefly as a means of affording mental discipline. Discipline quite as good, perhaps, can be had, and has often been obtained, outside of college walls. It is not merely a place in which to acquire the contents of books. Some of the most brilliant examinations that women have passed in recent years, as candidates for the baccalaureate and higher degrees, have been passed by those who have been obliged to do most of their studying outside of colleges, and with little help from instructors or lecturers. Nor is the college primarily an institution for moral and religious training. This function it divides with the home and the church.

But there is one supreme work which the college has to do,

for which no other instrumentality equally good exists. The college can enable those who will enter sincerely into its spirit to appreciate the many-sidedness of life, to feel the continuity of the present and the future with the past, to engage with enthusiasm in researches that promise to reward us with discoveries of truth hitherto unknown, and at the same time to revere the ideals of beauty and to cherish the immortal thoughts that have come down to us as a heritage of imperishable worth from other lands and other days. The college can enable its students to follow after utility and yet to value the ideal. It can do this because its spirit is one of liberty and of inclusion, because it frankly avows the excellence of sound learning and of true criticism apart from their practical applications, because without apology it proclaims that —

> "If you get simple beauty and naught else,
> You get about the best thing God invents."

Because, in short, it says that true education is no mere analysis of things, but is rather, as Ruskin has so finely said, "a grand assay of the human soul."

To cherish this spirit and to defend this conception of the educational end, was never more needful than now. Our American life lacks balance, proportion, and repose. We are overwhelmed with cares of our own devising. We are pestered by ingenious, sometimes half-brilliant, cranks. We are made unhappy by reformers who are common nuisances and common scolds. We should demand that college training make the student above all things large-minded and level-headed. We should expect it to show the man how to keep alive his enthusiasm, his devotion to the highest ideal that has flashed upon his vision, without becoming a zealot or a fanatic; to show the woman how to work ardently for every worthy cause without becoming a suffragist or an anti-suffragist, a prohibitionist or an anti-prohibitionist, a vivisectionist or an anti-vivisectionist, or any other kind of "ist" or "ologist" or "freak."

Let us then accept it as our duty, and as our privilege, too, to cherish the idealism of life. Let us stand steadfast for intellectual liberty and cultivate intellectual courage.

Let us apply our courage in defending those interests that we know to be of supreme concern, against those who, on the one hand, would call us impractical, and against those who, on the other hand, would assail our motives, pronouncing us unsympathetic or selfish. "My dear young woman," a recent story-writer makes one of her characters say, "we are not living in a poetry book bound with gilt edges. We are living in a paper-backed volume of prose." This is true; but have we not had in this country and in recent years rather too much insistence on this particular kind of truth? Have we not sacrificed rather too exclusively at the altar of the commonplace? I believe that it is the duty of the college and of the college graduate to make life at least more of a poetry book than it is; and if that is not possible, I confess that I do not quite see why we should spend a considerable part of life in acquiring the college training. But possible it is, and upon college-trained women especially must rest the duty of converting the possibility into reality. Mr. Parkman, in the essay from which I quoted a few moments ago, pointed out that more and more this work would fall to women. "It is often and most justly said," he wrote, "that the intellectual growth of the country bears no proportion to its material progress. The drift toward pursuits called practical is so strong that it carries with it nearly all the best male talent. The rush and whirl of business catches men as in a maelstrom, and if it sharpens and invigorates some of their powers, it dwarfs others and narrows the mental horizon. Women are free from these disadvantages. Many of them have abundant leisure and opportunities of culture better than the best within the reach of men on this continent forty years ago. Their sex is itself a power if they use it rightly. They can, if they will, create and maintain higher standards of thought and purpose, raise the whole tone of national life, and give our civilization the fulness that it lacks, for, if they raise themselves, they will infallibly raise the men with them."

In this view of the matter I most sincerely concur. To "raise the whole tone of national life, and give our civiliza-

tion the fulness that it lacks," is, preëminently, the duty of the hour that rests upon the graduates of colleges for women, and, if so, then most of all upon you, alumnæ of Bryn Mawr.

And do not think that in thus setting distinctly before yourselves the duty of upholding intellectual standards and of striving to increase the beauty and the joy of life, you are neglecting the cultivation of character. We cannot fix our attention on beauty and on truth without being changed within ourselves. We cannot defend them against error and baseness without being ourselves made pure and strong.

> "The gods exact for song,
> To become what we sing."

XIV

THE POPULAR INSTRUCTION MOST NECESSARY IN A DEMOCRACY

XIV

THE POPULAR INSTRUCTION MOST NECESSARY IN A DEMOCRACY

THERE is an ancient book of political wisdom which awakens the wonder of those persons who turn its pages for the first time. More deeply still does it amaze those who study its chapters with patient care and penetrate its more profound meanings. So sharply outlined are its pictures of political situations in a democratic community, so fresh and strong are its comments upon the political methods of demagogues, so comprehensive is its grasp of all the known forms of government, and so practical is its treatment of those problems that arise from the attempt to secure the reality of good government under any plan of organization, that we find ourselves doubting if the author is not one of our contemporaries, who is portraying the actual politics of American commonwealths in the closing years of the nineteenth Christian century.

This ancient book, I need hardly take the trouble to tell you, is a political treatise that is briefly and familiarly known as the "Politics" of Aristotle.

The reason why this ancient treatise appeals to us as so intensely modern, is found in the circumstance that, in a measure, stages of social evolution are independent of chronology. As the interests and habits of childhood were much the same in Thebes or in Athens that they are in Boston or in Chicago; so in the lives of nations, the age of tutelage, during which the people look to their kings and priests for guidance, has had the same social and political character whether it has fallen within the period of ancient or within that of modern history. In like manner, in all that pertains to ambition and to character, the years of independent manhood were

the same before the conquest of the Western world by Germanic peoples that they have been since the race of Saxon blood has overspread the world. Furthermore, the period of emancipation in the life of nations, when the people throw off the domination of the so-called higher classes and irretrievably commit themselves to the experiment of democracy, had been realized in history before the French Revolution. Athens had entered upon this period of democractic experiment when Aristotle wrote; and, in all essential details, those things which he recorded are true of democratic government in America to-day.

There is one detail in particular to which on this occasion I desire to ask your especial attention Not only does Aristotle perceive the practical difficulties of democratic politics, and expressly state his judgment that, if it were possible to maintain an aristocracy in the true sense of the word, namely, that of the rule of the virtuous, the wise, the self-sacrificing, and prudent, it would be folly to contemplate any other form of government; not only does he regretfully set aside this preference as of little practical importance because the day has forever passed in which its realization was possible; not only does he grapple with the question, How shall democratic government, when it has become inevitable, be made as unobjectionable as possible? but, going to the bottom of the psychological conditions that underlie organization and practical politics of every sort, he addresses himself to the final inquiry, What sort of education, what kind of training, shall we maintain in our democratic communities in order that the errors of popular judgment, the passion and unreason of mobs, shall be as narrowly as possible restricted in action; in order that, as far as possible, the masses of mankind shall be developed into self-reliant, self-respecting, calm thinking, and patriotic citizens who, in spite of the relative imperfections of democracies, shall yet maintain a state of which the end is the perfection of the good life?

I ask your attention to this detail of Aristotle's work because, while we may still learn much from his analysis of political forms, from his account of political forces, and from

his criticism of methods and policies, we may perhaps learn even more from his suggestions of educational means to insure the improvement of democracies through the discipline of the mind and the inner transformation of the soul of the individual citizen.

On every hand we see evidence that thoughtful men in our own democratic-American society have long realized the importance of greater attention to this fundamental condition of popular sovereignty. In the earliest days of our New England commonwealths there was a profound conviction that the public school was of coördinate importance with the freemen's meeting in maintaining a democratic mode of political activity. That conviction has spread throughout the nation, and very few, if any, men whose judgment is worth considering, would to-day question the soundness of that belief. The interest to which I more especially refer is that which is now manifesting itself in attempts to supplement the work of public schools by other forms of popular instruction. It is realized that, because the schools themselves are often imperfect in organization and in methods, because a majority of their pupils go out from them into money-earning activities before the years of childhood are passed, the schools are at best an inadequate means of preparing each successive generation for the duties of American citizenship. We are beginning to perceive how important have been other means of education, particularly the family, the church, the public meeting, the lyceum, and the library. In every large city at the present time and, to some extent, in most of the towns and villages, attempts are being made to stimulate these educational agencies to greater activity and to supplement them by courses of definite popular instruction, through university extension lectures, through the clubs and classes that are maintained at university and other social settlements, and through numerous other means.

You will agree with me that so deep and widespread an interest in the relation of education to citizenship, so strong a conviction that the continuing success of popular government depends upon a sound preparatory training of the

citizen, is in itself a phenomenon of significance. Surely we need not despair of the stability or even of the continuing improvement of democratic government as long as the people look at it from this point of view, and show their earnest determination to build the state upon the foundations of intelligence and moral discipline.

It is important, however, that such efforts should be wisely directed, and that from time to time we should ask ourselves what, after all, are the things that are of vital necessity in popular instruction. Remembering how vast is the inertia of ignorance, how brief is the time within which we may hope to impress enduring lessons upon the minds of our fellow-men, we cannot afford to misdirect our efforts or to squander any energy that may be available for the discipline and enlightenment of the people. In one sense, all knowledge is of priceless worth; and any intellectual or moral effort brings reward. In another sense, however, knowledge and discipline are valuable in the degree that they ensure the accomplishment of specific results. From the standpoint of democracy, some knowledge is better than other knowledge. Some instruction is vital, while other instruction may be neglected. Let us then ask what instruction of the people is vitally necessary for the success of our American experiment in popular, or in democratic, government.

Here again let us turn for a moment to the ancient pages of our great philosopher. In the Seventh Book of the "Politics" he says, "A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then inquire how a man becomes virtuous." He then continues, "There are three things which make men good and virtuous: these are Nature, Habit, Reason," and he reminds us that, to some extent, nature may be modified by habit and to some extent by reason. The business of education, then, is so to instruct that nature shall be kept vigorous, alert, and brave, while appetite is subjected to the control of reason. Since nature is modified by both habit and reason, it is important to inquire whether the training of early life should be chiefly that of

reason or chiefly that of habit. Aristotle sees that the two should accord; and that when in accord, they make the best of harmonies. He firmly believes that reason is the supreme thing in the universe; for he says, "Now in men, reason and mind are the end toward which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them." He recognizes that reason may make mistakes and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life. But he reminds us that habit also may fail in like manner. On the whole, it is the judgment of Aristotle that the education of habit should proceed the training in reason. "As the soul and body are two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two corresponding states — reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and will and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow; none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul."

Accordingly, Aristotle first raises the preliminary question of the determination of the child's inherited nature. He discusses with the utmost frankness the question of suitable and unsuitable marriages, and insists strongly upon the duty of considering the probable offspring of any proposed union of man and woman. Especially earnest is he in deprecating those marriages of the very young, which result in enfeebled constitutions; and those marriages of valetudinarians, which result in the birth of criminals and the mentally defective. If the modern readers of Lombroso and Havelock Ellis wish to be convinced that "there is nothing new under the sun," let them turn to the sixteenth chapter of the Seventh Book of the "Politics."

The child having come into the world with his nature determined, those disciplines that form character, subdue the passions, and strengthen the will are next to be considered.

Four forms of instruction are enumerated by Aristotle as customary in the Athens of his day. These are: first, reading and writing; second, gymnastic exercises; third, music; fourth, drawing. Of these, he says, reading, writing, and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways; and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. Concerning music, he says that a doubt may be raised; but this is because in his day men had begun to cultivate music for the sake of pleasure, whereas its true value must be found in its proper use in the formation of character. Here we have the keynote to all that follows in the discussion of this subject. Training of every kind, occupations and amusements of every kind, are to be estimated with reference to their reaction upon the character of the citizen.

So it happens that in this treatise on education, by one of the greatest writers of any age, we discover no further discussion of reading and writing, which are passed by as merely the obvious foundation of a convenient kind of knowledge. There is nothing of that elaborate consideration of the disciplinary value of languages, mathematics, natural sciences, which has occupied so large a part of modern educational theory. The entire space which Aristotle devotes to the educational question is given to his discussion of gymnastics and music.

Turning to these, we again are struck with the intense modernness of the views presented. Was it yesterday or two thousand years ago that one wrote this? "The temperament of an athlete is not suited to the life of a citizen or to the health or to the procreation of children, any more than is that of the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution." Or again, is it in the columns of the New York *Evening Post* or in our ancient philosophical work, that we read the following: "Of those states which in our own day seem to take the greatest care of children, some aim at producing in them an athletic habit, but they only injure their forms and stunt their growth. Although the Lacedæmonians have not fallen into this mistake, yet they brutalize their children by laborious exercises which they think will make them courageous. But in truth, as we have often repeated, education should not be

exclusively directed to this or to any other single end. And even if we suppose the Lacedæmonians to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals, courage is found associated not with the greatest ferocity, but with a gentle and lion-like temper."

Aristotle has no intention, however, of decrying gymnastic exercises. On the contrary, he strongly holds that they should be employed in all education, and that they should be so directed as to secure strength and suppleness of body, self-control, and an active disposition. It is that abuse which in our day has become known as professionalism, or, shall we say, in some instances as amateurism, which Aristotle exposes. He even goes so far as to call in evidence the most cherished of Grecian institutions. "The evil of excessive training in early years," he says, "is strikingly proved by the example of the Olympic victors, for not more than two or three of them have gained a prize as boys and as men." Their early training and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. One other popular fallacy in regard to exercise Aristotle also exposes. In ancient Greece, as in our own day, it was held by many that the brain worker should combine manual labour with his intellectual exertions. There were Tolstois then as now. Since no man has ever accomplished more with his brain than Aristotle did, his testimony is not to be lightly regarded. "Men ought not to labour," he says, "at the same time with their minds and their bodies; for the two kinds of labour are opposed to one another. The labour of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body."

On the subject of music, as an element in education, Aristotle's views may be summed up in two brief propositions. One is, that all music which is in its nature exciting or voluptuous, tending to inflame the passions or to overstimulate the emotions, is rigidly to be excluded from the education of children and youth; while the music which he calls ethical, that is to say, the music which awakens noble sentiments, heroic moods, is freely to be employed. The other proposition is, that children and youth are not to sit passively and enjoy the performance of paid professional musicians. There

must be no cultivation of mere passive receptivity. Youth are themselves to learn the principles and art of musical performance; they must acquire skill in the use of the voice and of instruments. In a word, education in music must be an education in serious activity, not in passive enjoyment.

While we unaccountably fail to find in Aristotle's discussion of education, in its relation to citizenship, any suggestion as to a direct training of the reason — that end toward which nature strives, that highest faculty which must coöperate with habit in moulding nature and restraining passion — we discover in the fourth chapter of the Eighth Book a parenthetical remark that when the gymnastic training of boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other studies; and we know from Aristotle's other writings that he believed in severe intellectual discipline. Indeed, we cannot doubt that had he chosen to discourse further on this subject, he would have insisted strongly upon the importance of logic, mathematics, and philosophical disputations.

Is this, then, all that the great Stagirite has to say upon the training of men for membership of the state? To encourage children in gymnastic exercises, but to stop short of excessive athletic training; to encourage them to acquire musical skill in the performance of ennobling harmonies, but to withhold them from enervating and voluptuous pleasure; and, as they grow older, to keep them employed with intellectual exercises — are these the all-sufficient principles of educational preparation for the responsibilities of citizenship? We must answer that this is substantially all that we find in Aristotle's treatment of the subject. But before we assume that it is strangely inadequate, let us be sure that we have fully grasped his meaning.

Evidently, it was no part of Aristotle's purpose to enter upon an exhaustive discussion of educational details. He wished rather to strike out two or three essential truths in the fundamental philosophy of the subject; and above all — as I think we may gather from a careful examination of his paragraphs — to insist upon one preëminent truth, namely, that the indispensable training for citizenship, whether it be

secured by means of intellectual, gymnastic, musical, or other exercises, is a discipline in the combined *activity* of the intellect, the higher emotions, and the will, within the bounds of temperance and self-restraint. The deadliest peril to be avoided is an extreme of any kind — either that which exhausts and distorts the bodily powers under the name of athletics, or that which, neglecting all wholesome activity, surrenders body, mind, and soul to the enjoyment of any kind of pleasure or mere idle contemplation. The citizen, in short, must be an active man; a self-reliant man, but a calm and moderate man; a courageous man, but a gentle and peace-loving man, who will not fight without cause; a hater of sensuality and of corruption, but an appreciator of all that is noble in art and in human struggle.

Let us now inquire what it was that led Aristotle thus to emphasize the importance of moderation and of an education in manly activity, both physical and mental, as a preparation for citizenship. In part, of course, we must attribute his teaching to the underlying principles of his philosophy. But in part, we can, I think, account for it by his perfect insight into the nature of popular government. Aristotle was indeed the greatest of theorists; but he was likewise one of the shrewdest judges of what we call practical politics. His theories grew out of his observations; and they formulated vital principles from concrete social conditions. Why, then, from the standpoint of the observer of democratic institutions, did Aristotle so strenuously insist upon the supreme importance of wholesome activity, of temperance in all things, and of discipline in philosophical studies?

The dangers of democracy arise chiefly from two sources. One is that unbridled emotionalism which, in its graver manifestations, becomes the violence of mobs and of revolutions; which arouses the fanatical cruelty of the criminal classes, when they have risen to temporary power in days of anarchy; which upholds the absolutism of the multitude, and tramples on all rights of minorities. The second is the decay of character.

Students of political history have long been familiar with

the first of these dangers. Examples of political frenzy were not lacking in the contemporary political life of Greece in Aristotle's day; and they have not been exhausted in the horrors of later revolutionary turmoil. We do not need the lurid pages of Carlyle or the solemn warnings of Edmund Burke to deepen our dread of proletarian madness. We have too often seen it in the streets of New York and of San Francisco, in the railroad yards of Pittsburg and of Chicago, in the mining fields of Pennsylvania and of Illinois. Moreover, it is not only the idle and the mob that we have thus to fear. We have to fear ourselves. The possibilities of unreason lie deep in our own breasts. Was it calm reason that held sway a few short months ago when, throughout the length and breadth of our land, the cry of "Remember the *Maine!*" was passed from lip to lip? Was it government by deliberation or was it government by obsession that was then witnessed in the senate chamber of the United States? Do we not know that however expedient and righteous the war with Spain may have been, there was no real discussion of either expediency or morals until after hostilities were begun?

The second of the dangers of democracy, like the first, was not unperceived in the small democracies of ancient times; but its full gravity, like that of the first, has been revealed only in modern days. It is a danger far more subtle and far more likely to lead to the complete subversion of popular institutions than is any momentary outbreak of popular violence. In the painful exhibition of cowardice and dishonour that has recently been seen in France, we behold the really disheartening peril to republican institutions. Unhappily, we cannot comfort ourselves with the thought that America is not France, and that Saxon integrity is a more robust virtue than Gallic honour. Our own record is not so clean that we can afford to waste our indignation in scorn of a decadent race. Not only do we in shame recall the briberies and dishonest contracts that have disgraced our recent legislative history, but we are obliged to face the far more serious fact that American voters are not sufficiently alive to the importance of a determined effort to substitute honour and decency

for the low expediences that we have come to regard as the essentials of practical political management. It is a commonplace of political conversation and of newspaper comment that in all our American cities the upright voters are numerous enough to maintain an honest municipal administration, if they cared to do it. We know that New York City need not be given over to exploitation by the criminal and vile, if the honest and pure-minded citizens of that city chose to combine for the overthrow of a dangerous and degrading power. We know that Chicago has business men who bathe and pay their debts, and that, if they really wanted such a luxury, they could have streets in which it would be possible to walk without physical contamination, or danger of robbery by the worst outlaws of two hemispheres. We know that the commonwealth of Pennsylvania need not be held at the throat by one of the boldest criminal gangs of any land or age, if her business and professional classes were really in earnest to throw off so degrading a bondage.

The source of all these evils, there is no need to argue, is found in the undisputed fact that the eminently respectable "average citizen" cares somewhat more for the privilege of illegally obstructing a sidewalk with his own merchandise than for an impartial enforcement of all municipal ordinances; somewhat more to obtain an irregular concession from the Building Department or from the Board of Health than to have the streets of his city cleaned from physical filth and cleared of vicious characters. The observing and informed will hardly deny that but for these moral conditions, the purification of American state and municipal governments might be hastened. The source of evil, then, as I have said, lies in a certain infirmity of character, a certain failure to place duty at the forefront of our daily interests, an unwillingness to sacrifice personal comfort, convenience, and gain for the public welfare.

Let us, then, ask wherein lies the remedy for these evils of unreason and of moral imperfection, in so far as remedy can be found in any form of popular instruction. In seeking to answer this question, we shall do well to remember Aristotle's

distinction of those restraints that we find in habit and those that we find in reason. By both habit and reason, properly disciplined, impulse can be restrained and character can be ennobled.

We are not likely to exaggerate our indebtedness as a nation to that Puritan morality which, for generations, was nurtured in New England and from New England has spread throughout the forty-five commonwealths of the present republic. As all will concede, that morality has been far more a thing of habit than of precept; and doubtless it is to-day much more a matter of habit than of reasoned conviction. The unsettling effects of much modern speculation and scientific investigation have appeared in the ethical theories that large numbers of cultivated Americans defend in discussion. But in our conduct, habits of an earlier time persist; and, under the domination of a New England conscience, men make sacrifices that they would not pretend to demand of themselves from the standpoint of their philosophy. Under this domination, American voters do now and then honestly face their civic duty and, for a season, give time and effort to correct a public wrong that has become too scandalous or too threatening. Assuredly, this fact has been one of the chief causes of the relative success of American democracy, notwithstanding the corruption and the indifference that have prevented a realization of our ideals. We have, then, a great historic object lesson in the importance of habit as a restraining influence in democracy, and a great encouragement to hope for the improvement of our political conduct, if we give sufficient attention to the training of character by habit.

This can be accomplished in various ways, but chiefly, no doubt, through the subtle power of suggestion and example rather than through an overzealous insistence upon mere precept. What form, then, shall this instruction by example and suggestion take? The sufficient and always true answer has been given in Aristotle's pages. A character manly, brave, self-sacrificing, sincere, resolute, and yet temperate, calm, and self-controlled, can be formed by insisting upon active pursuits, active pleasures, a thoroughly wide-awake

and determined life, and upon an avoidance of those pleasures that weaken the will, destroy the zest for intellectual effort and public activity, and end at length in sordid inertia, if not in sensuality. A people can be judged and its career can be predicted from the character of its pleasures, with more accuracy than from any other data. Always to prefer the pleasures of passive receptivity, of merely witnessing artistic productions however exquisite in themselves, of merely listening to sensuous music, of merely diverting the mind with daily news or comminuted science, always to be, in fine,

> "A careless looker-on and nothing more,
> Indifferent and amused but nothing more,"

— this is to touch but not to smite the chord of self. We read to-day of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon, and of the decadence of the Latin race; and the handwriting of fate is again revealed, as in Babylon of old, not at sunrise in Belshazzar's camp, but at midnight at his feast. A people that idly sips its cognac on the boulevards as it lightly takes a trifling part in the *comédie humaine*, can only go down in the struggle for existence with men who have learned that happiness, in distinction from idle pleasure, is the satisfaction that comes only with the tingling of the blood, when we surmount the physical and the moral obstacles of life.

Turning now to the training of reason, what is the requirement? It is, I think, that in all popular instruction — by the pulpit, the press, the platform, and the lyceum — the purely intellectual side of human interests should be grasped and fearlessly presented. Here, again, our American history affords us an object lesson of large proportions and significance. The Puritan morality was one of the influences that insured the relative success of American popular government. The hard-headedness, the practical rationality, which was developed by the New England controversial theology was another factor. You will not make the mistake of supposing that I am defending the New England theology, as a system of doctrine, in either its Calvinistic or its Unitarian forms, or wishing that it could again be taught as a chief intellectual

material for the American mind to exercise its faculties upon. I do mean that it was a great thing for the political as for the moral development of this nation that the New Englander of earlier days, instructed throughout the week in the rugged duties and denials of the Puritan morality, on Sunday heard a gospel of keenly argued and vigorously defended propositions, which admitted of debate, and which invariably were debated in his own mind and with his own comrades; and that he did not listen to a sentimental essay, calculated to touch only his emotions, or witness a ritualistic ceremonial, appealing chiefly to imagination. What men were those who once held the attention of these New England communities: Edwards, Hopkins, Bellamy, Emmons, Emerson, Parker, Channing, and Orville Dewey! Do not these names stand for the most original contributions to vigorous thought that have been made in the United States? These men were not callous to the finer things of life. On the contrary, they were men of kindly natures and delicate sensibilities. They were endowed with not a little of the reformer's zeal. Especially was this true of the remorselessly intellectual Hopkins, of the discriminating Channing, and of the critical Dewey, who all were leaders of the anti-slavery agitation in the days of its inauguration. And how were these men themselves trained? Not by any soft academic methods, much less by any modern system of cramming. In a memoir of Hopkins that is included in the collected edition of his writings, there is a significant account of the Yale curriculum of his day. The study of languages was completed in the freshman year, and exercises in logic were begun. During the second year, the first four mornings of every week were given to ethics and metaphysics. The third year was almost wholly devoted to physics, or natural science, and the fourth to mathematics. Here was, indeed, a remorseless system, and one indifferent enough to all super-refinements of sentiment. I should not wish to commend it, without reservations; but at least it did not make scatter-brains, or dilettantes, or dabblers. In later years, President Woolsey, writing of it, said: "By it some of New England's best minds were formed. Men like Jonathan

Edwards, Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Smalley, and Emmons . . . do not proceed from cloistered retirements, where the mind is wholly asleep and afraid to think. . . . On the other hand, an effect of the modern system of education or of society, or of both, is to repress originality of thinking, to destroy individual peculiarities, and to produce a general sameness among those who are educated."

Not only by precept, but by that unconsciously exerted influence of example, preference, and emphasis which counts for so much more, these men created in the New England population a keen intellectual activity which permeated secular no less than religious interests. Those who, for their Sunday edification, listened to discourses upon the most perplexing questions of theology, carried to the town-meeting and to the market-place the habit of argumentative disputation, the insatiable desire to pry into every question, to criticise every proposition that did not instantly commend itself to reason, and, in short, to prove all things. Can we exaggerate the inestimable value of this sturdy intellectual habit to the American people? Are we likely to overestimate the part that it has played in preventing ill-considered action in times of grave national peril, or its saving power in helping the people to a sound decision at the end of long years of agitation of great questions? Like other peoples, we in America have our moods of impulse, we are subject to like passions with our brethren of other lands; but more than most nations, we are an intellectual, an inquiring, a reasoning set of men — thanks largely to popular teaching by the New England race of preachers.

Now I wish to submit that the time has not passed when we can afford to substitute for this strong meat of intellectual discourse the watered milk of sentiment, appreciation, and æsthetic refinement. The more numerous our population becomes, and the more miscellaneous its character with the inflow of foreign elements from every European land, the more likely are we to submerge true public opinion beneath waves of emotion, belief, and impulse. True public opinion, as I have attempted in some of my more formal writings to

show, is an intellectual phenomenon. It is a rational like-mindedness, and is created by argumentative discussion. Public feeling, public sentiment, the most ardent conviction of belief, may exist with scarcely an admixture of real public opinion. We can derive from history and from psychology no assurance that a stable popular government can be maintained in a nation which ceases to be hourly creative of genuine public opinion — the fruit of rational discourse. We can find in no record of the past any assurance that a people which uncritically accepts every exciting proposition that is uttered, can maintain either social order at home or a respected place among nations. The formation of opinion, as distinguished from emotional conviction or belief, begins when some one has the hardihood to doubt, to call for explanations, to insist upon proof, to be satisfied with nothing less than a clear intellectual understanding of the problems involved. It is, then, of vital necessity to preserve and to nurture a habit that takes the form of a certain kind of scepticism — not the scepticism that ends in mere denial and a paralysis of will, but that which is the instrument of a sincere determination to know and to face the truth. Perhaps it is an unusual interpretation of the New England preaching which sees in it the most powerful propaganda of scepticism — in this noble sense of the word — which has ever acted upon the minds of men. Yet I believe that such an interpretation is a strictly valid one. In scarcely a discourse by such giants as Edwards and Hopkins, not to speak of their liberal co-equals, Emerson and Channing, is there a failure to admit the possibility of argumentative error, or hesitation to grapple with the hypothetical antagonist. Men did not hear such discourses without learning to carry the method into all their intellectual activity. It bore religious fruit in the Unitarian movement, and political fruit in the doctrine of national sovereignty.

The allusion to the scepticism which ends in mere denial and paralysis of will is a reminder of one further vitally necessary element in popular teaching, which must now be considered. The intellectual life is no exception to the rule

that any mode of human activity may become intemperate or decadent. The excess of intellectualism appears when rationality ceases to be positive, or creative, in its aim, and degenerates into merely negative thinking. This is the indubitable truth that underlies a healthy popular repugnance to certain nerveless types of "mugwumpery." In a cultivated community there always appears an order of men who are so dissatisfied with existing conditions, so intolerant of the strong convictions of their fellows, so impressed with the difficulties of discovering the deeper truths of philosophy and of life, that they lapse into the moods of scorn and cynical indifference. In the long run, these moods — no less surely than sentimentalism and sensuality — undermine the character of individuals and destroy the nerve of nations. In the struggle for existence intellect has been developed, not as a substitute for, but as the ally and guide of, the motor processes of the conscious organism. Its purpose has been to discover the complexities of environing situations, in order that a truer adjustment may be made to them. Intellect apart from purpose and positive conduct is an anomaly in nature — as surely a mode of degeneration as is the lapse into a sentimental form of passivity. The cynic, the scoffer, the man who has no sturdy intention, is as truly a part of the great company of the unfit which nature has doomed to extinction as is the pauper or the idiot. Therefore, nothing can be more disheartening than to see large numbers of cultivated men falling back into the position of political indifference, taking the ground that all earnest strife is useless, and proclaiming that politics are in their nature corrupt, demoralizing, and unfit for gentlemen. It is indeed true that such men usually are

> "Calm in the thick of the tempest,"

they have the virtue of restraint; but not the less are they

> "A partner in its motion and mixed up
> With its career."

We need to-day more of the teaching that intellect must be positive and linked to serious purpose.

What, then, to summarize our conclusions, shall we say is

the popular instruction most necessary in a democracy? It is, first, the teaching by every available agency — the pulpit, the press, the lecture — of the duty of training children, and as far as possible adults, in habits of active, rather than of passive, enjoyment. It is, secondly, the stirring up of intellectual strife. It is the inculcation of the duty of seriously grappling with the problem presented in every human relation, instead of accepting its sentimental value as sufficient. It is the teaching, in season and out of season, that it is folly to yield ourselves to any mood of popular feeling or to any clamour of popular belief, until we have subjected the implied proposition to that truth-searching doubt which insists upon a full understanding of the situation. It is, finally, the teaching of the supremely important truth that intellect must be the servant and guide of life. All these teachings, by all of these agencies of popular instruction, must be not less by spirit, by manner, suggestion, and example, than by precept and argumentation. Above all, must the instructor himself maintain an individual faith in the reality of his message, which, quite as much as any words that he may use, will carry conviction to those whose characters he would mould. Realizing, as he must, that dangers will continually threaten the stability of any popular government that does not rest upon moral foundations and is not guided by calm intelligence; knowing, as he must, that doubt in the higher sense of the word is necessary to sincere investigation; he must yet preserve his faith in the possibility of passing safely through all dangers and of emerging from all doubt into the light of attainable truth. With Paracelsus, he must say: —

> "If I stoop
> Into a dark tremendous sea of cloud,
> It is but for a time: I press God's lamp
> Close to my breast; its splendour, soon or late,
> Will pierce the gloom: I shall emerge one day."

XV

THE SHADOW AND THE SUBSTANCE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

XV

THE SHADOW AND THE SUBSTANCE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

WHETHER our political institutions are more or less republican than they were a generation or two ago, is a question that turns upon the meaning of the word "republican." If by a republic we mean a government organized by a large body of electors, and carried on through the agency of representatives who are responsible to their constituents, our institutions are certainly as yet republican in form. Between form and substance, however, there may be a vital difference; and nothing in the history of human institutions is more familiar than the survival of forms from which the original content has forever disappeared.

The republics of the past did, indeed, disappear in form and in name as well as in substance. The republic of Rome became a despotism and then an empire; the republics of Florence and of Venice disappeared before the power of the dictators; the first republic of France gladly exchanged its anarchy and bloodshed for the despotic rule of the first Napoleon; the second republic of France willingly surrendered itself to the imperial will of Napoleon III.

We hardly need to fear that, within any future which human foresight can now explore, the political institutions of our own country will cease to be republican in name and outward semblance. It is peculiarly characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon civilization to preserve ancient forms while greatly, or even wholly, changing the substance within. The British government is still a monarchy in name; its House of Peers is still in seeming a coördinate branch of the lawmaking power. In reality, Great Britain has long been

one of the most democratic of modern nations, and the House of Commons is practically the absolute sovereign.

In the United States we have seen in our political development more than one exemplification of this transformation of institutions. The founders of the Constitution expected that the electoral college would be the real electing body; and from 1778 until 1800 the electoral college did, in fact, choose the President of the United States. But in 1800 the practice of putting forward the nominees of a congressional caucus sprang up and rapidly strengthened, and until 1824 our presidents were in reality chosen by Congress, whose decisions were ratified by the electoral college. Then followed a brief period of nomination by the state legislatures. This was succeeded by the present system in 1831 and 1832, when, for the first time, candidates were put in nomination by conventions of the two dominant parties. Since that time the electoral college has been in practice nothing more than a dignified body which formally ratifies the decision already made; and the last pretence that it was, or could be, anything more disappeared in 1877, when James Russell Lowell refused to cast his vote for Tilden, and thereby to terminate the dangerous contest between Tilden and Hayes, on the ground that he could not honourably act otherwise than as his constituents had expected when they voted for him.

Yet more significant, if not so well understood, is the change that has taken place in the methods of making and amending statute laws. Probably the majority of American citizens still suppose that state legislatures are a law-creating power. Actually, to a great extent, they make law to-day only as the electoral college elects a chief magistrate. To a great extent legislators merely formulate and ratify measures already prepared elsewhere. Very seldom, indeed, does a member of a legislature introduce a bill drafted by himself, and in which he himself is personally interested. Bills are prepared by associations, clubs, individuals, and party managers. They are taken to the state capital by paid agents, who ascertain what representative and what senator are, on the whole, the best persons to introduce the measures as

drafted, and who then watch them through every stage of progress to enactment or defeat. Legislatures, in fact, have become forms, and the real law-making power has moved back into the hands of individuals, party organizations, and other voluntary associations.

Under this system, party organizations have obtained control of governmental machinery; and within each party a smaller voluntary group, consisting of the workers and the leaders, the "machine" and the "boss," has risen to an unstable supremacy, which is practically absolute most of the time, although now and then it is greatly limited by faction or revolt. Consequently, all measures, good and bad, that originate outside of party organizations, must be put in line with party interests. If they antagonize the plans of the "boss" and the "machine," they are usually defeated *ab initio*, because of the certainty that all party men who support them will fail of renomination, or of appointment, or of promotion in the future. Obviously, therefore, the question whether our system of government by voluntary organizations and personal leadership, working through governmental forms that are republican in name and appearance, shall be also republican in reality, is one that will be answered by the relations that develop between party organization, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those thousands of free associations which are primarily concerned with business, religion, science, art, education, and philanthropy, but are compelled from time to time to ask for changes in existing law or administration. Theoretically, the government that has its springs in voluntary initiative should be the freest, the most truly republican, of all known modes of government. Theoretically, the leadership of the "boss" should be flexible and delicately sensitive to public feeling; because, theoretically, it is a product of a free competition and natural selection among bosses. Actually, however, when the political party has made itself the only form of non-governmental organization through which other forms can influence the legislative body, the government that results is republican in reality only if a majority of voters are keenly alive to the importance of

maintaining other forms of free association besides their party, to the importance of securing consideration for every question upon its merits, and to the importance of keeping the way open for every natural leader of men to rise to a position of influence. If a political party can retain power by other means than its appeal to conscience and intelligence, or if two great parties by deals and trades can defy both common sense and common morality, a government republican in name and form must soon cease to be republican in fact.

Herein lies the danger of those relations which party organizations have established with interests that furnish the pecuniary means for great political undertakings. It is no secret that in former years the Republican party drew its revenues from office-holders, who were systematically assessed; it is no secret that in the presidential contest of 1896 the same party obtained the revenues with which it conducted its campaign of education against the free silver movement, by contributions from the great corporations. Directors did not hesitate to appropriate the money of their stockholders to this purpose, or to justify their action by the plea that the very existence of business interests was imperilled. The enormous danger for the future that lurks in this argument and this practice needs only to be mentioned to be understood. The Democratic party, on the other hand, has, until recently, drawn its revenues in the great cities chiefly from saloons and from various forms of vice. It is generally believed that in recent municipal campaigns in New York the Tammany organization has expended large sums of money obtained from corporations enjoying public franchises.

Is there a lesson for the citizen to draw from these notorious facts? Is the substance of republicanism endangered, unless certain changes in our present methods of government can be secured? Is the most important practical conclusion, perhaps, the suggestion that such great services as those which are now rendered in our cities by corporations holding franchises, and such great pecuniary interests as the liquor traffic should be taken altogether out of private hands, and placed within the control and management of the state?

An affirmative answer to these questions is held by many thoughtful men to be almost necessarily true; and they therefore throw themselves with sincere earnestness into the agitation for a public ownership of quasi-public enterprises. It is highly probable that, in a measure, their efforts will be successful. The present drift of public policy is toward an expansion of the business activities of municipal corporations. This tendency, however, is not without its own great dangers. Political parties that at heart believe in the spoils system can probably destroy the reality of popular government more quickly through the exploitation of a gigantic public business than through any other means. To look to socialistic measures for an increase of essential republicanism is, I fear, to misapprehend either republicanism or socialism. The substance of republicanism must be preserved, if at all, by further increasing, not by curtailing, the freedom of individual initiative, the vitality of voluntary organization, the competitive struggle among the true natural leaders of men; and by more strenuously demanding that political parties shall deal openly, soberly, and honestly with public interests.

All this can be accomplished if the "boss" and the "machine" can be made responsible to the party. The party will then be itself responsible to the public. Just how such responsibility is to be brought about, perhaps no one at present very clearly sees. Until the thing actually happened no one in England foresaw how a shamelessly corrupt party government was to become sensitively responsible to public opinion through the device of ministerial responsibility in the House of Commons. A very different device will have to be invented for the United States; but it is not unreasonable to expect that in one way or another the "boss" and the "machine" will presently be made as strictly accountable to their party as are the Prime Minister and his associates in the British cabinet.

XVI

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

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THERE could be no better proof that ethical ideas are an expression of a vague but massive desire to break over limiting conditions, and permit an ever-enlarging development of human personality, than is afforded in the maxim so dear to the American mind, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

From every point of view this maxim is revolutionary. As an epigrammatic bit of political literature, its origin may be found in the revolutionary thought of Rousseau and his contemporaries; while back of Rousseau it may in substance be traced through many generations of speculative discontent. As a statement of alleged political fact, it has singularly little content of truth. In human history governments have not often derived any powers, just or unjust, from any conscious, rational consent of the governed. Consent is more than submission; it implies that the consenting person, with full apprehension of the facts, has agreed to a certain conclusion or policy, through an act of his individual reason. Governments have always been dependent for their stability upon the non-resistance of the governed, but non-resistance may be a product of a thousand mental and moral factors other than consent. Furthermore, only through revolution have there been occasional instances of the establishment of government upon the consent of the governed. No state has ever been outright created by covenant. And, finally, the maxim has in our own history been used chiefly for revolutionary purposes. The actual evolution of government in times of tranquillity has gone on, for the most part, with little conscious reference to other than purely practical considerations of possibility, expediency, and convenience. Police

powers for the most part have been developed rather with reference to the maxim that public welfare is the supreme law, than to the proposition that no law is ethically right if it does not rest upon the consent of those who must obey it. The annexation of territory and the framing of constitutional provisions to govern the relations of commonwealths to the Union, in like manner have proceeded from considerations of general fitness, opportunity, and practical utility, rather than from notions of ideal justice. Nevertheless, every American doubtless would say that the foundation of government upon the consent of the governed is an ideal to be reverently cherished and, as far as possible, attained.

This wide divergence between principle and practice is of course differently regarded by men of different sentiments. While to minds of one type it is only a phase of the conflict between desire and fact, between ideal and possibility, which should not discourage us; to minds of another type it is a more or less disgraceful failure to remain true to our professions. That a nation which was founded — at least professedly founded — upon the maxim of consent, should use its power to compel submission, seems to them to be an utter repudiation of moral principle, not to say an act of unpardonable bad faith.

It may therefore be worth while to inquire whether the conflict between ideal and reality is indeed as fundamental as sometimes appears. And this we can best do by asking what rational meaning the maxim itself contains.

Is it, then, true, merely as an ethical proposition, that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed? If we say that they do, we must define our position upon the moral rightfulness of any coercion. Shall we say with the philosophical anarchists, that all government of man by man is wrong? This is a simple and consistent doctrine, if not a practical one; but if we accept it, we deny that governments can derive just powers from any source whatever. Or shall we say that the coercion of individuals or of minorities by majorities is a just power of governments, derivable from "consent"? An affirmative answer is easily sus-

tained, if, at the outset, we give narrow technical meanings to the terms "justice," "government," and "consent." If we so choose we may say that by "consent" we mean only that men rationally agree among themselves that public order must be established, and that, having done this, they must not rebel when they are subsequently required to do various things which, at the time, they do not rationally approve; that by "government" we mean the will of a majority; and that by "justice" we mean the execution of such laws as the majority chooses to enact. Thus narrowly construing the terms, we may say that governments so established exercise no unjust powers if a majority coerces a minority; if police powers interfere outrageously with private conduct; if, under the guise of taxation, governments systematically rob and confiscate; if, indeed, governments even trample upon such fundamental rights as the habeas corpus or the trial by jury. Is this narrow construction, however, that which the maxim really should bear? If it is, the only comment to be made is that the maxim is of no conceivable value for ethical theory, and of little more than a vague and sentimental value for political philosophy. It means that practically the test of moral government is nothing more than mere approval by human numbers, who may be ignorant or even depraved, and that minorities, even when made up of the most intelligent and conscientious men in the community, have no other moral rights than those which a majority, in the exercise of its legal power, chooses to recognize. If this is all that the phrase means, it is not worth a moment's consideration by any intelligent being.

It will hardly be disputed that those who really care about this historic maxim regard it as having a much more fundamental and noble content. They suppose it to mean not only that, when a government is established, a majority of those who are to live under it must assent to its formation and prescribe its powers; not only that, in its subsequent maintenance, a majority of its subjects must continue to desire its maintenance and continue to approve of its constitution and functions; but also that, in the ordinary exercise of its functions, a government must respect the rational convictions and

the moral rights of all its subjects, whether — on questions of mere expediency — they be counted with a minority or with a majority. That this is a true proposition, we have proof in the vast amount of attention which, in our constitutional law, has been given to the protection of the rights of minorities, and even of individuals. The very limitation of the powers of governments, the positive prohibitions of certain forms of governmental conduct, the insistence upon a two-thirds or a three-fourths vote in the decision of various fundamental matters — all these are admissions that, in the performance of its functions, a government to the utmost possible extent should look for and secure the consent of the governed, even when the governed are in a helpless minority.

If, then, we take this logical construction of the maxim, and then accept the maxim, we are bound to go yet further, and to say that, as a moral principle, governments should do absolutely nothing which — in some sense congenial to reason and conscience — the subject of government does not approve, or may reasonably be held to approve. To use a familiar illustration from theology and ethical philosophy, it is a known possibility of human experience that the sinner or the wrong-doer, when punished for his evil act, may as a rational and conscientious being admit that his punishment is just. This experience of the race, then, should set the limits to even the punitive action of government, and much more to all action that deals with men who are in no sense offenders. Even the punitive action of government must be of such a nature that the wrong-doer himself, if not an idiot or devoid of conscience, in his inmost soul and reason must allow that the action of government toward him is right.

Thus it would appear that the ethical and practical construction of the maxim that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is, that governments must be so constituted, must be so hedged about by limitations, and in the performance of all their functions must be so regardful of fundamental moral truths that all their acts shall receive the full assent of the reason and conscience of all subjects. This, of course, is an ideal that never

yet has been realized in human history. My contention is merely that the maxim in question expresses this ideal; or that, if it does not, the maxim itself is worthless.

If, however, we accept this as the true content of our historic maxim, a conclusion emerges which seems not to have been apprehended by everybody. At any rate it has been missed by those who have protested against coercive acts that have seemed to be necessary in the interest of the general welfare, in the interest of national cohesion, or in the interest of mankind. Over and over again, in our own history, the powers of state and national governments have been coercively applied to compel the submission of men who believed that they had as good a right to rebel against the existing governmental authority — because they had never given, or were unwilling to continue, their consent to it — as had the men of the thirteen colonies who threw off the British yoke. At the outset we compelled the submission of Indian tribes who were the rightful owners of land that we desired to possess. Rhode Island was vigorously threatened with compulsion if she did not throw in her fortunes with the other commonwealths under the Federal Constitution. It was thought no injustice that only a few of the four million persons who constituted the American population when the Constitution was adopted, were allowed to vote for representatives. The Southern states, which maintained that the Union was nothing but a federation that could be dissolved at the will of its component members, were compelled to accept the alternative interpretation of the commonwealths of the North. And now, as a result of the war with Spain, we are engaged in the attempt to compel a population of ten million souls to yield to our national authority, although they express their dissent in armed resistance.

It is a significant fact, that among those who insist that the maxim of the consent of the governed should bear a wide ethical interpretation, there is much diversity of opinion about the rightfulness of coercion in the instances that have just been named. There is little dissent from the view that, on one or another ground, the conquest of the Indian tribes

was admissible. There is fundamental disagreement about the ethical rightfulness of the coercion of the South, and almost equal diversity of opinion about the moral rightfulness of the coercion of the Filipinos.

The obvious explanation of this difference is that, while some men consistently hold the doctrine that governments should rest upon consent, others inconsistently are disposed to regard it as of limited application; or, with more show of reason, to admit that it is less fundamental than the maxim of the general welfare; since, after all, self-preservation is the first law of nature, and any more ideal ethical principle can be put in practice only when self-preservation and opportunity for the fittest in the struggle for existence have been made secure.

What, then, I desire here to point out is the true ethical import of the maxim of consent. In reality we do not need to appeal from the maxim of consent to any other principle, — like that of self-preservation, or the survival of the fittest, — in justification of a policy which strengthens or broadens civilization, or which in any part of the world displaces a lower by a higher social order. This is equivalent to saying that those who denounce the expropriation of the Indian tribes, or the coercion of Rhode Island, or the coercion of the South, or of the Philippine Islanders, are really failing to give to their maxim of consent that complete ethical interpretation which they believe they have found in it; and that those who would justify these acts by subordinating the maxim of consent to one that they regard as more fundamental, have in like manner failed to see what the maxim involves.

Accordingly, let us now raise the final and crucial question. If we seek in our maxim a deep ethical meaning, can we say that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed *at the moment when they submit to its authority?* If we patiently and conscientiously reflect upon this question, we shall undoubtedly be obliged to answer it in the negative. If I am a wrong-doer and, in the course of my evil career, am brought to bay by governmental authority,

it is highly improbable that, at the moment of my arrest and conviction, I shall freely yield the assent of my mind and will to the act of coercion which has deprived me of my liberty. And yet, when I have had time to reflect, or when, to use the theological phrase, I have undergone the conviction of sin, and have begun to realize that I have in reality been a wrong-doer, that the fault has been mine, that I myself have been the aggressor — then, however much I may dislike and regret my punishment, I shall in my reason and conscience consent thereto. I shall admit that the authority against which I have rebelled has, after all, been just. Or, to take a slightly different illustration: As a child, I may have rebelled against the authority of my father and my teachers, and have denounced their rules and their punishments as iniquitous; yet if, when I am grown and have attained the full measure of ethical consciousness, I look back upon my childhood years and, reflecting upon all their incidents, in the exercise of my own judgment decide that, after all, the government to which I was then subjected was reasonable, that it fitted me for manhood and its responsibilities, — then, obviously, I must pronounce that government just, and yield to it my rational approval. Thus it appears that, in simple cases of this sort at least, the ethical justice of government has its source, not in the consent of subjects who at the moment are unfit to understand or to appreciate it; but only in that approval which may be given or withheld after full experience of the nature, objects, and excellence of government, and after the attainment of full maturity of reason to understand and to interpret it. In like manner, if a barbarian people is compelled to accept the authority of a state more advanced in civilization, the test of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of this imposition of authority is to be found not at all in any assent or resistance at the moment when the government begins, but only *in the degree of probability* that, after full experience of what the government can do to raise the subject population to a higher plane of life, *a free and rational consent will be given* by those who have come to understand all that has been done. So, too, of the coercion of a

rebellious state: on grounds of ethical theory only, leaving aside all questions of expediency and survival of the fit, the test is found in the ultimate approval of those who have at first, against their will, been compelled to perpetuate relations which they would have dissolved. If, in later years, they see and admit that the perpetuation of the disputed relations was for their highest interest, it may reasonably be held that authority has been imposed with the consent of the governed.

This, then, is the only rational meaning that can be found in our venerable maxim. Remembering that consent is an approval by conscience and reason, and not a mere submission, it is obvious that consent can be given only when reason and conscience are brought face to face with the results of experience. Therefore, whenever the consent of the governed and the law of self-preservation, or the law by which higher civilizations supplant the lower, are brought face to face in apparent conflict, the legitimate and rightful appeal is always from any dissent of the governed now to that probable consent which, we have sufficient reason to believe, will be freely given when all the facts are clearly seen, and when the reason and conscience of the governed, fully awakened and matured, are able to look back upon their history in the light of empirical knowledge.

XVII

IMPERIALISM?

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Political events, unlike the phenomena of the physical world, can never be studied exclusively from the standpoint of descriptive and explanatory science. The ethical instinct and the ideal-creating passion will ever compel men to consider what "ought to be" in public policy, no less than to seek the causes of what has been and what is, and to study the factors that are shaping what is to be. Nevertheless, without patient investigation of causes and tendencies there can be no sound philosophy of politics; and it is an unfortunate infirmity of many noble minds that in their ambition to perfect the ethical ideals of the race they neglect the humbler task of forecasting social probabilities. They do not err in assuming that a widely shared sentiment of what "ought to be" should and will be a factor in the further evolution of public interests; for this assumption is true. Their error lies in a more or less serious failure to grapple with the larger problem of the relative importance of such factors, and consequently in a more or less complete failure to perceive what is reasonably to be expected as the actual outcome of the struggle of competing or coöperating influences, regarded as a whole.

This is unfortunate, because often it results in a waste or misdirection of the intellectual energies of the wisest men in the community. So intent are they upon their notion of what ought to be, so blind are they, at times, to what probably will be, that they give us no real aid in adapting ourselves to inevitable conditions. In battling for the impossible, long after they should see its impossibility, they leave us without guidance in making the best of circumstances as they are — in adjusting our lives to what cannot be helped.

With much reluctance, and with a painful feeling that I am opposed to men whose opinions I have long held in deep respect, I have been forced to the conclusion that a melancholy example of the mistake that I have just described has recently been afforded in the discussion of the war between the United States and Spain, and is now being afforded in the further discussion of the future policy of the United States. The attitude of nearly every conservative political thinker who has approached the subject in a philosophical temper has been that of moral opposition to the war. With few exceptions, the same thinkers are now vigorously opposing all territorial expansion, and are especially earnest in their antagonism to the retention of the Philippine Islands by the United States. The purpose of the present article is to show that this opposition, although it springs from conscientious convictions and is backed by arguments that deserve thoughtful consideration, is probably as futile as opposition to the trade wind or the storm. There are not lacking reasons for thinking that the war with Spain was as inevitable as any event of nature, and that, at this particular stage in the development of the United States, territorial expansion is as certain as the advent of spring after winter.

If these hypotheses are sound, it follows that our wise men should discontinue their idle contention against cosmic law — in the realms of mind and of history — and should address themselves to the practical question: How can the American people best adapt themselves to their new responsibilities?

These assertions must, of course, be proved. The alleged reasons must be named. It is idle to say that the war with Spain could not have been prevented, or that territorial expansion is a matter of destiny, unless there is an array of impregnable facts to support such propositions.

Why, then, should we entertain the proposition that the Spanish War was inevitable? The very men who have most vehemently declared that the war ought not to have occurred have partly answered this question: they have marshalled much proof that hostilities could not have been averted.

They have told us that the war was brought on by "jingoes" and yellow journals, aided and abetted by the combative instincts that express themselves in college athletics. For many years past, they have assured us, an uneasy element in the American population had been eager to engage in blood-letting. The peaceful pursuits of industry, professional life, and scholarship had become wearisome to men of this kind. A new excitement was necessary to give vent to their pent-up feelings. In Congress the Morgans, the Cabot Lodges, and the Forakers had clamoured for a foe. They had feared to see the American people lose its fighting qualities. They had dreaded the day when we should cease to be manly and become "supine." Our educators had feared that mere intellectual struggles would leave our youth anæmic book-worms, unfit for the serious work of practical politics. The yellow journalists, having worked the field of crime and scandal to the point of diminishing returns, had been obliged to cast about for new sensations; and what material could be found more profitable to the purveyor of extras than news of battle? All these people, we have been told, in the bottom of their hearts really wanted war — war to develop American character, war to afford an outlet to American energies and genius.

Now, an amusing side of all this is that the writers and speakers who have been telling us these things have apparently been making statements that they themselves have not quite believed. Or, at least, they have been so anxious to emphasize their disapproval or even contempt of the belligerent elements in our population, that they have failed to measure in a cold-blooded way the importance of certain facts merely as facts. They seem to have supposed that they could describe a man as bloodthirsty, and that then, without being ridiculous, they could argue that, if only the man were not bloodthirsty there need not be any fighting. In fact, it seems never to have occurred to these gentlemen that, if we *are* a nation of jingoes, bullies, and sensation lovers, it is waste of breath to talk about what might have been if we had all been reasonable, long-suffering, diplomatic, and peace-loving.

Again, these deprecators of force have assured us that, in its final outbreak, the war was merely an act of vengeance. They have said that the American people lost its senses over the destruction of the *Maine*, and made no critical inquiry to ascertain whether this disaster occurred with the connivance of the Spanish government. They have asserted that the whole nation, at white heat with excitement, took up the cry of "Remember the *Maine!*" without troubling itself with any nice questions of legal evidence or, indeed, of moral probability.

Here, again, we must notice that those who have condemned the war on this ground have been so preoccupied with moral feeling that they have failed to see the scientific significance of the fact which they allege, when looked at merely as a fact. If the American people was indeed swept off its feet by a wave of revengeful passion that submerged both reason and conscience, it is but little more profitable to discuss the occurrence in terms of the moral imperative than to talk about the wickedness of a West Indian hurricane.

In like manner, these reasoners have alleged other facts which, if they are facts, assure our territorial expansion. It seems that we are a nation of promoters, lobbyists, "boodlers," place-hunters, and Indian agents. We long ago became weary of sowing and reaping, and also of legitimate trading; we are beginning now to weary even of our protected manufactures. We must find new opportunities for making fortunes by jobs and government contracts. The reservations allotted to our unhappy red men have nearly all been appropriated by rough riders, and we naturally turn to the sunny lands and gentle savages of Hawaii and Luzon for further practice of the Christian art of exploitation. Honolulu may not be as good a field for political banking as Philadelphia has been; and Cuba does not afford unlimited opportunities for the development of Star Route postal facilities. Nevertheless, they offer something better than an honest living, earned in the sweat of one's brow. No one has so vivid a sense of the terrible rapidity with which the world is shrivelling up as those commercial sharks who "stand in" with successive administrations.

All these people, we are given to understand, are collectively the dominant power in American politics. They control Congresses and the political bosses. When times grow dull, they put forth every effort to secure some new outlet for their energies. For years they have been urging the annexation of Hawaii, and it now appears that they were guilty also of fomenting disturbances in Cuba. Doubtless they were the wicked ones who prompted Mr. Olney to write his famous message on the Venezuelan question, in the hope that we should evict Great Britain from some of her colonial possessions; and they have even been suspected of designs to build — at the public expense — a stone-ballasted railroad from the Klondike to Tierra del Fuego, in anticipation of our annexation of South America. And yet, notwithstanding this complete control of our politics and government by commercial adventurers, the philosophical observers who have discovered and described the situation profess to think that territorial expansion can be prevented by carefully reasoned demonstrations — by showing that a colonial policy is likely to undermine republican institutions, destroy the simplicity of American society, and conduct us on the downward road to that world of shadows where flit the historic ghosts of Carthage and the Roman Empire.

All this would be highly amusing if, as was said a moment ago, it were not so near the truth. For, in fact, these descriptions of the American people are caricatures rather than malicious inventions. Queer distortions as they are, the truth is yet visible in them, as were the features of Tweed and Sweeny in Thomas Nast's cartoons in the days of the great New York City ring.

The truth that underlies the caricature is simply this: the American population of seventy million or more souls is at this moment the most stupendous reservoir of seething energy to be found on any continent. Already it has accomplished marvels of material civilization, of governmental organization, of education, and even of scientific discovery. Let any reader of Mr. Wallace's "Wonderful Century," glancing again through its pages, ask himself what proportion of the achieve-

ments therein recorded are to be credited to America and Americans, and he will see a revelation compared with which the Apocalypse is tame. And yet it is practically certain that all the things that the American has done are but earnest of the things that he is to do. If in the coming centuries this reservoir of energy can discharge itself in enterprise, in investigation and discovery, it can do more for the advancement of the human race than imagination can now conceive. If, by any mistaken policy, it is denied an outlet, it may discharge itself in anarchistic, socialistic, and other destructive modes that are likely to work incalculable mischief.

This volume of human enterprise is not altogether made up of reasonableness, far-seeing wisdom, and stainless morality. It is as heterogeneous as it is vast. The millions of human beings who have come to our shores from foreign lands are not all assimilated to American standards, and their new-found liberty has not altogether ceased to be license. In those other millions who are descended from an earlier American stock, the primitive human passions have not been brought under absolute control, and the love of primitive occupations that partake of danger has not been eradicated. Let us not forget that no population on the face of the earth is so largely descended from daring adventurers. It is not yet three hundred years since the colonists of our eastern coasts were performing their daily industrial tasks under the shadow of ever-threatening danger from savage foes. It is not a hundred and fifty years since the pioneers of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys were making clearings in the wilderness during intervals of exterminating warfare. It is not yet fifty years since the later pioneers of the western plains were crossing a pathless desert, in caravans that left a trail of bleaching bones to mark a route for those who should follow them to the El Dorado of the West. Are we to suppose that the offspring of such men, in so short an interval, have lost those instincts that lead men to prefer enterprises that call for physical courage and resourcefulness? It is not true that we are a nation of jingoes. It is not true

that we desire war for the sake of war, or that in our sports we prefer methods that are adapted to inflict injury. But it is true that we are a nation endowed with exceptional courage, that we heartily despise physical cowardice and all manner of weakness. It is true that we are restless under the disappearance of opportunity for adventure and daring enterprise. It is therefore certain that, more than most nations, we are liable to an outbreak of warlike spirit under what we conceive to be real provocation; and that no other nation is so likely as ours to turn itself into great armies and to fight with an indomitable determination to conquer, when it is once convinced of the justice of its cause.

The same impulses, directed into peaceful channels, have produced the American commercial spirit. The love of risk and of great responsibilities characterizes our industrial and commercial undertakings to a degree unknown in any other country. The perfectly safe small business does not appeal to the native American mind. This may be unfortunate; but we are not now discussing merits and demerits, but only the actual facts and forces that are controlling our policy. Throughout the Eastern states, and with somewhat lesser rapidity in the West, small farming, shopkeeping, and minor manufacturing of the absolutely safe kind are falling into the hands of the immigrant population of French-Canadian, German, and Italian extraction. A few years ago the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor published an interesting investigation, showing that in New England the early factory population of American birth really had not been displaced by the Irish, French-Canadian, and Polish immigrants, but had voluntarily left the factory occupations to engage in more remunerative pursuits, calling for greater enterprise, greater personal initiative, and, withal, greater risk. No other people in the world has experimented on so costly a scale with new mechanical inventions. No other people has taken such gigantic risks of railway construction, with so little aid from the taxpayer. No other people has shown such eagerness to rebuild on a larger scale both old and new cities, displacing the three and four story office buildings of ten

years ago with modern sky-scrapers, reckless of the probability that much floor space would long remain unrented. No other people has shown so comprehensive a grasp of business possibilities in the organization of combinations and trusts. This trait of character has created also our social standards. It was through no mere whim or caprice that the aristocracy of Boston a generation ago consisted chiefly of families that had made their fortunes in the East India trade. That was the business that called for daring and range of thought, as did the military expeditions which created the earlier aristocracies of Europe. And the newer American aristocracy of to-day, which Professor Peck has entertainingly described,[1] is in reality founded on the same principle. If, among families equally well-to-do and not unequal in cultivation, some are admitted to the reigning social set, while others seem to be arbitrarily excluded, we shall usually find the explanation in the character of the business by which fortune was acquired.

Nevertheless, all this American love of adventure, struggle, and risk is astonishingly held within certain bounds. The restraining influence is the dominant Puritan spirit in our morals and religion. However much we may despise the timid man and covet the opportunities for dogged endurance and personal heroism which war offers, however much we may admire the business man who successfully achieves great combinations in the market, we do not deliberately or willingly enter upon war or upon commercial speculation unless plausible excuses can be offered to the Puritan conscience. Perhaps we are aggressive; but we do not like to be regarded as ruthlessly or indecently aggressive. We produce every year a crop of speculators and promoters whose fit habitation is the penitentiary; but the great mass of the people really abhors dishonest conduct in business; and it is more than doubtful whether, in any other nation, commercial credit rests so largely upon a secure foundation of personal integrity.

Let us now see how these truths apply to the events of the past summer. Are we to suppose that a people wholly unapt

[1] In the *Cosmopolitan*, September, 1898.

for war, and altogether loath to enter upon military enterprises, was suddenly transformed into a military nation by the mere accident of the destruction of a battleship in the harbor of Havana and by the diligence of yellow journals in reiterating a cry for vengeance? Are we to suppose that a people entirely satisfied with its present territory and commercial opportunities has, by the mere accident of a few fortunate naval engagements, been converted into a nation bent upon projects of world empire? Only those who are blind to the true character of the American people and forget or disregard innumerable events antecedent to the Spanish War can answer these questions in the affirmative. The warlike spirit existed long before the destruction of the *Maine;* and the demand for new outlets for both commercial enterprise and political ingenuity was already insistent many years before the battle of Manila Bay. More than once in the past twenty-five years the people of this country have been in a state of mind that would have resulted in a declaration of war, if only the occasion had been one that they could conscientiously regard as adequate. The war feeling was strong in 1891, when our seamen had been attacked in Valparaiso and the North Atlantic squadron was despatched to the coast of South America. Still stronger was the war feeling that arose during the years of our misunderstandings with Great Britain over the Canadian and the Behring Sea fisheries and culminated in the Venezuelan boundary trouble. It is within the personal knowledge of the writer that, less than six months ago, a prominent member of the United States Senate said, in this city, that he voiced the opinion of many of the most influential classes of the Mississippi Valley in declaring that the British Empire ought to be blotted from the map of the world! The remark was absurd; and there is no reason to suppose that the people of the Mississippi Valley entertained any such opinion. But the remark undoubtedly did reflect an angry feeling prevalent throughout the country, which might easily have grown to serious proportions. I believe that the real reason why nothing came of that anger, and why no serious results fol-

lowed the Chilean episode, was the deep underlying conscientiousness of the American people. Angry as they were, and ready as they were to fight, if fighting were necessary, they could not enter upon war without at least the semblance of moral reason. They required more than the thirst for vengeance, more than the love of adventure, more than the desire for commercial opportunity: they had to find a pretext that appealed either to their sympathies or to their sense of justice.

In like manner, a desire for the extension of commercial and political opportunities existed before the beginning of the war with Spain, and manifested itself in questionable and even dangerous forms. Let the reader glance over the files of the leading reviews and magazines from 1886 to 1896; let him dip into the books and monographs of the same decade that dealt with the group of questions centring about the Monroe doctrine; and he will discover that a strong feeling was developing throughout the interior, and in the South, in favour of a policy that should bring the United States into closer relations with the Spanish-American republics, and should ignore commercial and political relations with the rest of the world. The silver question was intimately bound up with this idea. It was said that the United States, acting with the South American governments, could establish a coinage that need have no relation whatever to the monetary systems administered from London. It was argued that we could build up on the American continent a little international world of our own, and let the effete commerce of the Eastern Hemisphere dwindle to its plainly foreseen extinction. The Bureau of American Republics was the administrative embodiment of this grotesque idea; and the free silver lunacy was nursed and coddled by it.

If the foregoing is a substantially correct description of the forces of character, temperament, idea, and passion that are working out the development of American politics, little further argument is needed to show that the war with Spain was neither accidental nor merely a product of the machinations of self-loving politicians. The Cuban situation gave

the American people the first apparently decent excuse for fighting that had been vouchsafed them since the Civil War. That the sufferings of the Cuban population were real, was beyond reasonable doubt. That the government of the island was thoroughly corrupt, no one denied. That justice had long been little more than a name was currently believed; and that years of bad government had culminated in a deliberate attempt to starve the *reconcentrados*, was believed by practically every newspaper-reading American who had no exact knowledge of political conditions beyond the borders of his own commonwealth. All those feelings of mingled sympathy and anger which precipitated the Civil War were again awakened by the sufferings of Cuba. With hardly an exception, the religious press insisted that it was the duty of America to intervene. Thus, there existed that peculiar combination of the moral forces of sympathy and conviction with the inherited love of dangerous enterprise which, as I have attempted to show, must exist before the American people will go to war, but which is practically certain, when it does exist, to beget war.

What results is the Spanish War likely to bring in its train? Are they, on the whole, likely to be advantageous to this country and to the world, or the reverse? In attempting to answer these questions, let us confine ourselves to the observation of what has been, what is, and what probably is to be, leaving the discussion of what ought to be to those who feel competent to undertake it.

For nearly a generation now, the economists and the substantial business men of the United States have earnestly desired to achieve two vitally important economic reforms.

They have striven, first and most anxiously, for the establishment by our government of a thoroughly sound monetary system, on a gold basis, in perfect accord with the monetary sytems of Great Britain, Germany, and other European nations. Almost continuously, since the unfortunate issue of the legal-tender paper currency of the Civil War, they

have been obliged to contend against the wildest popular delusions about fiat money, state banking, the free coinage of silver, and government depositories of farm products and chattels as security for loans. Whenever they have attempted to expose and destroy these delusions, they have been forced to show the intricate relations of domestic and foreign trade; and they have been met by an assertion which to the uneducated mind has seemed to have overwhelming weight — the assertion that the United States is a country big enough to have its own monetary system, no less than its own form of government and its own protected manufactures. "What have we to do with abroad?" has been at once the argument, the cant, and the silencing retort of the politician and the untrained voter. If the Spanish War has accomplished nothing else that can be pronounced good, it has apparently created a notable popular willingness to have much to do henceforth with "abroad." It has destroyed the good American's naïve conviction that he could never take any great interest in the politics or the commerce of nations over sea. It has brought home to his imagination, with overwhelming vividness, the essential nearness of America, in these days of steam and electrical communication, to the coasts of Europe and of Asia. The mere thought of conducting successful naval operations at the extreme limit of the Pacific Ocean on one side of the world, and of possibly bombarding the ports of Spain on the other, has awakened a dormant sense of geography that will never again permit the American voter to look at his domestic problems with the old-time satisfaction in our secure isolation.

In the second place, our economists and business men have grappled somewhat less earnestly, and yet seriously, with the question of our trade policy. It has long been perfectly clear to the theoretical economist, and for many years it has been evident to business men of the wider-visioned sort, that we cannot continue indefinitely to sacrifice foreign trade to domestic industry to the extent that was contemplated in the war and McKinley tariffs. That American manufactures were already, in many instances, outgrowing the home de-

mand and, like our agricultural products, needed a foreign market, was becoming daily more obvious before the recent hostilities began. And yet it was not less evident that a strong and deep-rooted popular belief in the wisdom and even necessity of high protection was still to be overcome before any great change in our trade policy could be effected. The real nature of the obstacle, however, was discovered by few of those writers and teachers who believed that, through a campaign of education, through economic teaching in the colleges, through popular discussion and statistical reasoning, the American people in the course of time could be converted to the doctrines of free trade. There is a type of free trader who may be described as a creature endowed with reason and nothing else; and many of the American free-trade teachers were of this type. Utterly lacking in imagination, despising appeals to feeling and to prejudice, they were unable to understand that the masses of mankind are influenced far more by those things that appeal to imagination than by those that can be formulated in irrefragable syllogisms. Now, it is reasonably safe to say that protectionism, in its more extreme forms at least, has held the American mind, not because of its rationality, but because it has powerfully appealed to the lively imagination and to the personal feelings of the average man. What was absolutely necessary to make the policy of trade expansion as popular as protection had been, was some circumstance or train of events to bring the possibilities of foreign commerce before the popular imagination and to associate foreign trade with feelings of a more or less dramatic quality. It was not until a similar appeal to imagination and to feeling was made in England that the repeal of the Corn Laws and the gigantic expansion of England's foreign trade became possible. There was never any good reason to suppose that a similar change could occur in the United States without a similar cause. That cause has now come into operation as a result of our brilliantly successful operations in Cuba and in the Far East. For the first time in our history, foreign trade has taken on colour and acquired dramatic interest. The average voter no

longer thinks of it in terms of Treasury statistics. It has become definitely associated in his imagination with the annexation of tropical islands, the populations of which have suddenly interested him and the resources of which are new objects of his thought; with brilliant naval victories in the waters of Manila Bay and of Santiago; with the relation of the Philippine Islands to the rest of the Far East; to the destinies of China and to the limitless possibilities of commercial enterprise that attend the awakening of the Orient. Never again will the protectionist be able to address the same kind of an American mind as in the past. Never again will he be able to pass off his highly coloured pictures of prosperity under a McKinley tariff against a mere array of carefully constructed arguments directed upon him by the free trader. In coming days he must address himself to minds already filled with visions of dramatic complications with foreign powers, and of a prosperity based upon colonial possessions.

The same psychological considerations apply to the question whether we shall retain the Philippine Islands, or merely attempt to dictate their trade policy after they are restored to Spain or allowed to pass into the hands of some other European power. It may be asked: Will not the fact that by conquest and occupation we have already made ourselves familiar with their commercial value, be a sufficient stimulus to our trade with them, if only we insist that their ports shall not be closed to us or opened on better terms to other nations? Have not our statisticians and commercial journals shown that our trade with China is great already, and increasing; and will it not be all-sufficient if we join with Great Britain in her demand for the open door? Unquestionably the open door is all that we really need for the further development of our Oriental trade. But exactly here lies the difficulty; and here is the danger, so far as our economic interests are concerned, of throwing away our present opportunity to perpetuate our sovereignty in the Eastern Archipelago. It is one thing to say that we *can* take a firm stand upon the question of the freest commercial opportunities in

the East, and another thing, possibly, to take the stand and to maintain it. In these matters, nations are like individuals. Their policies are determined, not by syllogisms, but by concrete facts. The demand for liberal trade opportunities in the East will not be respected by China and her great overlord, Russia, merely because we are able to show how valuable such privileges have been and may become to them and to ourselves. They will think of us as our protectionists have thought of them and of Europe — as a people afar off; and they will yield a more attentive ear to powers that, in delusive perspective, seem to be more important because they are nearer. All history points to the conclusion that in no way can we make our demand for greater trade facilities in the East so effective as by maintaining our sovereignty over some territory, however small, in that quarter of the world. If we have possessions there, if we have difficulties and responsibilities to meet there, our own attention will not be withdrawn from the opportunities there offered; and the Oriental powers will not themselves forget our existence and our resources. In short, unless we are prepared to see the Oriental trade that we now enjoy slip out of our hands, and unless we are oblivious to the possibilities of its increase, we probably must retain possession of some territory in the Western Pacific. Possession of the Philippine Islands will afford us the exact sort of reason, or the exact kind of excuse, that will appeal to the Oriental mind and to the European powers, when we are forced to protest against any policy of exclusiveness in that quarter of the world.

These psychological considerations apply also to our place and part in another vast economic development, in which our possession of Puerto Rico, our possible annexation at some later time of Cuba, our already accomplished annexation of Hawaii, and our possible retention of the Philippine Islands give us a new and wider interest. This is the development of the economic possibilities of the tropics. Those who have not read the recently published monograph by Mr. Benjamin Kidd, on "The Control of the Tropics," have missed the most

significant contribution to political economy, in the wide sense of the word, that has recently been made. Mr. Kidd marshals an array of figures which, although for years past perfectly accessible to the general reader and familiar to many students of trade reports, had failed to tell their full story until this writer took them in hand. He shows that of Great Britain's foreign commerce, amounting in 1896 to £738,000,000, no less than £138,000,000 was an exchange between the United Kingdom and tropical regions; and that the proportion of tropical trade is steadily increasing. In the foreign commerce of the United States, amounting in 1895 to $1,538,000,000, no less than $346,000,000 was a trade in tropical commodities. Yet, great as it is already, the product of the tropics is insignificant in comparison with what it may become under the more intelligent direction of the white races. It has been abundantly demonstrated, however, that the white races can never colonize the strictly tropical portions of the world; and if the vast possibilities of the torrid zone are to be developed for the benefit of mankind, one of two alternative policies must boldly and definitely be chosen. Either the tropics must be held by northern nations as plantations, to be exploited remorselessly in the old-fashioned way for the benefit of their owners, without regard to the well-being of their native populations; or they must be held as territorial possessions, to be governed firmly, in the interest both of the world at large and of their own native inhabitants, by administrative agents appointed and directed by the home governments of the northern nations. In the latter case, the white officials will be appointed for such terms as may be found expedient, in view of the strain that tropical life imposes upon the white man's constitution. Mr. Kidd makes an argument, convincing to any reasonable mind, that the second of these policies is the one which the conscience and the judgment of the English-speaking race will ultimately approve and adopt. The task of governing from a distance the inferior races of mankind will be one of great difficulty — one that will tax every resource of intellect and character; but it is one that must be faced and overcome,

if the civilized world is not to abandon all hope of continuing its economic conquest of the natural resources of the globe. Is it extravagant to say that the English-speaking people will not be discouraged by the difficulty, and that it will regard as preposterous any suggestion to turn aside from the natural course of economic evolution? Is it not a foregone conclusion that the United States, having at length been brought, as England many years ago was brought, face to face with this problem in its practical form, will make precisely the choice that England made; and that it will resolutely give its attention to the task of doing its share in that attempt to bring tropical regions under efficient government and a sound industrial organization, which is the only ultimate possibility to be thought of by humane and far-seeing men?

I have indicated the chief economic advantages that we may reasonably hope to achieve in consequence of our war with Spain. Of another benefit which apparently we are to reap — that, namely, of a good understanding and friendly alliance with Great Britain — I need not speak. Among the bitterest opponents of all that has been done, none is found who does not rejoice that at last we recognize our kinsmen over sea as our brethren and as our co-workers in the tasks of civilization.

Are we, then, to close our eyes to that other side of the picture which has been so clearly drawn by conservative writers, who have pointed out the grave political dangers that our republic may incur if we enter upon a policy of territorial expansion? Is it not more than possible that the economic advantages which have here been suggested, and even the good understanding with Great Britain, for which every true American is profoundly thankful, may be bought at too dear a price? Assuredly, no sane man will deny that this may indeed prove to be the case. It would be childish to ignore the great probability that for many years to come the government of any island territories that we may annex will be corrupt, and perhaps even more scandalous than anything that we have hitherto known within our present

boundaries. We cannot expect that civil-service reformers will be permitted to dictate appointments, or that pure statesmanship will frame legislation and administrative policies. Indeed, there is every reason to expect that political adventurers of the most disreputable sort will find such opportunities as they have not enjoyed since the days of Reconstruction in the South. Corruption and scandals, then, we may expect; but is this all that we may look for?

It is a commonplace of popular philosophy and a sound principle of statecraft that responsibility is a powerful moralizing influence, and that it often develops the highest qualities of character in men of whom little but evil has been anticipated. Some of the best administrations that our country has enjoyed have been conducted by men who, before their assumption of the high duties of the presidential office, were known only as machine politicians of the baser sort. Outlying possessions will compel us, as nothing hitherto has done, to respect the opinions, the manners, and the interests of other nations. They will continually involve us in complications from which we can hope to emerge unscathed only by the utmost exercise of tact and knowledge. They will enforce the steady improvement of our diplomatic and consular service. During the last six months the affairs of our Department of State have been conducted by men who would not for a moment have been thought of for such services had not imperative necessity compelled the administration to resort to expert knowledge. Is it, then, fanciful to assume that our new possessions will, in the long run, effectively demand appointments of the same high character? Not all this beneficial reaction of political contact with the larger world will be accomplished immediately, or even in a generation. Moral evolution and the perfecting of government are slow processes; but they are always to be expected under the continuing pressure of necessity. Nations, like individuals, improve both their morals and their manners when they have no alternative.

Therefore, so far from despairing of the republic, if we enter into more complicated and more delicate relations to

world politics, we may rather anticipate that the change will prove to be precisely what was needed, and that our new responsibilities will operate more surely and more continuously than any other influences to improve the morale and the wisdom of American administration. In this belief we are supported by the experience of British colonial government. As every student of history knows, the age of Walpole was marked by corruption greater and apparently more irremediable than any which we have yet known in American political life. Who could have predicted that, after a century of continuous territorial expansion, with a correspondingly rapid multiplication of official positions, the administrative side of British government, instead of becoming hopelessly incapable under the increasing strain, would have become the purest and most nearly perfect mechanism thus far known in political history? Have we, then, any right to despair of our own experiment, under a similar broadening of opportunities and responsibilities? If we have, our estimate of American character must be a sorry one. Great Britain successfully administers the governmental affairs and protects the economic interests of populations numbering 381,037,874 souls, occupying a territory of 11,335,806 square miles. The islands that have recently been annexed, and those that may soon be annexed to the territory of the United States, are 167,753 square miles in extent and are inhabited by about 10,000,000 people. If the republican form of government is to be undermined and destroyed in a nation of 70,000,000 of the most resourceful, energetic, and, all in all, conscientious human beings that have yet lived upon this planet, under the strain of devising and administering a workable territorial government for outlying island possessions of such modest dimensions as these, it would appear that our estimate of the excellence and stability of republican institutions must have been a grotesque exaggeration.

And now there remains one further consideration, before completing this rapid and necessarily superficial survey of the forces and circumstances that are bearing the American people into a new and momentous stage of their political

evolution. Republican institutions may be destroyed by internal corruption or overwhelmed by external force. This latter danger has never been a real one for the American people; because, during our century of political experiment, world politics have been dominated by a power which, notwithstanding the disobedience of our early years and the cantankerous spirit of our adolescence, has ever regarded us with a certain parental pride and has ever wished us well. Very different might have been our fate had world politics during these one hundred years been dominated by an empire of the Napoleonic type. Let us then soberly ask ourselves whether we have any substantial assurance that the time has gone by when political absolutism may again have the ascendency in international relations? So securely have we dwelt in our Western isolation that we have almost ceased to think of absolutism as a modern force, or to regard it as anything but a singular survival of antiquity, as powerless and as picturesque as the ruin of an ancient fortress. From this security we may rudely be awakened. Of late it has dawned upon a few outreaching minds that the one formidable competitor of the liberty-loving, English-speaking people of the world is that gigantic nation of the North, whose political organization is still absolutely autocratic and whose teeming millions of inhabitants are, for the most part, a superstitious, ignorant multitude, who bow to authority with unquestioning submission. The rapidity with which that nation is extending its territorial possessions and influence indicates that its statesmen are restrained by no such fears of the inherent weakness of empire as have recently been voiced within the United States. Little by little it is tightening its grasp upon the peoples of Eastern Asia; and its purpose stands clearly revealed to extend its sovereignty and its political organization throughout at least a great part of China. Can any one look forward to the consolidation of a Russian-Chinese empire without serious misgivings as to the future of those things that we are accustomed to regard as the essentials of civilization? Certain it is that a gigantic struggle impends between that empire and the power from

which we have derived our own civilization and institutions, and which to-day is our truest friend and strongest ally. In the broad sense, there is from henceforth but one real political question before mankind. That question is: Are world politics to be dominated by English-speaking people in the interest of an English civilization, with its principles of freedom, self-government, and opportunity for all; or by the Russian-Chinese combination, with its policy of exclusiveness and its tradition of irresponsible authority? Let us not deceive ourselves with any notion that we can safely stand apart from this conflict. If we pursue a course so selfish and short-sighted, the probabilities are that both Great Britain and the United States will lose commercial opportunities, will sink to positions of secondary influence, and will presently find themselves obliged to conform in all their policies to a power that will dominate international relations as remorselessly as did Cæsar or Napoleon. If, on the contrary, we throw our energies into the struggle in alliance with Great Britain, we need have little fear that another thousand years of mediæval night will fall upon the Western world.

Opportunity is ours to determine the fate of more nations than one. In the closing days of June in the year 451, on the plain of Châlons-sur-Marne, was fought the most murderous battle that has occurred within the Christian era. An army of 700,000 Huns from Central Asia, apparently about to take possession of the European coasts and forever to extinguish the Latin civilization and the Christian faith, was there opposed by the united forces of Aëtius and Theodoric; and the struggle was to the death. Legendary history says that 160,000 warriors were left dead upon the field. The remnant of Attila's horde made its way back through Italy, and at length to its Asian home. On the first morning of May in the year now passing into history, on the other side of the world, under a tropical sun, in the waters of Manila Bay, was fought the most nearly bloodless battle of any importance within the Christian era. Without loss of American life, a fleet of second-class, but efficient vessels

overwhelmed the Spanish naval forces of the Pacific. But was that all? The victory of Châlons forever turned back the hordes of Asian barbarism from their westward advance. Were they stopped in their eastward advance by the guns of Admiral Dewey's fleet? It is for the people of the United States to say.

XVIII

THE SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIBERTY

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RECENT events have raised the question of the stability of American institutions. The war with Spain was bitterly deplored by many educated men, who feared that military activity would necessarily create arbitrary power and curtail the liberties of individual citizens. When our demand for the cession of the Philippine Islands was included in the terms of peace, and the treaty of Paris was followed by the despatch of troops to Manila to put down insurrection, these opponents of the nation's policy, believing that their worst fears were being realized, asserted that the American people, intoxicated with military success, were blindly departing from all the safe traditions of their history to enter upon a hazardous and probably fatal experiment of imperialism. The arguments of these men have disquieted many timid souls, some of whom seem to be already convinced that our republic is verily a thing of history,— one more splendid failure added to the long list of glorious, but tragic attempts of earth's bravest sons to build an enduring state upon foundations of equality and self-government. Indeed, so despondent have some of our self-styled anti-imperialists become that, in their bitterness, they do not hesitate to malign the character of their fellow-citizens, or to insult the fair fame of the nation that has nurtured and that still defends them. In one lamentable instance, a citizen of honoured name has so far lost all sense of reality as to declare in a public address that "we are a great assassin nation," and that "the slaughter of patriots stains our hands."

And yet, these proclamations of doom have failed to arouse the nation. Some seventy millions of people continue their daily vocations in serenity of mind, wholly unconscious of

the impending extinction of their liberties. Does this mean that the plain people, the bone and sinew of the nation, who hitherto have shown themselves intelligent enough to deal wisely and fearlessly with the gravest issues of human welfare are, after all, amazingly obtuse? Does it mean that, after a hundred years of level-headed self-government, the American people are now blindly moving toward a ruin which clear-sighted men should plainly foresee? Or, does it rather mean that these millions of plain people, with all their mental limitations, are still, as so often they have been in the past, immeasurably wiser — that they are gifted with a deeper insight, that they are endowed with a truer knowledge and a saner judgment, and that they are fortified with a sturdier faith — than are the prophets of gloom? That the latter is the true explanation I have not the shadow of a doubt, and for a brief hour I ask your attention to reasons in support of this belief.

And first of all, we have the undeniable fact that the faith itself which the American people feel in their own power, in the stability of their institutions, and in the nobility of their destiny, is at the present moment unbounded. Whatever the pessimists may say, the millions of hard-working, common people do not believe that republican government has failed, or that civil liberty is not to be the heritage of their sons. Never since the Constitution was ratified by the thirteen original commonwealths have the American people, as a whole, felt so confident of their place among the nations, or so sure of the excellence of their polity, and of the vitality of their laws and immunities. Never have they been so profoundly convinced that their greatest work for civilization lies not in the past, but in the future. They stand at the beginning of the twentieth century, in their own minds fully assured that the responsibilities which they are about to face, and that the achievements which they expect to complete, are immeasurably greater than are those which have crowned the century of their experiment and discipline.

What, then, are the sources of this faith? Is it a baseless enthusiasm, a thoughtless confidence born of an ignorant

conceit, or is it in reality a substantial and truthful forecast of the future, which we may safely accept, as one that is neither more nor less than a projection into coming years of those lessons that experience has taught us in the past?

The sources of all genuine faith in the future are two. The first is vitality. The second is our knowledge of what already is or has been.

The consciousness of vigorous life, the sense of physical power, imparts to those who have it an unconquerable faith in their ability to achieve; and this mere vitality is undoubtedly the primal source of the American's faith in himself and in the destiny of his country. It is also our best assurance that the faith will find realization. In no other population is there such abounding energy, such inventive ability, such fearless enterprise as in the American people. This vitality has been manifested not only in our industrial enterprise, but also in that very territorial expansion which of late has been under discussion. From the Louisiana purchase to the annexation of Hawaii we have seized, with unhesitating promptness, every opportunity to broaden our national domain and to extend our institutions to annexed populations. Even more convincingly has our vigour been shown in the fearlessness with which the cost of every new responsibility has been met. Whether this cost has been paid in treasure or in blood, the American people has met it without one moment's hesitation. Physical courage is, after all, the elemental factor in a nation's power, the very fountain-head of its moral stability and its faith ; and that in such courage we are not lacking, the records of Lexington and Yorktown, of New Orleans and Chapultepec, of Antietam and Gettysburg, of Manila and El Caney, will tell.

Next to vitality, and supplementing it, the basis of faith in the future is a sound, full knowledge of the present and the past. The American people know facts about their own numbers, resources, and activities, which fully justify their belief that they are at the beginning, not approaching the end, of their evolution as a civilized nation. Only in a few spots within our national domain does the

density of population yet approach the average density of the older European countries. Notwithstanding the rapidity with which the best lands of the interior and of the South-west have been appropriated as homesteads, the intensive cultivation of our vast domain has hardly begun. While, according to the census of 1890, the states constituting the north Atlantic division had a population of 107 to the square mile, the United States as a whole had less than 22 to the square mile. The western division had less than 3 to the square mile; the great north central division, comprising some of the most prosperous commonwealths in the Union, had less than 30; and the south Atlantic division, comprising the old slave-owning and cotton-growing states, had less than 33. A population of 300,000,000, instead of 75,000,000, or 80,000,000, would not seriously tax our food-producing capacity.

Into this domain the population of Europe continues to discharge its overflow; and the stream of immigration shows no marked decrease save in the exceptional years of industrial depression. Of chief significance, however, is the fact that the greater part of all the immigration that we have thus far received has consisted of the same nationalities from whose amalgamation the original American stock was produced. England, Ireland, Germany, and Scandinavia have sent to our shores the greater part of our population not descended from the American colonists. Of the foreign-born population enumerated in the United States in 1890, 33.76 per cent were from the United Kingdom, 30.11 per cent were from Germany, 10.61 per cent from Canada, 10.09 per cent from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, 1.22 per cent from France, leaving only 14.21 per cent from all other countries. The total immigration to the United States from 1821 to the 30th of June, 1898, was 18,490,368, and of this total much more than two-thirds came from the United Kingdom and the Germanic countries. When we remember that it was the crossing of the Germanic and the Celtic stocks that produced the English race itself, we are obliged to assume that the future American people will be substantially the same human

stuff that created the English common law, founded parliamentary institutions, established American self-government, and framed the Constitution of the United States.

All our knowledge of social evolution compels us to believe that a nation which has not yet begun to reach the limit of its resources and which is thus still receiving great additions to its population by an immigration of elements that, for the most part, are readily assimilated to the older stock, is one which, if no overwhelming catastrophe prevents, must continue for numberless generations to maintain and to perfect its civilization.

Nevertheless, it may be said, the institutions of civil liberty presuppose something more than a vigorous and growing population that has an unbounded faith in its own abilities and destinies. Great peoples have given themselves over to policies — not to say to crazes — that have resulted in the destruction of their primitive liberties and in the complete transformation of their institutions. An energetic people may devote itself to the production of wealth or to military achievements, and neglect the less alluring task of perfecting and protecting individual rights. Rome conquered the world, but at the cost of her republican simplicity. Florence and Venice achieved wealth and splendour, but bowed to despotism. France overran Europe with her armies, and then enthroned her own military dictator.

These lessons of history are often recalled, and their application to American conditions has often been attempted. I think it is high time to protest that, in scientific strictness, these lessons do not apply to ourselves in any important particular. The historian by this time should understand the truth (which the students of physical science in our generation have so completely mastered) that like antecedents have like consequents *when all conditions remain unchanged*, but that, when all conditions are changed, like antecedents, with unerring certainty, are followed by *unlike* consequents. Very slightly, indeed, do the conditions of American life to-day reproduce the conditions of Roman, Florentine, Venetian, or Parisian history.

The overwhelming difference is this: In the earlier days, republican institutions were cherished only here and there in exceptional communities, and they were threatened on every hand by the hosts of military despotism; to-day they are rooted in unnumbered communities, which only now and then are diverted by war from the normal pursuits of peace.

Rome, in the days of her republican freedom, was a single local community practically isolated from any similar social organization. Such was the situation also of each of the Italian republics and of Paris after the Revolution; for, outside of Paris, France was not yet republican. To undermine in a single isolated town or city any given form of government and to substitute for it something totally different, has never been a difficult undertaking. But to offset this fact we have the equally important truth — one of the most important that historical sociology discloses — that nothing is more difficult than to destroy institutions and customs that are rooted in more than one spot, if they admit of being carried from one place to another. The Roman Republic was destroyed, but not the Roman law, which lives to-day and is applied to the interests of millions more of human beings than in the days of Julius Cæsar. The Roman Empire was overthrown, but not the Roman system of provincial administration, which to this hour, in its essential features, is preserved in the municipal and departmental governments of every European state.

Bearing these truths in mind, let us look at the conditions presented by the United States. Instead of being a single city-state, organized on republican lines, practically isolated from any similar community, and, therefore, defenceless against any influence powerfully tending to undermine or to destroy it, the United States is a strongly organized aggregate of thousands of local republics, each one of which, practically independent in its home affairs, preserves all the traditions of English civil liberty, of democratic custom, and of American constitutional order.

It is true that not all of these self-governing local communities enjoy that perfect form of democratic administration which was developed in the New England town; but whether

as towns, counties, or parishes, as incorporated villages, boroughs, or municipalities, practically all the subdivisions of the American commonwealths are self-governing bodies of one type or another. They make ordinances and elect magistrates, they raise and expend revenues. It is true that important modifications of local government are now taking place throughout the nation. The concentration of wealth and of population in the larger cities, the long-continued depression of agriculture, and the consequent abandonment of farming by large numbers of country-bred youth, are bringing about a certain readjustment of functions between state and township administration. It is easy for the state to raise money, increasingly difficult for the rural town. Consequently, we see a disposition to throw upon the state governments a part of the burden of maintaining roads and bridges, of supporting schools, and of caring for the insane and other defective persons. With this transfer of financial responsibility, goes, of course, a transfer of administrative regulation. To this extent, it must be admitted, we are witnessing a certain decay of that local self-government which hitherto has been most immediately bound up with the daily lives and lesser interests of the people. And even in the cities the abuses of popular power have, in some instances, led to a transfer of authority from municipal to state governments; as, for example, in cities like Boston, which no longer elect or through their mayors appoint their police commissions, but accept them at the hands of the governor of the commonwealth. Yet, notwithstanding these facts, it is certain that throughout the national domain the lesser local governments still have great vitality, and that no modification of our administrative machinery is likely to strip them altogether of their functions. Far more probable is it, that the limit of addition to the duties of our commonwealth governments will soon be reached. Certain functions which in the past have been performed by townships and counties, or by municipalities, may be given over to the states because they pertain to matters in which all the people of the commonwealth are directly interested, but

other matters of purely local interest will be left even more entirely than now to the local administrative organs. States may maintain the more important roads and bridges, but not the lesser ones. They will care for the insane, but probably not for the ordinary poor. They will support some of the higher institutions of learning, but not, to any great extent, the common schools.

Local administration, however, is not the only or, perhaps, the most important means through which the traditions of civil liberty are maintained in our American Republic. Of the greatest educational influence are the local courts and their procedure. So long as every boy is bound to learn, not through books, but through the events that happen year by year in his own township or county, the fundamental traditions of the common law, the immunity from arrest without a warrant, the personal responsibility of the officer of the law, the right of bail and of trial by jury, the right of free speech and of public meeting, there is little danger that the American people will submit tamely to any arbitrary attempt of a central government to abridge these liberties.

If these things are true, then it is further true that from the traditions and existing habits of any one of these thousands of self-governing local communities, together composing the United States of America, could be reproduced the entire fabric of American polity, if in every other one the entire constitutional system were suddenly destroyed. This is a fact unique in the history of civil liberty. It is a guarantee of the perpetuity of our institutions, so tremendous that only the blindest of pessimists can fail to appreciate its significance. Remembering that, as was said before, a form of law or type of institution, or even a custom, once rooted in more than one place on the earth's surface, is practically indestructible, since if destroyed in one it can always be reproduced from another, it is impossible to believe that any modification of our governmental system, whether by territorial expansion or by military activity, whether by the growth of trusts or by any other phenomenon of the pursuit of wealth, can ever, throughout the length and breadth of

our vast domain, destroy in all these thousands of local communities the instincts, the habits, and the institutions of Anglo-Saxon civil liberty.

Not only will this civil liberty be preserved, but it will also be developed. The heritage of a nation which, historically speaking, is yet in its most vigorous youth, with generations of active effort for the perfection of civilization yet before it, civil liberty will not be worshipped with passive idolatry, but, continually thought about, worked over, and enlarged by a reflective people of abounding vitality and limitless faith in their own destiny, it will be brought to a perfection of justice, of discrimination, of fairness to all men such as has not yet been achieved under any human government.

To a great extent the task of all government — through its legislation, its interpretation of law, and its administrative activity — is to reconcile equality with liberty. Most of the restraints upon liberty are in the interest of that measure of equality which experience has shown to be necessary to social stability, and which the conscience of mankind declares to be right. The reconciliation, however, is not an easy thing to accomplish, and all systems of law and policy remain imperfect.

The equality to which we here refer, and with which public policy has to do, is not an equality of bodily powers, of mental abilities, or of moral attainments. In these matters men are not and, while biological evolution continues, cannot be equal. Only those writers who are willing to misrepresent their opponents ever attribute to the founders of the republic the absurd notion that in these personal attributes men are born equal and free. The equality which the state should create and cherish is that social condition which prevails when a just government restrains those who, being powerful, are also unscrupulous, from taking any unfair advantage of the weak, and when no artificial distinctions, privileges, or monopolies are created by the state itself to aggrandize the few by the impoverishment of the many. To permit the intelligent and the strong to profit by their superiority, so long as they derive their gain from the bounty of nature, and not from the enslavement or robbery of their brethren, is one

thing ; to permit or to encourage them to use their superiority at the expense of their fellows is a totally different thing; and it is the latter which is opposed by the notion of equality as a principle of civil government.

This notion, however, is of slow growth in the minds of men, and of slower application to the concrete facts of legal procedure, political status, property, trade, taxation, and the employment of labour. From the earliest days we in America have proclaimed the principle of equality before the law. All men, we say, in natural justice have, and in the courts must secure, substantially equal rights. Yet we have not always in practice faithfully adhered to this high standard. The poor man has not always had the same treatment as the rich man, at the bar of justice. Juries have been bribed, and so occasionally have been prosecuting attorneys and even judges. On the whole, however, our record in these matters has probably been higher than that of any preceding civilization in all human history; and it is certain that the moral forces of the nation are conspiring to make it yet more satisfactory in coming years.

Political equality was not an original principle of American government. Of the adult male citizens comprised within the population of less than four million souls dwelling in the United States a century ago, not one half enjoyed the political suffrage. A majority were disqualified by lack of property or of education. The approach to universal suffrage has been very gradually made by the abolition of the earlier restrictions, until now, in many of the commonwealths, voters need not even pay a poll-tax.

Political equality in the long run means an attempt to set limits to those inequalities of economic condition which rapidly grow up in a prosperous state if the rights of private property are unconditionally extended to all the requisites of production, and if no restraints are placed upon the methods of business competition or of trade combination. It is this question of the relation of the state to economic inequality which is by far the most perplexing one to the conscience and the judgment of the patriotic citizen. One immensely

important restriction of liberty in the interest of equality was made at the foundation of our government, largely through the sagacity and fearlessness of Thomas Jefferson, who did not hesitate to antagonize the land-owning aristocracy of Virginia, to which he himself belonged. This was the prohibition of primogeniture and entail. Thanks to this wise restriction, the vast estates that under our present laws may be built up in America can be continued in the same families through successive generations only if their owners have the business ability to use them productively.

To what extent we shall further limit the freedom of bequest and the right of private accumulation, no statesman or economist has at this moment the prescience to foretell. We only know that thousands of thoughtful and conscientious men are asking the question whether the withdrawing of some portion of the land and productive capital of the nation from private ownership — as has been done in Australia and New Zealand — may not ultimately be demanded by natural justice and a due consideration for the highest social welfare. We know that experiments in the redistribution of taxation, with the avowed purpose of placing a larger share of public burdens upon the owners of great wealth, are not likely to cease for many years to come. At the same time, we may repose great confidence in both the Puritan conscience and the Yankee common sense of the American people. Whatever the difficulties of the undertaking, we may expect them to find a practical method for limiting the undue growth of economic inequality without discouraging business enterprise or destroying our prosperity.

The same good sense and sound morality may be expected to solve also the problems arising out of the conflicts of individual liberty with natural justice in our business methods. Legislatures and courts have for many years been earnestly endeavouring to maintain the old common-law rule against combinations in restraint of trade; but just how morality and business expediency are to be identified in practice, we do not yet clearly see. Certain it is that at the present moment the conscience of the people is far in advance of the positive law.

The law as yet provides no way to punish a combination that deliberately crushes a legitimate business, not by permanently lowering prices for the benefit of consumers, but by a temporary cut which is not to be maintained after the rival is destroyed. Such conduct is not yet a crime, but an unsophisticated conscience pronounces it blameworthy, from a moral point of view as wrong as were the cattle-raiding and castle-burning exploits of mediæval barons, or as any act of wanton conquest. By one or another means it will ultimately be made impossible in a nation that values honourable dealing above gold.

As among educated men there are some who distrust the vital instincts of the people and the popular sense of justice, so also are there some who deplore the popular demand for equality. Blinded by a culture that is at once too sensitive and too narrow in its sympathies, these men would persuade us that only through the growth of economic inequality can we create a splendid art, develop a profound philosophy, and attain elegance of manners. To all such I would commend the thoughtful conclusions of that most cultivated, most reasonable of modern critics, Mr. Matthew Arnold, whose essays on "Democracy" and "Equality" are, perhaps, the sanest reflections on these great themes that our age has produced. It is not equality, it is rather the unchecked growth of a monstrous inequality that, as Arnold shows, ultimately destroys all fresh enthusiasms, all spontaneous sweetness, all brightness in social intercourse, and that brutalizes the selfish rich no less than the burdened poor. "Can it be denied," he asks, "that a certain approach to equality, at any rate a certain reduction of signal inequalities, is a natural, instinctive demand of that impulse which drives society as a whole — no longer individuals and limited classes only, but the mass of a community — to develop itself with the utmost possible fullness and freedom? Can it be denied, that to live in a society of equals tends in general to make a man's spirits expand, and his faculties work easily and actively; while, to live in a society of superiors, although it may occasionally be very good discipline, yet in general tends to tame the spirits and to

make the play of the faculties less secure and active? Can it be denied, that to be heavily overshadowed, to be profoundly insignificant, has, on the whole, a depressing and benumbing effect on the character?" And of the common people in France he truly says, that the economic equality which was created among them by the Revolution and the "Code Napoleon" has undoubtedly given to the lower classes "a self-respect and an enlargement of spirit, a consciousness of counting for something in their country's action, which has raised them in the scale of humanity." "The common people, in France," he continues, "seem to me the soundest part of the French nation. They seem to me more free from the two opposite degradations of multitudes, brutality and servility, to have a more developed human life, more of what distinguishes elsewhere the cultured classes from the vulgar, than the common people in any other country with which I am acquainted."

That this view of the relation of equality to the highest civilization prevails among the American people, as among the people of France, I presume no one will seriously question. At the same time, the American is more assertive, more self-reliant, more intolerant of any unnecessary limitation of his personal liberty than is the man of Gallic blood. The American is at bottom a Saxon-Norman. After all it is the blood of the old untamable pirates that courses through his veins. Consequently, he will continue to struggle with this practical problem of the conciliation of liberty with equality. This problem will continue to furnish the fundamental questions of his politics; and he will gradually solve it, not by the elaboration of an abstract theory, but by a practical dealing with concrete cases as they arise. Just as our law is developed largely through the evolution of equity, wherein a larger and sounder justice is made to override precedents and technicalities that have ceased to be a true expression of living conditions, so shall our politics also develop through the evolution of a larger equity, which, passing the bounds of the equity known to lawyers and the courts, shall be nothing less than a fundamental policy, expressive of the best conscience and judgment of the nation.

The great task, then, which I foresee for the American people in the coming centuries, and which I believe is to be its supreme contribution to civilization, is the creation of this larger equity, and its perfect expression and guarantee in the institutions of civil liberty. It is to be the task of the American people, rather than of any other nation, because in no other nation are combined so many of the forces and conditions necessary for its perfect achievement. No other great nation is still so young, so vigorous, in possession of so exhaustless a fund of energy for great undertakings. In no other nation are the people in reality so democratic. In no other is the sense of equality in reality so strong. In no other is the individual so assertive, so little likely to surrender his privilege of free initiative, and to make himself a mere creature of the state. But chiefly is this task committed to America because in no other people is so strongly developed that spirit of helpfulness, of human brotherhood, which alone will suffice to make the reconciliation of equality with liberty complete and lasting. As yet no other nation in the world has shown this spirit in such practical and costly forms — no other has made such sacrifices to emancipate the slave, to give education to the poorest and the humblest, to carry the elements of civilization through home and foreign missions to the unenlightened of every land. This spirit, together with the other forces and conditions that I have named, will, in the coming years, find a practical solution of the difficult problem of the right relation of equality and liberty, and will thereby establish a relatively perfect equity.

There is, however, a proviso, a condition. All this will happen, provided the American population, with its abounding vitality, its faith in its own powers, and its heritage of liberal traditions dispersed throughout a wide domain, is composed of individual men of the right moral type. Any failure of character, any breaking away from the highest ideals of manhood, could easily result in the destruction of all our hopes.

And here we are brought to a consideration of the relation of our educational institutions to the future of the American nation, and to the survival of civil liberty.

The duty of schools and colleges cannot be told in a word. They must impart knowledge, they must quicken the love of truth, they must foster scientific research, they must discipline character. But none of these is the supreme obligation. The highest duty of any institution of learning is to present to all its students a noble ideal of manhood and womanhood, and through all the ways of discipline to strive unceasingly to mould them to its perfect image. Never should any student find it possible to pass from the quiet nurture of his college life into the storm and stress of the outer world, without taking with him a distinct notion of what sort of man, merely as a man, apart from all his attainments, the college graduate should be; a notion that he can never efface, even though, through any evil disposition, he should wish to do so; a notion that forever will force itself upon his attention, compelling him through all the years of his life to measure what he is by that image of what he ought to be.

Not, indeed, in all the endless marvel of detail can the ideal of character be drawn. By each human being for himself must the detail be filled in. But in general outlines we can sketch the type of perfect manhood that we ought to require of ourselves and of our fellow-men.

The perfect citizen demanded by our own age and by our own nation can be characterized in a single phrase. The American who is worthy to be so called, the patriot on whom his country may depend in any hour of peril, the voter who will neither take the scoundrel's bribe nor follow the lead of any fool, — he is exactly and fully described when we say that he is a rationally conscientious man.

For such a man is, first of all, everything for which the word "man" stands in its truest emphasis. He is virile, a personal force, an organism overflowing with splendid power, alert, fearless, able to carry to perfect fulfilment any undertaking to which he may put his hand. Moreover, he is independent, preserving in his disposition and habits the best traditions of a pioneer manhood, of those Americans of an earlier time who asked little and did much, who made homes and careers for themselves. He demands not too much of

society or of his government. He does not expect to be provided for. He does not ask what ready-made places in the government service or elsewhere he may slip into, to enjoy through life with little bother or anxiety. Rather does he explore, invent, and create opportunities for himself and for others. It is a melancholy thing when numbers of educated men go looking for "jobs," or stand waiting for opportunities to drift their way. The educated man has already had opportunity, and the world rightly expects him to show powers of initiative and leadership. He has no right to be a mere imitator of others; and when he is content to be such, there is something radically wrong either with him or with the college that has trained him.

In the second place, the true American is a conscientious man. He feels as a vital truth — and does not merely say as cant — that no one liveth to himself. When he has provided for his own, he does not think that he has accomplished the whole duty of man. He remembers that, although he has demanded little of society, he has in reality received much. Education, legal protection, the unnumbered benefits flowing from the inventions, the sacrifices, and the patriotism of past generations, he has shared. These benefactions he wishes to repay, and he realizes that most of them he must pay for through the activities of good citizenship. And especially does he realize that no man can pay these debts by merely living justly in private life and kindly within the circle of his immediate family and personal friends. There is no more wretched sophistry than that which excuses unprincipled conduct in politics, on the ground that the wrong-doer has always been a good husband and father, and an honourable man in his private affairs. No nation can endure which draws fine distinctions between public and private morality. There is only one kind of honour, there is only one recognized brand of common honesty. A man who, to serve his party, becomes a liar and a thief, *is* a liar and a thief, through and through, in every fibre of his being, though he never told a falsehood to his wife or robbed an orphan niece of her inheritance.

And, finally, the true American must be a rational man.

His conscientiousness must not be of that narrow, dogmatic type, which degenerates into mere formality or, what is worse, into intolerant fanaticism. We must not suppose that because the future of America is full of promise it is devoid of dangers. Among the dangers that we have to face, none is more grave than that fanatical passion which too often manifests itself in lawless dealings with criminal offenders — in the name of justice destroying the very foundation of legal retribution — which now and then takes the form of a wild destruction of property in a misguided attempt to redress the wrongs of the working man, or which, from time to time, breaks forth in political crazes that sweep thousands of voters into the support of sheer folly and dishonour. To meet these dangers we must have men not only honest and manly, but also cool, deliberate, large-minded, able to deal reasonably with problems that are not easy of solution.

> "Not till the ways of prudence all are tried,
> And tried in vain, the turn of rashness comes."

But let us not be deceived by words. There is rationalism and rationalism. The rationalism which our country demands is the positive, not the merely negative and fault-finding kind. We have quite enough of men whose genius consists in an acute perception of all that is wrong or imperfect. We have quite enough of those critics of our political system who can find nothing good since the fathers fell asleep. The men of the new day must be of tougher fibre than they, of broader views, of more inventive mind. The efficient citizen of the twentieth century must be rational in a positive and constructive sense. A lover of justice, a hater of wrong, he must be also a disciple of wisdom.

> "For to live disobedient to these two, Justice and Wisdom, is no life at all."

In presenting these views of the future of our country and of the type of man which it will demand, to you who are about to go forth from college life into the realities of that future, I feel assured of comprehension and approval; because, in an eminent degree, you have enjoyed the teaching

and received the inspiration which foster the manly and womanly character that I have endeavoured to describe. Preëminently among our colleges has Oberlin stood for the positive, the helpful, the hopeful spirit. Preëminently has she represented ideals of democracy and equality. No distinctions of race or of nationality have been recognized by her. And not only this, but an inspiration of the rarest kind you have had in the personal history of one from whom this institution took its name. Few, indeed, have been the lives that have so perfectly exemplified the ideal of rationally conscientious manhood as did that of Jean Frédéric Oberlin, the tireless pastor of the Ban de la Roche. That district of the Vosges, when Oberlin began his labours there, was merely nine thousand acres of rocky soil, with only mule paths for roads. It was inhabited by a people desperately poor, and so ignorant that few of them could read, while none spoke any other language than a barbarous patois. Before Oberlin died, sixty years later, the Ban de la Roche, largely through his influence, had been transformed into a productive region, densely populated, exporting agricultural products, traversed by excellent roads, and built up with substantial dwellings. Its people had learned to maintain admirable schools and churches, and to speak the French language with a purity not excelled anywhere in France. Such are the possibilities of one earnest life. What may not you accomplish toward the perfection of our American civilization, if, in the active years upon which you now enter, you are faithful to examples such as this.

Do not, however, be satisfied with any mere following of example, with any mere conformity to standards that have been held before you, in your college days. From you, as from those who have lived before you, the world will rightly demand new thoughts and new achievements. Look back upon your Alma Mater with reverence, but also with a filial care that she do not too early descend "the quiet, mossy track of age." As alumni, let it be your study to discover wherein her discipline can be made more liberal, her teaching sounder and broader, her influence wider, saner, and more enduring.

And carry with you into the larger life of American citizenship the same spirit. Be not satisfied with those achievements of the nation that have passed into history. Do not forget the past, but live and work for the future. If you and those others who, like you, have enjoyed the privileges of a liberal training, as educated men and women, as citizens of our republic, shall do your whole duty rationally, conscientiously, fearlessly, there can be no failure of our experiment in self-government, no diminution of the blessings of civil liberty.

XIX

THE IDEALS OF NATIONS

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THE IDEALS OF NATIONS

"I UNDERTOOK civil and foreign wars by land and sea throughout the whole world, and as victor I showed mercy to all surviving citizens." These two lines from the "Monumentum Ancyranum," the autobiographical epitaph of the divine Augustus, are an epitome of the moral history of the civilized world. Every nation that has played an important part in the elevation of mankind from barbarism to enlightenment, from despotism to civil liberty, from ruthless cruelty to compassion and fraternity, has begun its career with a magnificent display of power, has continued it in the lust of wealth, has learned the lessons of restraint and sacrifice, and at length has come to some appreciation of the infinite capacities, the immeasurable potential value of the individual soul. It has begun with conquest; but it has crowned its career with mercy and beneficence.

The hidden forces of national life are instinctive and unconscious. The masses of men move onward to the fulfilment of their destinies as individuals do, borne forward by currents of feeling, and automatically guided by motor impulses that had their origin thousands of generations back in the dim ages of animal evolution. But nations, like individuals, in a measure have shaped their destinies, in a measure have guided their progress, by the light of ideals that reason has created, through critical reflection upon the revelations of experience, and by a comparative study of the relative values of human desires, as tested by experiment.

As the individualities of men and women are created by their differing tastes and varied enthusiasms far more than by their physical peculiarities, so the individualities of nations — those indefinable qualities that impart a personal interest to

the struggle and fate of empires — are a product of their ideals rather than of their institutions. An instinctive perception of this truth has sustained the more poetic lovers of history in rebellion against the too great pretensions of institutional study. This truth one more and more deeply feels as he reads through Mr. Henry Osborne Taylor's noble volumes on "Ancient Ideals." They tell anew the story of ancient history, but not as a story of wars, of dynasties or of commerce. It is a story of the inner life, of the spiritual growth of those far-away folk. Although he does not ignore the interaction of race with environment, Mr. Taylor makes little pretence of ethnological learning, and little attempt at institutional analysis, as he tells us of Egypt and Babylon, of Persia and Cathay, of Judea, Greece, and Rome. His interpretation is intuitive, poetical, religious; and when we have read it through, we are aware that dormant intuitions and the sort of sympathy that clarifies thought, have been quickened within ourselves. We feel that we know those mighty peoples of the olden times as we did not know them before.

Besides the interest which we thus feel in the characterizing quality of national ideals and in what we may call their inherent spiritual worthiness, when, in all their varied moral beauty, they are drawn by a master hand, there is another aspect — perhaps without detraction we may say a more scientific aspect — of popular ideals which has its own legitimate interest for the historian, and especially for the evolutionist. From an evolutionary point of view some things may be said about the genesis of ideals and about the order of their succession, combination, and recapitulation in history, which would not naturally find place in a less realistic, though equally serious, interpretation. This still open opportunity is my excuse for touching a subject that Mr. Taylor has so worthily made his own.

The ideals of nations, like those of individuals, are derived from concrete qualities of character. Next to his own self-preservation, every man is chiefly concerned about the nature of his companions in the struggle for existence; nay, he is

concerned about his associates precisely because self-preservation is his supreme interest, since his fate is quite as likely to be determined by his fellow-beings as by his physical surroundings. To some extent he necessarily associates with men whom he distrusts and dislikes. As far as possible, however, he exercises choice in the selection of comrades and coworkers. He allies himself to those with whom he sympathizes, and gathers round him those whose instincts and purposes are substantially like his own, in whom he can repose confidence, and for whom he can feel admiration. This is relatively an easy task — much easier than would be the attempt to find associates widely unlike himself; because he and most other members of the population to which he belongs are descended from a common stock, have inherited like instincts, have been subjected to like conditions, and thereby have been moulded to a common type. For the same reason, at a particular time, some one type of character is generally preferred. Consequently the prevailing ideal, then and there cherished, is that of a complete realization of the preferred character. The subordinate ideals are mental images of the economic, moral, and social conditions that are conceived to be necessary as means to the perfection of the ideal character.

To a majority of men, the struggle for existence is still fraught with difficulty and risk, and often with peril. Most men, therefore, still have need of force and courage, and most men profoundly admire these qualities. It is doubtful if the transition from chronic warfare to a busy industrial civilization materially diminishes the demand for primitive virtues. Not only the soldier and the marine, but also the common sailor, the explorer and the engineer, the ranchman and the miner, and even the farmer and the mechanic, are compelled by the daily exigencies of their lives to scorn and cast out the overtimid co-worker. Consequently it is not among primitive men only that physical prowess is valued above all other gifts. In modern populations, also, the average man, who cares little for the graces of body or mind, is likely to care everything for the mere power to achieve. The strong and valorous comrade he admires above all other characters. This univer-

sal adoration of power is modified or coloured, of course, by other emotions and by the intellectual processes. It may even take the form of a supreme admiration for intellectual or moral power, as distinguished from physical strength, but in one or another form it is the ruling sentiment, the fundamental preference of mankind. The prize fighter, the athlete, the military hero, the imperturbable leader who can withstand the assaults of malignity, these are the popular idols.

To mankind generally the chief relaxation in the struggle for existence is found in social pleasures of the convivial type. Enough not only to eat, but also to drink, the jovial pleasures of feast and bout, these rude rewards of dangerous toil are still dear to the average man. And so, most naturally, when peril is past and the day's work is done, the average man desires that his companions, like himself, shall enter into the spirit of good-fellowship. The convivial man becomes a type of character widely appreciated. Like the valorous, this type is modified and refined in various ways, but chiefly by prosperity and the differentiating effects of increasing wealth. In prosperous communities the convivial man becomes the pleasure-loving man in manifold avatars. At his best he is the gracious man; and, as such, he often is a popular idol only less adored than the military hero. As such, he must be a prosperous man, and gifted. But above all things he must, with his accomplishments, combine generosity, liberality of spirit, and the love of enjoyment. By his talents or his wealth he must contribute in numberless ways to the pleasure of his fellow-men. Withal, he must be a complaisant man, a respecter of the social virtues, but discreetly and often more than a little blind to the reigning faults and follies of a luxurious age.

Thus two of the generic ideals of character spring directly from a successful struggle for existence. The valorous man and the convivial man are nature's primordial products in the moral realm. But in this realm, as in that of physical life, nature is wasteful to a degree that appals imagination. That we may see one life of truly heroic mould, she spawns a million stalwart brutes; and that we may have the truly gracious

strain, she permits unnumbered roisterers to waste not only their substance, but even their inmost souls.

It is by reaction against these wastes that we get the two remaining types and ideals of character. In some of those who have too often seen a jovial intoxication end in sottishness; who have too often seen luxury pass over into debauchery and wantonness; who have even seen graciousness become a wretched deceit that ends in dishonour, a healthy opposition has been aroused, and they have begun to demand of themselves and of their associates the exercise of a decent self-restraint. Under circumstances of prolonged and general hardship, when the mere maintenance of life becomes difficult, this demand is strengthened by experiences of intolerable burdens laid upon the prudent by all extravagant indulgences on the part of the reckless. Under such circumstances, the demand is not only for self-restraint, but also for self-denial. It is then that the austere man, who can firmly put aside the pleasures of life, and in mere duty give himself to severe employments, is idealized by thousands of those humble and patient ones to whom the struggle for existence has brought neither any great success nor overwhelming disaster, but only life itself, in exchange for unremitting toil.

The austere man, therefore, is the character-ideal of a section of mankind by no means insignificant. Variously known in history as the Hebraic, the Roman, the Puritan type, he has often commanded an uncompromising allegiance and played a leading rôle.

But from the ranks of austere men, inured to hardship, there continually spring those individuals, numbered in modern times by tens of thousands, who achieve a real and often a great success in the universal struggle. To such, mere existence is no longer the sole reward of effort. Opportunities open before them for an expansion of life. For them emotion is attuned and coloured, and the ranges of thought are widened. They do not cease to be self-restrained, but they become intellectually fearless. They can no longer think of self-denial as inherently good, but they can make sacrifices for worthy ends. Enlightened, yet still sincere,

they look with tolerant minds upon much which they do not commend. In such men is born the highest of all ideals of character, that of the rationally conscientious man. Always striving to break through narrowing limitations, but casting aside pretence of every sort, the rationally conscientious man endeavours in his conduct to express and to perfect his own essential nature. Perceiving in himself many unrealized possibilities, some of larger life and some of moral decay, he looks frankly at them all, and, resisting those that make for degeneration, without apology yields to those of growth. His habit, therefore, is not that of indulgence for its own sake or of self-denial for its own sake: it is a rational choosing of the larger life. Thus the perfect ideal of rationally conscientious manhood contains the notion of self-realization, and, on the objective side, that of meliorism or progress. The rationally conscientious man believes in the mental and moral advancement of his race. Exploring the wider possibilities of conscious existence, he tries to establish the intellectual habit, to broaden knowledge, to perfect the forms of beauty in manners and in art, to enlighten the ignorant, to open new opportunities to those who have enjoyed but little, to improve the forms of society and of the state, and to perform with wisdom the duties of a citizen.

These, then, are the four original ideals of character, created directly, or through reaction, by the struggle for existence. In every population they are simultaneously held, and nearly every individual admires or believes in more than one of them; not, however, with equal intensity. In a majority of minds the ideal of valour is supreme, but the convivial man is next best beloved. To a large minority of minds the ideal of the austere man appeals with constraining power. The rationally conscientious man remains the ideal of the relatively few.

These four ideals of character are not only simultaneously held by different classes in every population, but also they are successively held by those individuals and classes that pass through a complete cycle of moral evolution. The ideal of power is first to take possession of the imagination; and

it is because large numbers of men in their ethical development never get further, that this ideal is more prevalent than any other. The ideal of good fellowship, conviviality, and graciousness, is held by those who have gone on to a second stage of moral evolution. The ideal of austere restraint is attained by those who have experienced the evils of excess, or who have seen that indulgence in mere luxury cannot permanently satisfy, and have healthily reacted upon intemperate desires. The fourth ideal is held only by those who, as individuals or as family stocks, have passed through all earlier stages of experience, and have discovered that even denial can be carried to excess, until it narrows and hardens, and have learned that complete satisfaction is found only in a life to which no permanent bounds can be assigned.

Nations, like individuals, normally move through this cycle of moral experience. To the ideals of individual character correspond ideals of national achievement and renown. These are derived partly from conditions that create the individual ideal, and partly from the individual ideal itself. The community that supremely values the valorous man cares chiefly for national power. The community that prefers the gifted, the successful, the convivial and gracious man chiefly values material splendour in its civic life. The community that favours chiefly the austere man insists upon ceremonial purity, or upon ceremonial righteousness, or devotes itself to the establishment of civil justice. While, finally, the community that cares for the conscientiously rational life strives to establish liberty, for only under liberty can there be progress and self-realization. Nations, then, begin their careers with a supreme interest in mere power. They pass through the stages of materialism and of ceremonial righteousness; and, if they survive, they devote themselves at length to the higher achievements of science, philosophy, and popular education, and to the perfection of that civic life in which every individual can find opportunity for the realization of whatever is best in his own nature.

Not all nations, indeed, have moved through these suc-

cessive stages of the moral cycle at the same rate; not all have shown equal devotion at successive periods of their history to each of the four ideals; not all have completed the cycle. Nevertheless, in their allegiance to ideals, nations have often shown significant groupings, and often have complemented or supplemented one another's moral evolution. Moreover, a few nations, having completed the moral cycle, having attained to full and varied life, have combined the ideals of character and achievement in ethical products of extraordinary complexity. It is when surveyed in the light of these facts that the story of world history acquires its deepest significance and its true dramatic unity.

As in a sonata, different but related musical themes are successively introduced in a first movement, to be combined and developed in a second movement, so in universal history the ideals of nations were successively presented to mankind by the peoples whose aspirations and achievements made up the story of ancient history; and they have been combined and recapitulated, in harmonies of marvellous complexity, in the history that began with Hellenic civilization on the shores of the Ægean Sea. The themes of history were introduced by the peoples of the East. They have been developed, combined, and recapitulated by the nations of the West.

The ancient empires of Egypt and Babylonia were, above all else, embodiments of power. They were the first magnificent achievements in civic unity and military strength. They first among men achieved the task of converting aggregations of barbarian tribes, organized on the basis of kinship, into mighty civil states organized on the basis of territorial association. This was in itself the most difficult of tasks; and its success depended upon the possibility of establishing and maintaining among elements of population originally diverse a relatively perfect homogeneity of interests, beliefs, and habits. This was accomplished by those primitive policies of civilization which sought to compel all men to submit to the same military discipline, to worship the same gods, to wear prescribed costumes, and to order their daily

lives by prescribed rules. By these means were created centralized governments of unprecedented power; and by their activity in conquest great wealth was amassed and material magnificence was made possible. Power, then, and prosperity were the cherished ideals of that ancient world. Beyond these stages of moral development, individuals no doubt often succeeded in passing; but the nations of Babylonia and Egypt in their entirety got no further.

Under what circumstances, then, was any great population for the first time in human history converted to the higher ideal of restraint, temperance, and patient performance of daily duty, with much cheerful acceptance of the necessity of daily self-denial?

Perhaps the answer may be found in the story of the first great migration of a civilized people into a distant, unknown land, where, in contact with an aboriginal barbarian humanity, it became necessary to lay the foundations of a new civil life. Already beginning to feel the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence, the Akkadian builders of Babylon were presently overwhelmed by Semitic invaders, and in large numbers were driven forth from the valley of the Euphrates. Wandering eastward for no one knows how many years or generations (for the story was long since lost in the morning mists of history), these bearers of the world's first knowledge of statecraft and the arts came at last into that eastern quarter of Asia which borders on the Yellow Sea. There, mingling with the native population, they created a new race, a new nation, and a mode of life which has scarcely changed for four thousand years.

On that long march it must have happened that many men repined at their fate and could not cheerfully relinquish the comforts and pleasures of life in the wonderful city from which they had been driven forth. Such men were only a burden to themselves and to their comrades; and doubtless, with few exceptions, they perished miserably by the way. Only those men could push on to endure the continuing hardships, to achieve the new tasks and the new success, who

could patiently undergo disappointment and loss, who could resolutely renounce the past, and, with fidelity to one another, take up the new duties of everyday life, where little was to be enjoyed as the reward of much toil endured. To such men the only possible ideal of character was that in which the qualities of patience, persistence, fidelity, devotion to duty, and a spirit of cheerful acquiescence in whatever lot awaited them, were the dominant traits. And this ideal they carried with them into the far-away land; and there, for unnumbered generations, it has persisted, the dominant note of life in a vast celestial empire, distinguished above all other peoples in the world for filial piety, for tireless industry, for patient endurance, for quiet content, in whatever fate may bestow.

Directly across the path of that first migration of civilized man, there moved, we know not when, or along what route, another stream of wandering men — they of the Aryan tongue. Regarding their origin we need make no assumption. The question as to whether they first dwelt in Scandinavia, in Germany, in the upland vales of the Caucasus, or on the plains of Pamir, has ceased to be important, because we now know that before the dawn of history the Aryan stocks were distributed throughout a zone that extended from the fjords of Norway in Northwestern Europe, across Southern Russia and up the valley of the Oxus, to the slopes of the Hindu Kush. And we know also that some of them, at a time from which no monumental or written records remain, moved southward until they came into the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus.

To these people, too, had come the lesson of endurance, of temperance, and of denial. To them, however, nature had given an endowment of imagination, a sensitiveness to beauty, a love of poetic colouring in which the people who had moved eastward from Babylonia were wholly lacking. So, when they halted in the highlands of Persia and Medea, and endeavoured there to work out the foundations of a civil life, they clothed their ideal of restraint and duty in forms of sublime imagery and of lighter fancy, which gave to the

ideas themselves an attractiveness that never from that day failed to impress and fascinate the minds of men. Their ideal became that of the righteous man and the life fulfilling righteousness. "With hands stretched out, I pray to fulfil all good works, the first law of Mazda. . . . As many as I may I seek to teach to seek the good. Come with good thought, O Righteousness. Give the gifts which last eternally." So was this third ideal of man in its Iranian form expressed in ceremonial prayer. Yet further developed in Judea, it finally attained its loftiest expression in the sublime ethical poetry of the Hebrew prophets.

In the poetic colouring which the Iranian gave to his ideal of the self-controlled life, we perceive an element that was later to find its development in the fourth ideal, an essential characteristic of which is a sincere appreciation, at once rational and emotional, of life itself and of its possibilities when stripped of artificiality. This appreciation finds expression not only in character, but also objectively in those free forms of art that break away from ancient conventionalities, in the higher forms of religion, and in types of citizenship that create and maintain liberty. Among the people of Persia it early found expression in an art that took many of its models from Babylonia and Egypt, but handled them with freedom and gave to them a grace and a vitality altogether new. This was true also of much of the literary product of Iran.

Not, however, until the migrating Aryans had found their way into India did their faculty for sincere appreciation and untrammeled expression reach its full attainment. There the mind of man came in contact with phases of nature more varied, more beautiful, and more terrible than any that had hitherto been encountered. There, face to face with dangers more manifold and dreadful, the soul of man became serious and contemplative in a new degree. Observing nature in her most magnificent expression, the imagination was expanded; and, witnessing the struggle for existence in an intensity which had had no parallel in earlier experience, the heart was moved to a compassion for suffering and failure

that had not before been either so deep or so pitiful. From these experiences there sprang a luxuriant art, largely developed from Persian models, a noble epic literature, a philosophy as profound as man has yet attained, and a religion of compassion which perhaps in its universal sympathy and mercifulness has not been surpassed. Out of all this emerged the ideal of the rationally perfect man — the man who has touched life at every point, who has surrendered all illusions, who has become clear-minded and sincere, and has entered upon the way of self-realization. This man is contemplative, — his rationality is speculative rather than scientific, and herein is its limitation, — but he is also merciful and his pity has no bounds, for in his disillusionment he has suffered, and he has perceived that all who attain to self-knowledge must suffer in like manner. He has perceived the necessity of liberty; but he conceives of liberty as a freeing of the soul from bondage to material conditions. The perfect man, therefore, is he who has surmounted all moral obstacles and has conquered all passions; who, through contemplation and sincere obedience, has brought himself into complete adjustment to the eternal laws. The perfect community consists of those who attain such sincerity and emancipation. That this ideal in its Hindu form was sombre in colouring, that it made more of resignation than of activity, more of pity than of struggle, more of religious contemplation than of artistic creation or of citizenship, was simply a consequence of the contact of a people not yet perfected in political organization, not yet master of the higher industrial methods, with an environment which inevitably, through its abundance, produced overpopulation, and impressed the imagination with awe rather than with a sense of scientific interest.

Yet farther to the East, in those islands which skirt the Yellow Sea, developed a people whose origins are more obscure than are those of any other group that has attained to a position of high culture. To the islands of Japan were carried the practical knowledge of China and the religion and philosophy of India, together with many artistic ideas that had travelled across the Asiatic continent from Egypt

and Chaldea. There they underwent a development finer and more varied than they had attained in either India or Persia. Above all other peoples of Asia, the Japanese acquired the delicacy of artistic feeling and the freedom of artistic expression which we are prone to ascribe only to the most gifted of Western communities. It was in artistic creation chiefly, but also in religious feeling to some extent, that the Japanese worked out their own national form of that highest ideal of human life which combines rationality with sincerity, and enjoys perfect liberty of expression. But in Japan the concrete realization of this type was the sensitive man, who could directly and accurately perceive beauty and truth; and the necessary liberty of such a character consisted not so much in moral emancipation or in civil privilege as in freedom from all prejudice and distorting passion.

Thus, in the earliest history of civilization, and in the evolution of the population of Asia regarded as a whole, the entire cycle of human ideals was created and traversed. It is only in the contemplation of Asia as a whole, however, that we discover the complete expression of all four of the great and fundamental ideals. Especially is it true that only in the career of two or three different Asiatic peoples do we find anything approaching a complete expression of the ideal of conscientious rationality — an expression which takes not only ethical but also artistic forms. In one particular, however, the Asiatic cycle falls short of completion. Nowhere on that continent or in its neighbouring islands do we find the fourth ideal taking shape in conceptions of perfect citizenship or of the highest type of statesmanship. These were reserved for the people of the West.

If now we turn to the history of the West, we shall find its most remarkable characteristic to be that successive Western peoples have each completed the cycle of national ideals, and have then developed them in complex combinations.

First among these were the Greeks, men of the same blood and speech and early experiences as those Aryans who crossed Iran, and made their way down the valleys of India to the

shores of the Indian Ocean. Even more highly gifted with imagination than the Eastern Aryans, more richly endowed with the critical quality of reason, though not so profoundly contemplative, and more versatile in artistic expression, the Greeks already, at the beginning of written history, had passed through the periods of creative conquest and rude splendour, and were entering upon those disciplinary experiences which disclose the loftier ideals. What may have been before the Mycenæan age we very imperfectly know, but the ruins of Mycenæ and of Argos themselves yield abounding proofs that, within their walls at least, military power had early created a superb and profuse luxury. With the decline of their supremacy, the Grecian colonizing of the Ægean Islands and of the Asian shore, if not then first begun, was vigorously continued. Into this new and harder life of an emigrant population entered those renunciations, those sacrifices of familiar and cherished pleasures, and those hardships which made men serious, dutiful, frugal, and self-restrained. A thousand evidences of these disciplines, and of the emergence — by reason of them — of a more austere ideal, we find scattered throughout the Homeric epics, where also are reflected the earlier ideals of power and splendour. Not only this, but also the rise of a new and nobler civilization we see clearly revealed. Enterprise and toil are rewarded with bountiful fruits of the earth and the favour of heaven. Brave and dutiful men become also wide-visioned, contemplative, and critical. The heroes of the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey" are more than men of strength and physical courage; they are men of wonderful intellectual resource and of strategic insight, and yet withal of tender and abounding pity. In the court of Olympian Jove and in the councils of men the ancient ideals of a ceremonial justice are undergoing a profound modification. They are widening into conceptions of moral liberty and of a socially ordered freedom.

Thus it is evident that before Attic history began the Greeks as a race had already conceived the noblest ideals. The rationally conscientious man, more critical and objective than the contemplative man of India, and retaining more of

the fire of primitive courage, — this already was the ideal personality; and liberty, breaking through many restraints of venerable custom, was already conceived as a possible ideal for the ordering of social affairs. The cycle of moral experience had been traversed, but the energy of the race was not diminished: it was still at the tension of youth. And thus it came about that with the rise of Attica began an absolutely new development in human history.

In Attica the ideals of manhood and of national renown were for the first time combined, recapitulated, and blended in an intricate moral pattern. In the matchless funeral oration by Pericles, as Thucydides reports it, we read that the valour of the Athenian soldier had never been surpassed in the annals of war; that no citizen soldiery had ever surrendered for their state so many opportunities and pleasures, so many perfect joys of life; that wives and mothers and aged men had never more uncomplainingly borne burdens of sorrow, or taken up with more patient submission to civic duty the tasks intended for stronger hands, — and, while we read, we further discover that, added to all these ideal excellencies of character, the Athenian intellect was rational and crystal-clear. The oration is thus an epitome of experiences and reflections never before so combined; for the age of Pericles was the first in which the human mind so nearly attained complete self-realization. It was then, and from that time on, that every ideal found perfect expression in character, in literature, philosophy, art, and political experiment. It is not necessary here to dwell on the perfection of the art, the unequalled beauty of the literature, or the clear, critical quality of the philosophy. That which for our present purposes is of chief importance is to observe that all the ideals themselves are clarified and exalted by comparison and combination. The heroic man, as now conceived, must display, not only bravery, but also fortitude, and must endure, not only physical suffering like the soldiers of Xenophon's army, but also the tragic assaults of fate, with Promethean nobility. Festivity must be beautiful and pleasure joyous. Self-restraint must be more than temperance: it must include a

moderation of zeal and even of worldly ambition. And, above all, the rational life must find expression less in contemplation than in political activity. In Plato's thought, so marvellously worked out in the pages of the "Republic," of the state as the perfect expression of man's rational and moral nature; in the demonstration, so convincingly made by Aristotle in the "Politics," that the state exists for the good life, and that only in the state does man achieve the perfection of his rational personality, we have a form of the fourth ideal to which no Eastern people ever attained.

To many readers it will seem a questionable assertion, if we say that Rome likewise completed the cycle of moral evolution, and then, combining the ideals in a complex civilization, so developed the higher ones as to strengthen their influence over the human mind for all coming time. We are so accustomed to think of Rome as the unsurpassed embodiment of power and magnificence, that we have some difficulty in thinking of her also as a guardian of the ideals of austerity and justice, of reason, conscience, and liberty. Rome the conqueror, the mistress of the world, the seat of unrivalled splendour, of unbridled indulgence, — these are pictures that we know; but when did Rome become the teacher of self-denial, and when the promulgator of highest wisdom? When did she subordinate pride or pleasure to her own conception of justice, and when did she conceive of liberty?

It will not be denied that very early in her history Rome rose above the rude ideal of power cherished by her tribal kings, and above the rude ideal of splendour which found varied expression under the Etruscan supremacy. Throughout the earlier years of the republic life was strenuous. It called for sacrifice and restraint not less than for courage, and it soon became dominated by an ideal of austerity, perhaps quite as severe as has been elsewhere seen. Already we have observed that the name "Roman," no less than the word "Puritan," is historically associated with the austere character. It was not only in character, however, that this ideal found expression in early Roman days. Still more important was its objective expression in Roman law. As in the farther

East objective expression of the ideal of restraint had taken the form of ceremonial righteousness, and as in Greece it had begun to take the form of civic order, so in Rome for the first time it became a true civil law, formulating rules of justice that could be made of universal application. In the later days of the republic the ideals of rational personality also, and of disinterested citizenship as its objective medium, which had found expression in Greece, were entertained by the best Roman minds, as the writings of Cicero prove.

Nevertheless, we have fallen into the belief that these were not controlling ideals among the Roman people, because both austerity and a sincerely rational life were apparently overwhelmed by the materialism of the empire. We assume that, after attaining for a brief period to a higher moral life, Rome, at the death of Julius Cæsar, fell back to a lower level, and from that hour declined in spiritual worth as she grew in military strength and amassed material wealth.

Yet it is certain that this belief and this assumption are erroneous. In reality it was in the very age of Augustus, when the ideal of splendour and enjoyment had apparently enthralled all classes, that a reaction against excess and a devotion to the highest interests of the spiritual life had already begun. I do not here refer to the revival of literature in that age, which in itself was a sufficient proof that rational thought and artistic expression were at least not extinct. Far more significant was the return to austerity among the common people, which found a definite if strange expression in the rapid growth of ascetic sects that had sprung up in many parts of the empire, and preached a doctrine of self-denial, — sects of which the Essenes in Palestine were a type, and John the Baptist a warning voice. These sects prepared the soil for that new religion of renunciation of the world, that faith in the infinite value of spiritual life as compared with all earthly happiness, which spread from Nazareth throughout the Western world.

To show that, from this reaction against the excesses of material splendour, the Roman people went on to develop anew the fourth and highest ideal of life, it would be suffi-

cient to recall the steady encroachments of the Christian faith, both in the imperial city and in the provinces, until the emperors as well as the common people embraced the new religion, and at least nominally accepted its conceptions of human personality. It is not necessary, however, to depend upon this line of proof. There was another and not less interesting mode in which the progress of thought carried the better sort of Roman minds beyond all lower ideals of human achievement to the conception of a perfect rationality, and of its embodiment in civil institutions, as the goal of both national and individual endeavour.

This was nothing less than the intense, the often self-denying devotion, of the ablest men in the legal and administrative service of the empire to the perfection of the Roman law, to the formulation of the Roman rules of administration, and to the transmission of this superb body of human wisdom to those Northern races, which all far-seeing men knew must overrun the Roman dominions and establish a new national life upon the ruins of Roman greatness. It is a pity that we have not more definite personal biographies of the men who devoted their lives to this vast work. But we are unable to doubt that they were many, or that they performed their task with a sincere disinterestedness of purpose possible only to those who look into the future, and know that they are working for the perfection of men not yet aware of the blessings to be handed down to them as a legacy of civilization. On no other hypothesis can we account for the marvellous fact that the noblest product of legal intelligence and administrative experience which the modern world has inherited from the past was preserved so nearly unimpaired throughout those terrible centuries when Vandal barbarians were levelling in ruins the material monuments of Rome's imperial greatness. This priceless heritage we owe to thousands of obscure men, whose very names have perished from history, — men who believed that Rome's enduring contribution to the advancement of mankind was not her material monuments, but her rules of justice, of equity, and of civil order, and who saw that in the preservation of these Rome could

perpetuate her spirit throughout all coming ages. Surely to a people that produced such men, we cannot deny appreciation of the highest of ideals.

On the ruins of the Roman Empire slowly grew the nations of modern Europe. Created out of similar racial elements and developing side by side, they have had histories in many respects closely parallel; and the evolution of their moral characteristics has been more nearly the same than was ever true of contemporaneous peoples in the Eastern world. In each nation the early devotion to the ideal of power was conspicuous in every form of expression. The heroic epic and the legend of the age of migration faithfully reflect the barbaric strength, the social anarchy, the ruthless brutality, of that period of national creation. After feudalism and the growth of the mediæval towns, when kingly power was consolidated in France, England, and Spain, the chief desire everywhere was to establish the new national life on secure foundations and to make its government feared throughout the world. Then came the period of the rapid evolution of prosperity and of material well-being. The geographical discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the rapid colonization of distant lands, brought vast wealth to all the enterprising nations, and new desires and ideals. The splendour of Spain in the age of Charles V. and of Philip II., of France in the reigns of Louis XIII. and of Louis XIV., — the France of Richelieu and of Mazarin, — the splendour of England in the reign of Elizabeth, — these were products of the new prosperity and of national devotion to ideals of pleasure no less than of power.

The reaction came with the awakening of the common mind and of the thoughtful leaders of religious movements to the corruption that had survived through the upheavals of the Reformation, and still bound men to materialism of life, notwithstanding the awakening of their higher natures by the Renaissance and the ecclesiastical revolution. The Puritan movement in England was its most complete expression; but elsewhere also, — in France, in Germany, and in

the Netherlands, not to mention the republic of Geneva — the same reaction toward austerity of thought and morals was visible. This movement was by far the most complete development of the third ideal of individual character and national achievement which had thus far been attained in history. In the Eastern world, this ideal never passed beyond fragmentary expression. It was never perfectly developed, though it undoubtedly was reached in Greece and in Rome. But in western Europe it marked a distinct epoch of history, and gave its name to a mode of life, a philosophy, and an interpretation of religion, which will continue to influence mankind for generations.

For western Europe also was reserved a final development of the ideal of an expanding rational life. India did not get beyond the notion of wisdom, attained through renunciation; Athens developed the idea of a symmetrically rounded life, of rational knowledge and political activity, but did not conceive of an indefinite improvement for all mankind; Rome took up a self-denying educational work for future generations, but rather to conserve the past than to create new possibilities. Only in the West, and in very modern times, has the fourth ideal of nations become a conception of progress, — the thought of an ever continuing emancipation and enlightenment of the whole human race.

There are, therefore, certain specific facts in the external history, and in the development of the content of the liberal ideal in its modern form, which are deserving of special notice.

An increasing emphasis has been placed on liberty. The ideal now stands for a complete emancipation from every form of useless bondage, both in civil and in moral law. It affirms that only in perfect freedom can the human spirit attain the complete realization of its potential life. It does not, however, deny the necessity of order and proportion. Our notion of liberty is not anarchy, civil or moral. To every restraint and limitation we apply the test of utility. Restraints that are needful for peace, for order, or for safety, are not only to be tolerated, but are carefully to be cherished.

But restraints that can give no utilitarian account of themselves should as fast as possible be swept away. We all know that this particular phase of the ideal of perfection in its modern expression is a product of the great Revolution, which brought the human mind face to face with fundamental problems.

Again, the modern content of this highest ideal of nations includes that idea which, in literature and art, is known as Romanticism. To the Eastern sage, perfection of life was conceivable in terms of absolute renunciation of everything unessential or adventitious; to the Greek it was conceivable in terms of a perfect proportion and coördination of parts. Undoubtedly, the highest expression of the Greek form of the ultimate human ideal is found in Plato's "Republic." The life in which every passion is subordinated to reason, in which all activities are in equilibrium; the state in which there is a perfect division of labour, an exact adaption of every man to his civic function, — such is the perfected whole, in both public and private existence. This ideal, like that of the East, contemplates the actual attainment of a perfection beyond which no further progress can be made. Sharply marking off the modern ideal from all ideals of the past is its recognition of limitless possibilities, of the infinite distance of absolute perfection; its recognition of a boundless opportunity for further endeavour; its subordination of all form and rule in life and in art to content, of the means of expression to that which must be expressed.

A third characteristic of the highest ideal in its modern form is its content of ardent and generous feeling. It desires the widest opportunity and the highest attainment, not merely for the few, but equally for all classes and all races. It is vital with philanthropic interest and missionary earnestness. It is thoroughly democratic, and includes an unbounded faith in the future of the people.

These elements are found in the highest modern ideal, as it is cherished in many Western nations. Nevertheless, in each nation they are combined in unique ways, so that in each some particular phase is so emphasized that we may easily distinguish the ideal of each.

Such national differences are due to conditions which, in different countries, have brought about different developments of liberty and progress, and have produced also different types of the rationally conscientious man.

In England earlier than on the Continent the emancipation of the serf created a peculiarly independent type of the individual. As has been shown elsewhere in this volume, the destruction of the economic equality of villain tenants on the manor was quickly followed by the rise of the vigorous and enterprising to competence, or even to prosperity, and by the sinking of the incompetent to the level of wage earners. The industrial opportunities, the mechanical inventions, and the commercial activity that combined to make the social transformation possible, were fostered by the firm establishment and rapid growth of Protestantism in religion. In England, therefore, the rational man soon became the highly individualized man; while the broadening of economic opportunity and the supremacy of Protestantism conspired with national character and traditions to insure the firm establishment of political and civil liberty. And so it has come about that in the England of to-day the highly individualized character and individual liberty to act are supremely valued. Every man must be permitted to follow out his own initiative to the extent of his powers, and to make his own career. The truth that government is only a means to an end is not often forgotten, and even the lesser forms of social coöperation are more or less jealously regarded if they seem in any degree to diminish self-reliance or to curtail individual opportunity.

Across the Channel conditions united as inevitably to create a strong sense of social solidarity, a highly socialized type of personal character, and a zealous devotion to the idea of equality rather than to that of individual or civil liberty, in the English sense of the term. Industrial emancipation was long delayed. Protestantism was stamped out by persecution, and with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes the men and women whose self-reliance or individualistic tendencies were too pronounced sought safety in expatriation. Feudal

abuses and the sort of absolutism that goes with hereditary kingship were overthrown with the Revolution, but absolutism of another kind was not; and a centralized administration continued to strangle local independence. Meanwhile, among the common people an approximate equality of conditions was established by the levelling provisions of the revolutionary and Napoleonic codes.

Blending with a love of economic equality, thus created in France, was a shadowy notion of the subjective equality of men, which found literary incarnation in the philosophy of Rousseau. It seems to have sprung from a conjugation of three distinct ideas. Two of these were theological, or perhaps even religious, in character. The notion that all men are divinely created souls, whose intellectual faculties are only a penumbra, carried with it the implication that, in their inmost being as souls, all men in the sight of God their Creator are equal. Again, according to theological views, all men have sinned, and can be reclaimed from sin only by an act of divine grace. This notion also by implication contains the assumption that men essentially are equal. The third component notion in the idea of equality may have been derived from theology indirectly, but its immediate source is Romanticism. If every man has possibilities of improvement to which no limits can be assigned — or, to put the proposition a little more strongly, if the inequalities among men are due to circumstances, to limiting finite conditions, and if any man with proper instruction, favourable conditions, and unlimited time can make infinite progress in knowledge and well-doing — then, obviously, men are essentially equal, since infinite quantities of the same category cannot be unequal. Thus the conception of subjective equality is mystical rather than practical. Held as an article of faith by the mystical and the romantic, it is unacceptable to those who give more attention to finite, concrete realities of the here and now, than to the infinite possibilities of an unknown tomorrow. This is at least a part of the reason why equality is so strongly emphasized in the highest ideals of France, while England supremely values liberty.

Thoroughly Protestant and practical, England cares for the concrete achievements of the present. Men, as she regards them, may or may not be equal in their metaphysical being or in their potentialities: for practical purposes of everyday business and everyday politics they are unequal in an extreme degree; and it is practical common-sense to let the best of them achieve their best without too many hampering restrictions. France is still to a great degree Catholic in sentiment, if not in confession, and is still mystical in feeling, if not in profession. To her it matters little that individual liberty is imperfect, as long as men who feel a strong sense of social solidarity may meet on the same plane and cherish the same visions. Thus a touch of enthusiasm (some observers would say of fanaticism) is added to the Frenchman's thought of equality. On the whole, however, French equality is objective. The Frenchman does not insist that men are equal in talents or in virtue. What he chiefly demands is external equality — of conditions, of opportunity, of benefits from society, from education, and cultural institutions, — in short, equality of treatment. Consequently, his thought is largely centred upon the functions of government and its provision for each and all of its subjects.

Do we find that anywhere these two ideals — of liberty and equality — are synthetically combined? Is combination the significance, perhaps, of the American spirit of fraternity, of the American passion for comprehensiveness? England has produced the individualized man, and France the socialized man; is America at last creating the inclusive, the universalized man? Surely such is not an altogether fanciful belief. At least it is no exaggeration to say that the inclusive character, and an equity in which liberty and equality are reconciled, are our ideals. The American, like the Englishman, is to a great extent practical, hard-headed, Protestant. He keenly realizes the opportunities of the concrete present. He understands the meaning of all finite limitations; he knows that, within any given field of practical activity, men are widely unequal in their relation to a definite end to be attained. But America is not wholly an offspring of English

race and thought. America is also Celtic, Gallic, and Teutonic; it is Catholic as well as Protestant; and different modes of race thought and feeling, different religious views and sentiments, have here become strangely united. If more than the Frenchman the American is practical, he more than the Englishman is sentimental. His assertion of liberty is less uncompromising than the Englishman's, and his interest in equality is more subjective and less practical than the Frenchman's. Notwithstanding their alleged materialism, Americans are really less concerned about external conditions, and are more intent upon the subjective attitude of each man toward his neighbour, than are any people of Europe. The American likes to be estimated, not in terms of his station in life, which may be more or less an accidental matter, and not in terms of the opportunities that he has enjoyed, but in terms of his personal worth. He likes to know that his neighbour thinks him intrinsically as good as anybody. Within limits of reason he is willing to admit that other men are as good as himself. Thus, if sometimes in the business of the week he is too willing to sacrifice the economic equality of his fellow-men to his own worldly success, he nevertheless, in hours of relaxation and contemplation, cherishes a belief in the unlimited potentialities of even the meanest of human creatures, and is willing to do much to prove that, in a large measure, the potentialities of the common humanity can be realized under favouring opportunities. To a degree perhaps never before seen in history, the American who, through liberty and present acceptance of the practical point of view, has achieved a worldly success, stands ready in the spirit of fraternity to reach out a helping hand to the brother who has not yet succeeded, and to aid him in every possible way to attain the objects of his desire.

The creation of ideals is one of the highest activities of the human mind. Into his ideal enters man's estimate of the past and his forecast of the future; his scientific analysis, and his poetic feeling; his soberest judgment, and his religious aspiration. Yet in the growth of the most spiritual

ideal, as in that of the humblest material organism, we have a perfect illustration of the laws of evolution. The ideal, no less than any phenomenon of physical life, is a product of ceaseless transformations of energy, of continual re-groupings of things, of an endless struggle for existence. In its origin a simple mental picture of a character that is adapted to the dominant conditions of life, the ideal is slowly transformed, by both integration and differentiation, until it becomes too complex for any perfect portrayal. This continuity of its evolution is the spiritual thread of history; it is the succession and combination of historic themes. The Egyptian and the Chaldean created the ideals of valorous and pleasure-loving men; China, Persia, and Judea, of self-denying and austere men; India, of the rationally conscientious man, — who in Hindustan is contemplative and compassionate; in Japan, sensitive; in Greece, appreciative of every form of truth and beauty; in Rome, constructive; and in the farther and later West, scientific, — in England individualized, in France socialized, in America, where West again becomes East, universalized. Egypt and Babylonia created the national ideals of power and splendour; Iran and Judea of ceremonial righteousness. Greece created the ideal of citizenship; Rome the ideal of justice. England has created the ideal of civil liberty; France the ideal of social equality. America is slowly but surely creating the ideal of a broad and perfect equity, in which liberty and equality shall for all time be reconciled and combined.

XX

THE GOSPEL OF NON-RESISTANCE

XX

THE GOSPEL OF NON-RESISTANCE

A CONFORMING of life to the letter of the Christian gospels has been demanded by many sincere and by some brilliant minds in every century of the Christian era. It is probably the name of Count Leo Tolstoï, however, that will henceforth be associated with the doctrine that true Christian living involves the surrender of earthly possessions and perfect obedience of the command to resist not evil. His analysis of the spiritual content of Christ's teaching, his illustration of it from his individual experience, and his application of it to the world of modern industry and politics — so radically at variance with the creed of non-aggression — gives to his work a depth and completeness never found in any previous attempts of this nature; and it is therefore not surprising that every day adds to the number of disciples who, if they are not yet prepared to put teachings into practice, are nevertheless inwardly convinced that they are truth and ought to be applied in life.

It is a curious phenomenon, — this growth of conviction among intelligent people that the world would be better off if it accepted literally the gospel of non-resistance, while yet each civilized nation is strengthening its military resources and its armaments, and is intently watching every move of its rivals, all of whom are hoping to secure as large territorial acquisitions as possible in the final partition of the undeveloped regions of the earth. It is a phenomenon that raises again the question, as old as human curiosity, whether there is an inherent contradiction in the moral nature of man. Is he forever doomed to follow one course of action, which common-sense tells him is expedient or practicable, while always believing that it is wrong in principle — that he ought to set

his face against it, and with self-surrender strive for the realization of ideals to which nature seems to have put the very laws of life in opposition. The problem may be even more concretely stated. Is it accident, or is it a sardonic joke of fate, that the two chief intellectual movements of the nineteenth century should be almost perfectly symbolized in the names of Darwin and Tolstoï; one standing for the doctrine that all progress has come from a remorseless struggle for existence, in which thousands of millions of sentient creatures have miserably perished, in order that tens of millions may be somewhat intelligent and moderately happy; the other standing for an immediate and unquestioning return to the teaching that the strong should bear the burdens of the weak, and that the best of mankind should practically cease to struggle for their existence at all, and should concern themselves only with the rescue of such as are in danger of being submerged.

The answer that I shall make to this question in the present paper may seem to be as paradoxical as the situation that has been described; but this ought not to bar its serious consideration. Since the days of Heraclitus, the philosopher has known that mutation itself is a paradox, and that any interpretation of the ways of progressive life must largely consist of paradoxes. I therefore make no apology for submitting the proposition that the struggle for existence itself tends to bring about a human brotherhood in which the non-resistance of evil would be a successful working rule, and that, as a fact of history, this realization will come with the practical success of that other paradoxical organization already described in this volume, namely, the democratic empire.

In the introduction to an English translation of the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Professor Alexander Tille reminds us that even among the evolutionists there is a contradiction of views. It is nearly as radical, indeed, as the broader contradiction between Darwin and Tolstoï. Huxley's famous Romanes lecture was the first frank confession of a moral difficulty into which the evolutionists had drifted. In sub-

stance, Huxley's admission was, that in the process of natural selection there is no place for the virtues of compassion and generosity, or for the ideals of peace and human brotherhood. The struggle for existence is one in which physical strength, shrewdness, cunning, treachery, cruelty, have all had place, and presumably must continue to be important factors. Speaking for himself, Huxley was prepared to sacrifice the further results that might be won in a struggle for existence, and to accept a certain deterioration of the race, if need be, for the sake of saving those sympathies and ideals that are most widely opposed to egoistic self-assertion. "Let us understand once for all," he says, "that the ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it." He admits that this is "an audacious proposal"; but he thinks that man's ends are higher than the ends of nature, and hopes "that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success."

There are, of course, many evolutionists who deny that there is such a fundamental contradiction between the process of natural selection and the process of moral effort based on ideas of sympathy and justice. They urge that the higher and greater struggles have taken place, not between individuals, but between groups, and that natural selection among races and nations has accomplished more for man, even in reference to his physical well-being and his power to perpetuate a sturdy race, than a purely individual struggle could have done. For group cohesion, toleration, sympathy, a certain degree of willingness to forgive, compassion, and helpfulness, have been necessary. These virtues, it is contended, are as much a product of natural selection as are force and cunning.

Recently, this argument has seriously been threatened by the later biology, with its theories of the non-transmission of acquired characteristics, and its corollary of panmixia, or the doctrine that when, within a group, the struggle for existence practically ceases among individuals, and those elements which such a struggle would eliminate are combined in an indiscriminate mixture by intermarriage with elements that would

normally survive, the result is a progressive deterioration of the race, which then, even in the most favourable circumstances, hardly maintains itself above mediocrity.

This notion, elaborated by severe scientific methods at the hands of statistical investigators like Sir Francis Galton, has been seized upon by the students of pathological nervous phenomena and by the more sturdy-minded critics of modern literature and art, as affording the true explanation of what, in the slang of the day, we call decadence. In panmixia, — itself a product of sympathy, philanthropy, and moral restraints in general — we are supposed to have the cause of nervous exhaustion, hysteria, and increasing insanity, and of innumerable manifestations in music, fiction, and plastic art, of an unhealthy emotionalism, begotten of neurotic and erotic degeneration.

In the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche we have the attempt to reduce all this to a philosophical theory, and to present its logical implications. Nietzsche assumes that Darwinism, in its most radical form of Weismannism, is the only true account of man's place in nature, the only true presentation of man's own nature and possible destiny. To ignore it is only to be an ostrich, hiding your head in the sand; to combat it, as Huxley advises, is only to kick against the pricks with an imbecile uselessness that Paul never dreamed of. You may attempt, if you like, to make men "good" in that sense which includes compassion and disinterestedness; but all you will get for your pains is a race of dyspeptics, anæmics, and neurotics, whose pathway to everlasting darkness will be not less broad and straight, but only less grewsome than the swift extinction which falls to the unfit when natural selection is unimpeded. Therefore, according to Nietzsche's philosophy, men of sense should set their faces sternly against everything that smacks of softness, forgiveness, and conventional morality. Above all, they should condemn and combat the traditional Christianity and all romantic ideals of equality. "Equality to the equal, inequality to the unequal, — that," he says, "would be the true teaching of justice." That which men should strive for is physiological

power, perfect physiological naturalness. Whatever is more than these cometh of evil. Might really does make right; and power, will, ability, the biological perfection of the race, — these are the only sure marks of excellence.

Here we have the complete and radical contradiction of that radical, literal type of Christianity which Tolstoï represents. Tolstoï and Nietzsche, these are the opposite poles of nineteenth-century thought. That Nietzsche lives in a lunatic asylum, to which the authorities have consigned him, and that Tolstoï, in the belief of some of his readers, dwells in a lunatic asylum of his own devising, should not complicate the issue for our minds. Each man has been sane enough, or sane long enough, to give unmistakable expression to a perfectly definite, comprehensible thought.

The criticism of these contradictory notions may best begin with the reflection that, if the present characteristics and activities of mankind are themselves products of evolution and continuing manifestations of its process, the process itself does not tend toward the severely simple form of the struggle for existence of which Nietzsche approves; and it is as yet very far from ending in that absolute panmixia which might result from the perfect application of Tolstoï's view to the everyday lives of civilized men. To a great extent the mass of mankind is still engaged in combat, aggression, conquest, and remorseless competition. It has not gotten rid of all its cruel instincts or suppressed the passion of vengeance. Yet it tempers its brutality with sympathy; it offsets selfishness with generosity; and it supplements its outbursts of anger with mercy and forgiveness. As a mere fact of observation, then, it is clear that neither the philosophy of Nietzsche nor that of Tolstoï is a true picture of reality. And if we are really evolutionists in our faith, this fact should go far to satisfy us that neither of these philosophies is a satisfactory statement of truth.

Turning, then, to a more explicit scientific criticism, let us ask whether the conclusions of Nietzsche are really contained in his premises, and then ask whether the teaching of Tolstoï, though in no way corresponding to present reality, may after

all be a true account of the goal toward which human evolution is tending.

The real premise from which the conclusions of Nietzsche are drawn is the fact that an actual struggle for existence does doom to nervous disorder, to mental and moral abnormity, and to ultimate extinction, those family stocks that are persistently weak or unsound in a purely physiological sense. Beyond any doubt, physiological power, physiological vigour, is the only enduring basis of human excellence. Any contrary doctrine is a form of the self-destructive philosophy that existence itself is an evil.

The error, then, of Nietzsche and of his disciples is not in their assumption of this major premise. We shall find that it consists in a totally inadequate conception of the myriad forms in which physiological power may manifest itself, through that process of differentiation which is an essential phase of all true evolution. This is really equivalent to saying — as will clearly appear in the sequel — that the maxim that might makes right, in this abstract form in which we commonly hear it quoted, is neither true nor untrue, but only meaningless. It is equivalent to saying that might makes right or makes wrong, according to the form of the might. Might differentiated, physiological power manifesting itself through unnumbered different channels duly coördinated — this might makes right and is right. Might crude, undifferentiated, contending against might differentiated and organized, makes for wrong and is wrong.

Let us get further into the meaning of these rather enigmatical phrases. What is the measure of physiological power? Accurately speaking, it is the amount of energy absorbed, stored up, transformed, and given forth by an organism. In the last analysis, all scientific measurements are given in terms of energy, and no others are possible. Accepting, then, this measure, shall we find that a strong, healthy savage, capable of slaying any foe who might be pitted against him in a brutal duel, is necessarily a man of greater physiological power than an intelligent business or professional man in a civilized community? Without quite saying so, Nietzsche leaves his

readers in no doubt whatever that he uncritically assumes the savage to be physiologically the stronger man. Actual tests, however, by refined scientific methods might possibly, or even probably, demonstrate that the civilized man is an organism drawing from its environment and giving forth in work vastly more energy than the savage. To take a simple illustration, the explorer would have to search long and far to find a savage who, day after day, for ten hours a day and six days in the week, could strike the number of blows on an anvil regularly struck by an ordinary blacksmith in an American country village. To take a more complex illustration, not one savage in ten thousand is capable of storing up and giving forth the amount of mere physical energy — absolutely irrespective of any skill in the performance — that is expended night after night by an average violin player in a good modern orchestra. Or once more, it is doubtful if anywhere on the surface of the earth the savage could be found whose power to absorb and give forth energy in the slightest degree approaches that of the business manager of a great modern railway system, whose vitality is expended in the thermal, electric, and chemical changes of brain activity.

Thus when we come to look into the matter in a strictly scientific way, we find absolutely no basis for the assumption that, in point of mere physiological power, the animals and savages whose struggle for existence is carried on entirely by crude modes of self-assertion and combat, are superior to men whose struggle for existence is a vastly more complicated process, and includes — auxiliary or antagonistic elements, as you please — the factors of compassion and coöperation. Writers like Nietzsche have made the assumption only because they have failed to see that when energy is distributed through innumerable channels instead of being concentrated in one or two — when, in short, differentiation of the organism and its activities has taken place, — the phenomenon is none the less one of the redistribution of matter and motion; and that quite possibly the energy which is being discharged through a million channels, although nearly imperceptible to the untrained observer, is

enormously greater in amount than that which is being crudely and abruptly discharged in one or two primitive ways.

The only other form in which the problem could be put by disciples of Nietzsche would be an assertion that, after all, the performance of the individual is not the important thing; that the physiological vitality essential to the race is that which takes the form of a transmission of unimpaired and increasing vigour to posterity. This proposition might be admitted without in any degree helping the case of those who assail the kindly virtues, as tending to undermine physical power in the long run. For, obviously, if it be true that civilized man to-day does, on the whole, expend in various ways far more energy than his savage prototype expended, it follows that the modes of evolutionary progress which have produced civilization — and with it compassion, the desire for equality, and all the other ideal feelings — have not really impaired the power of the race to perpetuate its physiological vigour in posterity. In short, without any violation of scientific method, the whole problem may summarily be disposed of by reminding the reader that if a civilized nation is actually able to conquer and subdue an uncivilized nation of equal numbers, the civilized nation has greater physiological vigour, and represents the better line of heredity.

Therefore what we actually get out of the Darwinian philosophy, when it is worked out to the radical conclusion that physiological vigour is the basis, and for all time must continue to be the test, of policies, expediencies, moralities, and idealisms, is simply this: while we are justified in assuming that no course of conduct can be ethically right if it ends in physical deterioration, and that therefore might, after all, is the basis of right; and while, as Nietzsche says, the will to live, the will to be powerful, is the radical form of all right feeling and right thinking; we are bound by every consideration of scientific accuracy to apply this test only after making sure that we have taken stock of all the possible modes of power, have observed all the possible channels through which energy may be transformed by the organism.

So doing, we shall always have the principle of differentiation as a minor test of the relative values of differing embodiments of power. The differentiated, organized form is the right one, unless there is clear proof that differentiation diminishes power in quantity. In brief, our complete test is this: those modes of conduct are right which increase the total physiological power of the race and differentiate its forms, or which differentiate its forms without diminishing its amount.

Among the forms in which might is distributed as it becomes differentiated, must be included sympathy and all its products. We need not stop to argue that sympathy in its origin is a physiological phenomenon, a mode of motor impulse, quite as much a form of energy as the contraction of muscle which seizes and masticates prey. It would be a ludicrous ignorance of all scientific facts which should leave sympathy out of the inventory of manifestations of power.

Not less are all the higher virtues — philanthropy, compassion, and forgiveness — manifestations of power. They have their origin in sympathy, and are simply differentiations of motor impulses and modes of expending energy. Moreover, it is only the men that have energy to spare who are normally altruistic. On the physiological side, altruism is a mode of expenditure of any surplus energy that has been left over from successful individual struggle. The meek shall inherit the earth, not because they are meek, but because, taking one generation with another, it is only the mighty that are or can be meek, and because the mighty — if normally evolved — are also by differentiation meek.

This, then, is the conception that we gain by comparing those facts which in the concrete are collectively lumped as "right," with facts that must be accepted as right if Darwinism is true. Darwinism affirms that total right equals might. The greater might overcomes the lesser; the greater survives, and must be accepted as right on the whole. Humanity, on the other hand, says that differentiated might equals right. According to our traditional notions, it is only when might has taken the varied forms of justice,

sympathy, compassion, and helpfulness, that it becomes right.

Now, a complete conception of evolution reveals to us the fact that might can be differentiated into numberless specialized forms, without diminishing its total amount. Indeed, as far any particular organism or group of organisms is concerned, there may be a continuing increase of the total amount of power that it expends, and a continuing differentiation of its forms. Integration and differentiation may, and normally do, proceed together. The history of the race shows that there are organized nations, also, which have continually differentiated their might while increasing its total amount. Thus, from all these facts, we arrive at the conclusion that right is the differentiation of might without diminution of its amount.

In this limitation, — in this proof that the total amount of human power must not be diminished while its forms are undergoing change and specialization, we have the one invaluable contribution of Darwinism to moral philosophy, and the one vital truth in the otherwise exaggerated and often perverse teachings of Nietzsche. In two distinct ways the individual may disregard the moral law. He may rest satisfied in the enjoyment and display of power in its crudest expression, making no effort to differentiate it into those varied and beautiful forms which the traditions of humanity have described as modes of right or goodness. Such a man is properly regarded as brutal; for such, literally, he is. He remains in the animal stage of evolution. Or the individual may pursue the higher modes of activity, centring his attention upon the possibilities of variation until he has lost his grip upon the sources of power, and begins to lose some measure of that total energy which is available for any purpose of life. The nation, in like manner, may rest satisfied in a merely brutal career of power, manifesting itself in the crude forms of conquest and material splendour, caring nothing for those higher modes of effort that are traditionally called right, including justice and charity. Or, on the other hand, it may so exclusively give attention to these varied and higher modes of

activity that it neglects the fundamental duty of maintaining its vigour and total power. It may even attempt to suppress the competitions that are an essential part of the struggle for existence, and coddle the worthless until deterioration begins. There can be no doubt that indiscriminate benevolence may increase panmixia, as it certainly does when paupers and criminals are permitted to breed like rabbits, while men of sturdier power add but few descendants to the race. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that some nations in a higher degree than others suffer from neurotic ills and a diminishing birth-rate.

Thus, according to our moral rule, nations and individuals alike should try not only to direct their energies into channels of beneficence and forgiveness, but also to discover what limits are set to their altruism by their staying power. In short, it is an obvious conclusion from our conception of the double aspect of the moral problem, that men ought to cultivate both the gentle virtues and the qualities that go with sturdy contest. Their lives should exhibit both of the fundamental phenomena of evolution, namely, the integration of power and its differentiation.

It is here that we discover the true origin of a curious moral fact which has baffled, not only the uninstructed man in his philosophizing, but also the philosopher in his attempts to account for the vagaries of the uninstructed man: the fact, namely, that humanity in the aggregate, attempting to adjust itself by groping and experiment to the fundamental conditions of life, has solved its problem in a rough experimental way by establishing two different and seemingly contradictory moral standards. Readers of Mr. Spencer's book on "The Study of Sociology" will remember the sarcasm with which he describes our ingenuous devotion to these two conflicting standards. Six days in the week we diligently follow the precepts of the religion of competition; on the seventh we as diligently contemplate the beauties of the religion of compassion. Mr. Spencer accurately traces this contradiction in conduct back to its origins in social experiences of the past; but he might have gone yet farther, and

have shown that, in reality, it is as fundamental as the distinction between the integrational and the differentiational aspects of universal evolution itself. While evolution continues, two standards are inevitable, and we must try as best we can to reconcile or coördinate them. As long as coördination is still imperfect, we must at one time be hostile, at another time benevolent; at one time remorseless, at another time compassionate, unless we are prepared to see all moral activity disappear in brutality on the one hand, or in degeneration on the other.

This is exactly what the practical world has always avowed, and what the theorists, dogmatists, and uncompromising idealists have always tried to get away from. The Nietzsches would go to one extreme, the Tolstoïs to another. Meanwhile, men in general try to find the reciprocal limitations of their conflicting standards.

The attempt has not been guided to any great extent by philosophy. The adjustment has been made tentatively, experimentally, more by groping than by thinking, and it has been continued through a long historical process. Only by glancing back over this history in rapid review can we discover whether, on the whole, we are still the primitive egoists that Nietzsche would approve, or sympathetic, if not always close and believing, followers of Count Tolstoï.

We must go back to that little group of blood kindred which was the earliest human community. A few brothers and sisters, recognizing their maternal kinship, maintained a common lair or camp, struggled together against beast and nature, and together obtained food supplies. Within that little band the competition of the Darwinian struggle had, in a measure, ceased. Toward all life that lay beyond the circle the rule was unrelenting war. Here, then, at the outset of human life, the two standards were already established. Helpfulness, compassion, forgiveness even, were right and expedient within the group. Remorseless enmity, cruelty, treachery, any expedient was right toward those men or creatures against which the band must struggle for its own existence.

By the combination of such small hordes, in relatively large aggregates, tribes were formed. By the federation of tribes, leagues or confederacies were formed. By the consolidation of leagues, nations and states were formed. By the consolidation of petty states, the vast territorial nations of modern times were formed. And practically all of this integration was accomplished by war.

At every stage in this progress, the double standard of conduct has been assumed and maintained. Those within a society organized by confederation or consolidation have regarded themselves as allies, and as having more to gain from a suppression of the harsher features of the struggle for existence among themselves than by permitting them to continue. This conclusion they have derived from their experience of what Professor Karl Pearson has called the "extra-group struggle." That is to say, a nation has always obtained a larger sum total of benefits from a struggle *en masse* with other nations *en masse* than it has obtained from the lesser struggles of its component groups against one another, or from the still more minute struggles of its individual units against one another. This has happened because the extra-group struggle of nation against nation has afforded abundant opportunities for individuals to distinguish themselves and to develop their distinctive qualities, even when conflicts with tribal brethren or fellow-citizens have ceased; and because, also, the hardships of the extra-group struggle — the poverty, pestilence, and taxation resulting from war — have exterminated great numbers of the unfit within each nation. In short, intertribal and international struggles have thus far continued the processes of natural selection; and, notwithstanding the growth of sympathy and benevolence within the nation, panmixia has not yet in more than one or two important instances prevented a gradual accumulation of power, while its differentiation has continued.

A closer examination of the internal phenomena of human societies shows us, furthermore, that the extension of sympathy and the gentler virtues from horde to tribe, from tribe to nation, has proceeded only as fast as a conception of like-

ness among the incorporated elements of the enlarged community has grown up in the minds of the people. The notion of the stranger and the notion of the enemy were identical in the early days of human struggle, and the identity has never wholly disappeared. In reality, it is only among those who regard themselves as in some sense brethren, as being either of one blood or spiritually akin, with agreeing ideas and common purposes, that non-resistance is a strictly natural, spontaneous phenomenon. Divergence of view and conflicting purposes normally provoke antagonism. Consequently, the growth of pacific forms of conduct, the gradual ceasing of strife, and the growth of habits of non-resistance have been made possible only by the spread of knowledge; by the better comprehension of one another by men who once misunderstood one another; by the perfecting of communication and of social intercourse; and by a gradual assimilation, through imitation and reciprocal instruction, of different men to a common type. In a word, non-aggression and non-resistance are an outcome of homogeneity.

A further inspection of the detail of the process shows us also that when men are in agreement upon fundamental matters of great importance for the purposes of everyday life, they may live in outward harmony, actually maintaining habits of non-aggression and non-resistance as far as physical combat is concerned, while differing radically in minor matters, and maintaining the fiercest kind of industrial, commercial, and intellectual struggles. As everybody knows, this is the state of things that exists at the present day in nations like the United States, where actual warfare of section against section, or of class against class, is practically unknown; where riot and insurrection are rare; and where, as compared with the internal disorder of ancient times, individual assaults are infrequent. There is fundamental agreement in such a population upon certain great principles of civil organization, of individual liberty, of standards of conduct, and of loyalty to a common destiny. In all lesser matters there is the widest difference; and in its commercial and intellectual modes the struggle for existence is fiercely continued.

We are now in sight of our conclusion upon the main question, whether habits of non-aggression and non-resistance in respect of the grosser modes of conflict are likely to be established in the further course of human progress, and whether they can be established without entailing race deterioration.

At the present time nearly the whole population of the world is distributed among great nations and their colonial dependencies. Within the more enlightened nations, habits of non-aggression and non-resistance largely dominate the affairs of private life. To predict when like habits will govern international relations would be rash in the highest degree.

Because, unless the course of history is to be reversed, further progress in this direction will be made only through a further absorption of small states and dependencies in larger political aggregates. Unless the whole course of history is meaningless for the future, there is to be no cessation of war — of extra-group competition — until vast empires embrace all nations. Whether in such empires compassion will co-exist with overpowering might, or whether the suppression of conflict among component parts will be followed by a hopeless race deterioration, will depend on the character of prevailing political systems. If they are highly centralized, if they stamp out local liberty, suppress individual initiative, and establish socialism, they will end in degeneration. But if, in all matters except that general loyalty to a common destiny, to a common standard of conduct, and to liberty, which is the one thing necessary for imperial unity, they tolerate local and ethnic differences, and protect individual freedom — if, in short, they are democratic empires — there will still be struggle and competition enough to ensure the continuation of natural selection.

Only when the democratic empire has compassed the uttermost parts of the world will there be that perfect understanding among men which is necessary for the growth of moral kinship. Only in the spiritual brotherhood of that secular republic, created by blood and iron not less than by thought and love, will the kingdom of heaven be established on the earth.

NOTE

The following papers and addresses, in whole or in part, have been incorporated in this volume:

"The Ethical Motive," *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume VIII. Number 3, April, 1898.

"The Psychology of Society," *Science*, New Series Volume IX., Number 210, January 6, 1899.

"The Practical Value of Sociology" ("The Mind of the Many"). An Address before the General Session of the First Annual Meeting of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, at Philadelphia, on the evening of April 11, 1898. Not hitherto published.

"The Ethics of Social Progress" ("The Costs of Progress"), *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume III., Number 2, January, 1893. (Included also in "Philanthropy and Social Progress," edited by Professor Henry C. Adams, Boston, T. Y. Crowell & Co., 1893).

Editorial and special articles in *Work and Wages* ("Industrial Democracy"), Springfield, Mass., 1886–1887.

"The Ethics of Socialism" ("Industrial Democracy"), *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume I., Number 2, January, 1891.

"Combinations of Capital in Relation to National Prosperity" ("The Trusts and the Public"). A paper read at the Annual Meeting of The American Paper and Pulp Association, in New York City, February 17, 1898. Printed in Proceedings of the Association, 1898.

"The Railroads and the State," *The Chatauquan*, Volume X., Number 4, January, 1890.

"Malthusianism and Working Women" ("Some Results of the Freedom of Women"), *The Ethical Record*, Volume III., Number 2, July, 1890.

"The Nature and Conduct of Political Majorities," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume VII., Number 1, March, 1892.

"The Destinies of Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume XI., Number 4, December, 1896.

"The Relation of Social Democracy to the Higher Education." A Commencement Address delivered at Bryn Mawr College, June 7, 1894. Privately printed, but not hitherto published.

"The Popular Instruction most Necessary in a Democracy." A lecture of the Cambridge (Mass.) "Conferences" Series, November 4, 1898. Not hitherto published.

"The Shadow and the Substance of Republican Government," *The Independent*, Volume XLIX., Number 2,560, December 23, 1897.

"Imperialism." A paper read before the New York Academy of Political Science on the evening of November 29, 1899. Published in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume XIII., Number 4, December, 1898.

"The Survival of Civil Liberty." A Commencement Address delivered at Oberlin College, June 21, 1899. Not hitherto published.

"The Ideals of Nations." A lecture of the Carew Foundation, delivered at the Hartford Theological Seminary on the evening of March 1, 1899. Not hitherto published.

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